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An Uncertain Year of the Goat
On 15 February 2015, four days before the start of the Lunar New Year, Xi 
Jinping met with local residents in the Yanta district 雁塔区 of Xi’an. He 
admired the Spring Festival papercuts they had made and selected one 
with a traditional ‘three goats’ 三羊 design. Photographs of Xi holding the 
papercut in both hands, and other photographs of him chatting or shaking 
hands with different groups of people in Xi’an, soon appeared in print and 
online. Xi has often called Xi’an, the site of China’s famous ancient capital 
Chang’an, his hometown—he was born in Fuping county 富平县, only an 
hour’s drive away. These images, which projected an aura of harmonious 
cordiality between a beaming General Secretary of China’s Communist 
Party and people who appeared visibly excited to be in close physical prox-
imity to him, marked an auspicious start to the Year of the Goat for China’s 
one-party state.   
As the first day of the Year of the Goat approached in 2015, Chinese 
cities and towns were awash with advertisements, festive banners, and 
papercuts featuring ‘three-goat’ designs. Luxury Swiss watch companies 
keen to capitalise on the appetite for goat symbolism among wealthy 
Chinese customers produced limited edition watches featuring single 
and triple goat designs. ‘Three goats’ is a visual 
pun for hexagram eleven in the early Chinese 
classic, the Book of Changes. The hexagram, 
which symbolises ‘grandeur’ 泰, consists at its 
base of ‘three yang lines’ 三阳 (that is, unbroken 
lines). The hexagram’s top three lines are yin 
(broken) lines. This symmetrical arrangement of 
three yang lines and three yin lines is regarded 
as highly auspicious. For divinatory purposes, 
the hexagram augurs greatness: ‘the three yang lines pave the way to 
grandeur’ 三阳开泰. This saying has long served as a New Year greeting 
and is especially popular during goat years because ‘three goats’ and 
‘three yang lines’ are both pronounced san yang in Chinese. Hence the 
saying is also often written as: ‘May the three goats bring grandeur your 
way’ 三羊开泰.
However, the festive euphoria of the week-long Spring Festival 
celebrations (18–24 February) was overshadowed by ongoing, widespread 
anxieties about pollution and financial volatility. The 2015 Yearbook is 
titled Pollution but environment and economy are interlinked in complex 
ways that preoccupied both Party and people throughout 2015. 
Goat symbolism: Jaquet Droz 
Ateliers d’Art watches cele-
brating the Year of the Goat
Source: timetransformed.com
























































The state-imposed presence of a ‘collective vision’ has enabled us to 
organise each of our Yearbooks around a theme that illuminates a key 
feature of life and society in the People’s Republic during that year. For 
2012, it was the rise of China’s ‘red boomers’ (or ‘revolutionary successors’, 
the ‘princeling’ children of the first generation of Chinese Communist 
leaders). Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai had emerged in the late 2000s as the 
two most prominent of these ‘red boomers’. That year saw the political 
demise of Bo and the rise of Xi to the leadership of both Party and state as 
chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the People’s 
Republic of China. In 2013, we considered the prominence accorded to 
‘civilisation’ in China’s official and public culture and discourse that 
year, with state-led ‘civilising’ projects in fields as varied as economics, 
education, politics, and social and urban planning. In 2014, Xi Jinping’s 
vision of China as leading a regional ‘community of shared destiny’ led us 
to explore how, as the world became increasingly dependent on China’s 
economic prosperity, the Chinese government and Chinese citizens were 
also finding a place for themselves in the world. 
As with the themes of previous years, we have chosen a Chinese 
character, 染 ran, to express the idea of the 2015’s theme of pollution. 
The basic meaning of the verb 染 is ‘to dye’ and it appears in the range 
of compound words that are used to describe different forms of dyeing, 
including the ‘dyeing’ (painting) of fingernails and toenails 染指甲 ran zhi jia.
By extension, 染 has also come to mean pollution in the sense of an 
agent or force that produces a negative change in an object, person or 
substance. Accordingly, 染 is part of the Chinese word for pollution 污染 
wuran. The word meant ‘contamination’ or ‘defilement’ in its premodern 
usage, of which a well-known instance appears in a statement attributed 
to the seer Guan Lu 管辂 (209–256) in the third century work, Records of 
the Three Kingdoms 三国志: ‘The bleeding bodies of dead soldiers defile 
the hills and mountains’ 军尸流血，污染丘山. As a modern word wuran 
refers mainly to environmental pollution and appears in terms denot-
ing particular types of pollution, such as air pollution 空气污染 or the 
pollution of drinking water 饮水污染. Other negative connotations of the 
verb 染 include the Buddhist-derived expression ‘to acquire a bad habit’ 染
恶习 ran e'xi; the term for ‘contracting an infectious disease’ 染病 ranbing, 
and the compound verb 染指 ranzhi, which refers to inappropriate uses of 
power and overreaching influence (whether of a country, group or indi-
vidual). For instance, in January 2015, China’s state media used the phrase 
‘encroachments on cultural circles’ 染指文化圈 to publicise the launch of 
the state’s investigations into how corrupt officials were manipulating the 
workings of China’s elite art market. These varied senses of 染 capture 
something of the complex trajectories of pollution as a Chinese idea. 
Also, as in previous years, the organisation of the chapters, forums, 
and information windows reflects the research themes of the Australian 
Centre on China in the World, including justice, numbers, text, time, ur-
ban, and everyday life, with specific focuses on culture and foreign rela-
tions (with special attention to China’s relations with Australia). We ex-
plore the relation between pollution and money through such questions 
as: Why have so many Chinese farmers chosen to gamble on the stock 
market instead of investing in farm equipment? Why, despite predictable 
environmental consequences, has Xi Jinping’s administration pushed so 
hard for the restructuring of the city of Beijing and the creation of the 
A fragment of the 
























































massive city-region called Jing-Jin-Ji (encompassing Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Hebei)? Why have the party-state’s commitments to resolve environmental 
problems in China, including the considerable suite of environmental laws 
it has already enacted, achieved very little to date? It is not only China that 
is ‘under the dome’ of its pollution (to borrow the title of a popular—and 
then suppressed—2015 documentary on pollution that is also the title of 
the opening chapter by Jane Golley). The country’s ambitious plans for a 
‘new silk road’ over land and sea in particular illustrate how we all share 
the same sky.
We also reflect on the further extension in 2015 of the party’s ‘mass 
education’ campaign that was first launched in 2013. Xi’s administration 
has shown a particular determination to ‘reform’ Chinese minds. As Chi-
na’s ‘opening up’ and integration with the global economy proceeds apace, 
the Party appears all the more intent on prescribing what citizens can 
and cannot do, write and even think. Accordingly, ‘Reform and Opening 
Up’ has acquired a highly particular connotation at odds with its original 
meaning. As the post-Maoist party-state’s guiding motto throughout the 
1980s (it was first introduced in December 1978), the slogan signalled a 
commitment to gradual political liberalisation (though never full democ-
ratisation) to complement the economic reforms already underway. 
Throughout 2015, the government led by Xi has sought to more 
effectively align the thinking of its citizens with that of the Party through 
new restrictions on the nation’s educational curriculum (particularly at 
university level), tightened censorship, and an unprecedented crackdown 
on rights and civil society activism that resulted in the arrest of more than 
one hundred 'rights-defence' 维权 lawyers and activists in July 2015. The 
current Party leadership’s understanding of political ‘reform’ is nowhere 
more evident than in its interpretation of the rule of law as a governing 
tool aimed at the preservation of the Party’s authority. 
The year also saw the continued prosecution of corrupt party and 
state officials: a key event being the closed-door trial in June 2015 of Zhou 
Yongkang, former head of China’s all-powerful state security. In 2015, the 
Party-state also introduced tougher penalties for environmental pollution, 
pressed on with massive building and infrastructure construction as part 
of the urbanisation drive, built more artificial islands in the South China 
Sea, and drew up an action plan for China’s global economic role, based 
on the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk 
Road’ initiatives first proposed by Xi in late 2013. In their public statements 
on these matters, party leaders and official spokespersons resolutely 
presented a grand narrative about China’s present and future. 
However, events that challenged that narrative appeared to have 
taken them by surprise, eliciting less certain, even erratic behaviour. 
For instance, officials praised Chai Jing’s 柴静 phenomenally successful 
documentary on air pollution and environmental degradation Under 
the Dome 穹顶之下 when it was released online on 28 February 2015 
but shut it down three days later—after it had been viewed almost 200 
million times. From June 2015, as prices tumbled on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges, the government moved rapidly from trying to 
prop up share prices with public funds to introducing incentives to boost 
investor confidence, to introducing penalties for short selling and finally 






















































demanding that China’s top brokerages invest funds to stabilise the stock 
market. Disjunctures between planning and reality are a problem for 
governments everywhere. In China, the opaque nature of the one-party 
system complicates the picture. But this authoritarian system also means 
the state is involved in everyone’s life—and various Internet forums 
readily expose the gaps and contradictions between the party’s narrative 
of a ‘collective vision’ and the diverse stories of average citizens. These 
gaps and contradictions have served as a framing device for the China 
Story Yearbook project since its launch in 2012. 
On Pollution
Pollution is both an om-
nipresent physical haz-
ard for people living in 
mainland China and a 
powerful metaphor for 
the things the current 
regime sees as a threat 
to its ability to maintain 
power and the People’s 
Republic itself. Xi’s ad-
ministration seeks to 
eradicate not only the 
pollution of the natural 
elements (air, water, soil), 
but also ‘polluting’ ideas and those whom they have identified as agents 
of these polluting ideas (whether individuals, groups, or organisations).
Back in 1983, when he was trying to work out how to reform the 
economy while keeping control over society, ideas, and politics, Deng 
Xiaoping launched an ‘anti-spiritual pollution’ 反对精神污染 campaign 
to silence critics, clamp down on newly emerging social freedoms and 
The National Times, 13–19 January 1984
Source: thechinastory.org
cleanse the cultural scene of 
such pollutants as abstract 
art, pop music, and ‘misty’ 
poetry 朦胧诗. The Party’s 
fear of spiritual pollution 
never quite went away, but 
it has intensified under Xi 
Jinping since 2013. In May 
2015, at the height of the 
party-state’s crackdown on 
dissenting voices in media, 
law, and academe, Xi Jinping stated: ‘Political and natural ecology are 
the same—neglect them even a little and they will very quickly become 
contaminated’.  
Xi’s rhetoric marks a decisive shift away from the approaches 
adopted by the previous administrations under Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) 
and Hu Jintao (2002–2012). Towards the end of his tenure in 2001, as 
socioeconomic inequalities deepened in China, Jiang introduced the 
concept of the ‘Three Represents’ 三个代表 to affirm the role of wealthy 
businesspeople in the nation’s economic development and to consolidate 
the links between the one-party system and private enterprise. As Jiang’s 
successor, Hu continued to strengthen this relationship while promoting 
a ‘harmonious society’ as a way of managing the growing gulf between 
haves and have-nots. Both Jiang and Hu relied on the collective style of 
management that Deng established at the Party’s historic Third Plenum in 
1978 and that formally ended the Maoist era.
Xi, conversely, has demanded that even the upper echelons of the 
Party submit to his leadership as he focused on eradicating corruption 
in the party’s ranks, a task which the two previous administrations also 
prosecuted but with much less success. In this process, Xi, departed 
significantly from the collective work style of his two immediate 
predecessors. Throughout 2015, party publications and state media 
Futu, Hebei: 'Practice the Thought of Three Represents, 






















































energetically promoted Xi’s image as a strong, enlightened, and morally 
superior leader. He has spoken of forging cadres (especially high-level 
cadres) with ‘four iron’ qualities ‘四铁’干部: an ‘iron-like’ belief and faith 
in the Party and an iron-clad discipline and sense of responsibility.  
Under Xi, the Chinese government views the country’s environmental 
problems and ideological consolidation as inextricably linked. They 
perceive cleaning the nation’s air, safeguarding its land, and purifying 
the water of its rivers, lakes, and coast as requiring not only scientific, 
technological and policy solutions but ideological commitment and a 
dedicated cadre of party and government officials as well.
This China Story Yearbook 2015 tracks three narratives of pollution: 
Environmental Pollution
Land-grabbing ur-




ture in China under 
stress. Several of our 
stories describe how 
both governments 
(central and local) 
and citizens have 
dealt with and re-
sponded to the challenges of pollution and contamination. We also look at 
how pollution has come to play a defining role in urban design and mega- 
city planning in the north and the repercussions of pollution on China’s 
growth. 
We also consider the complexities of implementing expensive and 
massive engineering solutions to address water scarcity and pollution 
and how cities struggle to provide a livable environment for an urban 
population destined to grow dramatically over the next decade. We note 
Dead fish floating in a contaminated river in Anhui province
Source: ah.people.cn
how a massive, catastrophic chemical explosion in an urban industri-
al warehouse in Tianjin in August 2015 exposed shortcomings in areas 
ranging from regulation to security and safety and emergency response 
preparedness that were the results of rapid and poorly planned industri-
alisation and how this incident exacerbated anxiety around the subject of 
pollution in both the populace and the leadership. 
Ideological Pollution
The Chinese government’s intensification of censorship and propagan-
da is an important part of the 2015 China story. We provide accounts of 
how it has sought to banish ‘Western values’ (meaning, broadly, ideas of 
a liberal democratic persuasion) from university classrooms, and how, in 
linking ‘de-Westernisation’ to a strengthening of ‘Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’, it has further politicised China’s legal system in the name 
of reform. 
In 2015, while tightening existing restrictions on free discussion, the 
party-state gave free reign to online abuse against the idea and promoters 
of Taiwanese independence. In the months leading up to the Taiwanese 
general election of 16 January 2016, and as the party leadership redoubled 
its efforts to strengthen diplomatic and trade ties with Taiwan, nationalistic 
Chinese netizens denounced Taiwanese independence. Some even called 
it a ‘polluting’ idea. For instance, an opinion piece of 24 November 2015 in 






















































the Fujian Daily included this line: 
‘Waste pollution and air pollution 
makes us angry but the “pollution” 
of “Taiwanese independence” is 
much more hateful’. When Tsai 
Ing-wen of the pro-independence 
Democratic Progressive Party was 
elected as Taiwan’s first female 
president, media commentators 
speculated that Taiwanese resentment at abusive online mainland 
discourse had played a part in the DPP’s landslide victory.  
Agents of Pollution
If things and ideas can be polluted, so can people. In June 2015, the trial of 
Zhou Yongkang was reported in ways that signaled the Party leadership’s 
determination to root out the ‘contagion’ of corruption, even if it meant 
taking down people in high positions. Zhou’s family members and many 
other senior Party and state officials linked to him have since gone down 
as well, and almost every province has experienced the fall of at least one 
important leader. 
Under Xi, the government has targeted many ‘unhealthy’ practices. 
This year saw the introduction of strict new regulations to ban smokers 
from public places and the imposition of heavy fines for disobedience. 
However, people who mounted their own campaigns risked being viewed 
as pollutants themselves. When the ‘Feminist Five’ sought to raise aware-
ness of sexual harassment on public transportation in March 2015, they 
were arrested, and other activists defending, for example, the rights of 
minorities, were also detained. To prevent the contagion effects of social 
activism, public security authorities throughout 2015 frequently charged 




When a newly-appointed Xi Jinping 
announced in November 2012 that 
achieving the ‘Chinese Dream’ 中国
梦 would be his primary goal, people 
had little idea of how far he would go 
to protect his vision from perceived 
contaminants and threats. In 2015 
and early 2016, an energetic debate 
has taken place outside China on the 
question of whether he—and China’s 
Communist party-state—would suc-
ceed or, ultimately, collapse.
The dissident blogger Mo Zhixu 莫之许 (pen name of Zhao Hui 赵
晖) wrote in April 2016 on Chinaorg.com that the previous year had seen 
a shift in the views of ‘mainstream Western scholars’ about ‘the future 
prospects for Chinese Communist rule’. They had previously argued, he 
observed, that China’s authoritarian regime would remain ‘resilient’, a 
thesis first elaborated by Columbia University-based political scientist 
Andrew Nathan in 2003. But now they were seemingly defending the 
opposite view. The ‘resilience and adaptation’ argument perceived 
the regime as uniquely capable of adapting to changing conditions 
and using its institutions to manage conflicts and transitions. In 2015, 
David Shambaugh, an influential American analyst of Chinese affairs 
and professor of politics at George Washington University, a previous 
supporter of the ‘resilience and adaptation’ argument, published a book, 
China’s Future, that featured a big question mark on its cover. Shambaugh 
was now predicting the progressive and ultimately fatal decline of China’s 
one-party system, as were commentators like Pei Minxin 裴敏欣, professor 
of government at Claremont McKenna College, who had long warned that 
Chinese communism was ‘trapped’ in ‘transition’. Pei more recently began 























































Whether or not one subscribes to the particular views held by 
Mo, Shambaugh, and others, it is undeniable that academic and online 
commentary about China’s ‘unstable and unsettled’ future is on the rise, 
including, to the extent allowed by China’s rigorous system of censorship, 
within China itself. Certainly, China suffers from rampant corruption, 
the flight of domestic capital, an ideology that struggles for true believers 
among China’s citizens, increasing repression of dissent (real or imagined) 
by an increasingly insecure regime and an economy with deep structural 
weaknesses. However, none of these phenomena are new, and they 
haven’t taken China to the brink yet. 
In his review of Shambaugh’s China’s 
Future, historian Jeffrey Wasserstrom of 
the University of California Irvine agreed 
with much of Shambaugh’s analysis, 
but did not ‘buy [Shambaugh’s] notion 
that the past performance of developing 
countries provides a clear guide for 
China’s future’. Will 2015 herald the 
collapse of one-party rule in China or will 
it be merely the prelude to the one-party 
system’s solidification under Xi Jinping’s 
strongman tactics? The outcome will not 
depend on Xi’s decisions alone. 
Geremie Barmé, founding director of the Australian Centre on China 
in the World, used the term ‘collapsism’ to describe the raft of pessimistic 
predictions among those who professionally comment on Chinese affairs. 
In a March 2015 interview, he noted that such speculation among American 
commentators in particular may have more to do with ‘huge anxiety about 
US politics and its future’ than with China per se. Barmé remarked: ‘Xi’s 
China is uglier, more repressive, and narrow, yet it's more confident, more 
articulate and more focused than at any time since Mao Zedong. That's why 
America is worried’.  
Jeffrey Wasserstrom
Image: Steve Zylius, UCI Communications
THE CAUSEWAY BAY BOOKS INCIDENT, by Gloria Davies and Linda Jaivin
The disappearance between 
October and December 2015 
of five people who worked at 
Causeway Bay Books 铜锣湾书
店 in Hong Kong alarmed fellow 
booksellers, media, and a 
general populace already wary 
of mainland interference in 
free expression in Hong Kong, 
and sparked international 
outrage. Lam Wing-kee 林 
榮基, the bookshop’s founder 
and book editor Lee Bo 李波 
(the bookshop is involved in 
publishing as well) were abducted by mainland agents in Hong Kong and taken across the 
border. Gui Minhai 桂敏海, a major shareholder and Swedish national, was also abducted, 
but from his home in Pattaya, Thailand, drawing both Sweden and Thailand into the incident. 
The two others, publisher Cheung Jiping 張志平 and manager and shareholder Lui Bo 呂波, 
were detained by the police when they visited family in Guangdong.
Causeway Bay Books, which Lam founded in 1994 and was acquired by Mighty Current 
Media Ltd in 2014, had made its reputation publishing books about in-fighting, intrigues, 
and scandals among China’s party leaders, ‘red aristocrats’, and their families. 
If the ‘Causeway Bay Books Incident’ 铜锣湾书店事件 was intended to be a lesson to other 
independent booksellers and publishers in Hong Kong, it had mixed results. On the one 
hand it was widely condemned. On the other, at least one publisher lost nerve. Hong Kong’s 
Open Books had contracted the dissident writer Yu Jie 余杰 to publish his critical account of 
Xi’s administration, Xi Jinping’s Nightmare 習近平的噩夢, but informed Yu on 3 January 2016 
that they could not publish the book. Yu relayed the contents of the email sent to him on that 
day by Jin Zhong 金鐘, editor-in-chief at Open Books, in which Jin wrote: 
The difficulty of publishing political books in Hong Kong is already in the international 
spotlight. People in the industry are feeling great fear and pressure; they want to stay 
out of trouble so that they won’t be the next one [to disappear]. I received many calls 
from friends and family trying to persuade me. Because of that, we decided after much 
deliberation to suspend the publication of your work. 
By mid-2016, several of the Hong Kong-based booksellers had been allowed to return 
to Hong Kong, though the circumstances of their disappearance remains unclear, with Lam 
alleging serious mistreatment. 
Thousands of people took to the streets in Hong Kong to protest 























































Throughout 2015, many mainland public intellectuals have expressed 
dismay at the increasingly authoritarian nature of China’s political culture. 
The dismay spread beyond China’s borders when, between October and 
December 2015, Chinese state agents carried out cross-border abductions 
of three Hong Kong booksellers from Causeway Bay Books while detaining 
two more of the bookshop’s staff when they visited family in Guangdong 
province. The bookshop, with its reputation for publishing works critical 
of China’s Communist Party leadership and selling titles banned on the 
Mainland, had long been a thorn in the side of the Chinese government. 
The governments of Western democratic countries denounced these 
extra-territorial abductions, with senior government figures in the UK 
and Sweden pressing for the release of two of the detained booksellers 
who held, respectively, British and Swedish citizenship (see Information 
Window 'The Causeway Bay Books Incident', p.xxiii).  
In 2015, the Chinese government also continued to request assistance 
from other countries to repatriate corrupt Chinese officials who had fled 
overseas. At the same time, it established a new Department of Overseas 
Fugitive Affairs to pursue economic fugitives abroad. This posed new and 
difficult problems for the governments of Western democracies, appre-
hensive about returning people to face a highly politicised justice system. 
The term 染指 (mentioned earlier) allows us to say that, given the sub-
stantial amount of money that corrupt Chinese officials have transferred 
Economic fugitives are 
repatriated with the help of 
overseas governments
Photo: chinadaily.com.cn
abroad, Western democracies must now contend with the ‘encroaching’ 
effects of those ill-gotten gains as well as Xi’s anti-graft campaign. The in-
tricate networks of financial and political power that have enabled the 
families of senior party leaders, including Xi Jinping, to amass vast and un-
accountable fortunes, are now a global problem. As Chinese investments 
in commercial, industrial, and property developments outside China con-
tinue to grow, countries such as Australia whose economies have become 
heavily dependent on trade with and investment from China, are increas-
ingly forced to reckon with the country's political complexities.
There is clear popular support in China for Xi’s anti-graft campaign 
but the relationship between the Party and the people is a delicate 
balancing act. With unilateral decision-making comes enormous, almost 
paternal responsibility. The Party expects the people to obey its directives. 
In return, the people expect the Party to ‘serve the people’—to ensure their 
socioeconomic and environmental well-being, and in more far-reaching 
ways than is expected of governments in democratic societies. Whether 
the Party-state is able and willing to meet these needs and expectations is 
one factor, but a big one, in determining its future and that of China itself.
The China Story Yearbook
The China Story Yearbook is a project of the Australian Centre on China 
in the World (CIW) at The Australian National University (ANU). It is part 
of a broad undertaking aimed at understanding what we call the China 
Story 中国的故事, both as portrayed by official China, and from various 
other perspectives. Our Centre on China in the World is a Commonwealth 
Government-ANU initiative that was announced by then Australian prime 
minister, the Hon Kevin Rudd MP, in April 2010 on the occasion of the 
Seventieth George E. Morrison Lecture at ANU. Geremie Barmé was its 
director from its founding through to 2015.
The Centre is dedicated to a holistic approach to the study of 

















































and ideas at work in China as a means of understanding the spectrum 
of China’s sociopolitical and cultural realities. The Australian Centre on 
China in the World fosters such an approach by supporting humanities-
led research that engages actively with the social sciences. The resulting 
admixture has, we believe, academic merit, public policy relevance, and 
value for the engaged public. The Yearbook is aimed at a broad readership 
that includes the general public as well as scholars from all fields, as well 
as people in business and government. 
The Australian Centre on China in the World promotes the 
New Sinology of which Geremie Barmé was a pioneer (http://www.
thechinastory.org/new-sinology/). This is a study of China underpinned 
by an understanding of the disparate living traditions of Chinese thought, 
language, and culture. Xi Jinping’s China is a gift to the New Sinologist, 
for the world of the Chairman of Everything requires the student of 
contemporary China to be familiar with basic classical Chinese thought, 
history and literature, appreciate the abiding influence of Marxist-Leninist 
ideas, and the dialectic prestidigitations of Mao Zedong Thought. Those 
who pursue narrow disciplinary approaches to China today serve well the 
metrics-obsessed international academy. However, they may be incapable 
of understanding and explaining the historically-derived and culturally-
fostered ideas and practices that shape both government and society in 
mainland China.
Most of the scholars and writers whose work features in the China 
Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution are members of, or associated with the 
Australian Centre on China in the World. They survey the China of Xi’s 
third year as leader of the Party and state through chapters, forums, and 
information windows on topics ranging from economics, politics, and 
China’s regional posture through urban change, social activism and law, 
the Internet, cultural mores, and present-day Chinese attitudes to history 
and thought. Their contributions, which cover the twelve-month period 
in 2015 with some reference to events in early 2016, offer an informed 
perspective on recent developments in China and what these may mean 
for the future. 
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The Yearbook is organised in the 
form of thematically arranged chapters 
which are interspersed with information 
windows that highlight particular words, 
issues, ideas, statistics, people, and events. 
Forums, or ‘interstices’, expand on the 
contents of chapters or discuss a topic of 
relevance to the year. This year, we have 
signposted the Chapters using the Five 
Elements 五行 of early Chinese thought—
water, fire, wood, metal, and earth. The 
five elements were used for reckoning time 
and remain widely used to this day for Chinese astrological calculations. 
The traditional Chinese belief that all phenomena of the known world 
are the result of dynamic interactions among these five elements offers 
a useful analogy for the intricately interdependent nature of events and 
trends in a globalised China. As 2015 was the Year of the Wood Goat, we 
have highlighted the wood element by featuring it twice. 
A Chronology at the end of the volume provides an overview of the 
year under discussion. Footnotes and the CIW-Danwei Archive of source 
materials are available online at: http://thechinastory.org/dossier/.
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The Cover Image
The Yearbook cover features the Chinese 
character 染 ran, ‘to dye’, embossed on swirls 
of Chinese black ink. 染 forms part of the 
Chinese word for pollution 污染 wuran, the 
theme of this year's Yearbook. Among the 
metaphorical and literal connotations of pol-
lution expressed in this Yearbook through 染 
are to adulterate, contaminate, spoil or vio-
late. 
Cover of the China Story Yearbook 
2015, showing the Chinese character 
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T H E  R O A D  TO  R E J U V E N AT I O N : 
T H E  A N I M AT E D  X I  J I N P I N G
Nick Stember
FUTURE HISTORIANS OF CHINESE animation may remember 2015 as 
a banner year for Chinese animations 
with the release of more than twenty 
feature-length and countless short an-
imated films. Major feature length ti-
tles include Amazing Pleasant Goat 羊
年喜羊羊, the big screen adaptation of 
the hit television series Pleasant Goat 
and Big Bad Wolf 喜羊羊与灰太狼; the 
dystopian sci-fi epic 10,000 Years Later 
一万年以后; and Teenage Mao Zedong 
少年毛泽东. 
Most memorable of all perhaps, 
though, was a three-minute English 
language YouTube video described 
by The Wall Street Journal as ‘a psy-
chedelic music video’ produced to 
promote China’s Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan. Dubbed ‘The 13 What’ by CCTV 
America, the film is credited to Road to 
Rejuvenation Studios 复兴路上工作室, 
a mysterious film production studio 
that has no official website and only a 
scattered social media presence across 
several accounts. The Chinese name of 
the studio can alternately be translated 
into English as ‘The Studio on Fuxing 
Road’. There are many Fuxing Roads 
in China, but one of the best known is 
just down the street from the Beijing 
offices of not only CCTV, but also the 
General Administration of Press, Pub-
lication, Radio, Film, and Television 
(GAPPRFT), at No. 2 Fuxing Gate Outer 
Street, Xicheng district 西城区复兴门外




















































Visually speaking, ‘The 13 What’ 
calls to mind the cut-and-paste col-
lage aesthetic of Terry Gilliam’s early 
animations for Monty Python: a pink, 
dismembered hand holds up the moon 
on a string, while a cubist elk with a 
giant mouth on its side and eyeball 
where its face should be dances in 
the background. The song that accom-
panies the film is performed entirely 
in English, with the exception of the 
words shi san wu 十三五 (‘thirteen 
five’), the Chinese abbreviation for the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan. Like other 
productions of Road to Rejuvenation 
Studios, the target audience seems to 
‘The 13 What’
Source: daliulian.net
  Xinhua News Agency, China 
Daily, and other party mouthpieces 
have reposted more than a half doz-
en short films produced by the studio 
since late 2013, some animated, some 
not. Several of the films were released 
to coincide with important events such 
as the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, the 
Boao Forum, and Xi Jinping’s official 
trips abroad. While two videos, one 
highlighting Chinese investment in the 
UK and the other in the US states of 
North and South Carolina, have racked 
up equivalent view counts, neither are 
quite as eye- (or ear-) catching as ‘The 
13 What’. 
be foreign rather than domestic audi-
ences. What might surprise veteran 
China watchers is the levity with which 
that message is communicated—in an-
other video titled ‘Who is Xi Dada?’ (os-
tensibly produced by the People’s Daily 
but bearing all the hallmarks of a Road 
to Rejuvenation Studios video), a Kore-
an student studying Chinese language 
jokes that, ‘If Xi Jinping were my hus-
band, I bet I’d be really happy’.
  ‘Xi Dada’ 习大大 or Uncle Xi, as 
he is often referred to in the videos, 
is a constant presence. The Power of 
Deepening Reforms 深改的力量, which 
seems to have been produced by the 
studio, was released on Sohu 搜狐 and 
other Chinese language news sites in 
late 2015. Audio clips of Xi’s speeches 
are used as hooks for a rap song ex-
plaining the goals of the anti-corrup-
tion campaign. ‘China Comes to Car-
olina,’ meanwhile, released just prior 
to Xi’s 2015 visit to the US, borrows the 
format of an American political cam-
paign ad, with heartfelt testimonies 
from American employees of compa-
nies saved from bankruptcy by an in-
fusion of Chinese capital. 
The variety of techniques em-
ployed by Road to Rejuvenation Stu-
dios suggests a sophisticated, tailored 
approach to public relations, involving 
The Power of Reform: a rap song explaining the 
anti-corruption campaign 
Source: youtube.com
a skilled team of producers, marketers, 
directors, artists, writers, and voice 
talent (the latter being particularly im-
pressive, given that several of the vid-
eos, like ‘The 13 What’ are entirely in 
English). Inquiries made by Matthew 
Robertson for the Epoch Times (a Falun 
Gong-controlled newspaper) indicate 
that at least some of this process is be-
ing outsourced to private firms outside 
of China. An anonymous employee of 
the London-based search engine opti-
misation (SEO) company Viralseeding.
com claimed that his company was 
paid ‘a few thousand to [potentially] 
tens of thousands’ to promote the Road 
to Rejuvenation Studios’ short film 
Britain Meets China, without being told 
who produced it. In an interview with 
the AFP news agency, a spokesperson 
for Road to Rejuvenation Studios said 
8
9
they had ‘continuously co-ordinat-
ed and co-operated with’ the global 
advertising agency BBDO on ‘The 13 
What’, although the Shanghai office of 
BBDO declined to comment on this. 
As of 6 June 2016, CCTV America’s 
posting of ‘The 13 What’ has garnered 
over 180,000 views on YouTube, while 
the posting of the video to Road to Re-
juvenation Studios own YouTube page 
has gained it another 45,000 views. A 
more recent video released in April 
2016 (with some 24,000 views over two 
channels), however, reflects the chal-
lenging reality of the Chinese econo-
my in 2016: ‘Kung Fu and the Chinese 
Economy’ ends with a play on words 
that doesn’t quite work in English. In 
Chinese, kung fu 功夫 is a homophone 
for gongfu 工夫, meaning free, or suf-
ficient time: ‘With gongfu,’ states the 
narrator, anyone can understand 
Chinese kung fu … and yes, even the 
Chinese economy!’ 
How Leaders are Made: uploaded in October 2015, this Chinese propaganda video has been viewed more than 






















































































ON 1 JUNE 2015, Beijing rolled out a new, strict anti-smoking law 
that placed a ban on smoking in pub-
lic, including restaurants, offices, and 
public transport. The regulation also 
forbids tobacco advertisements and 
the selling of cigarettes within one 
hundred metres of primary schools 
and kindergartens. 
China has over 300 million smok-
ers, 1.37 million of whom die from 
smoking-related illnesses every year, 
according to 2014 statistics released by 
the National Health and Family Plan-
ning Commission (NHFPC). Yet the fact 
that new China’s founding fathers such 
as Chairman Mao and Deng Xiaoping 
are often seen smoking in photographs 
and that some cigarette brands boast 
patriotic names like Zhongnanhai 中
南海 (China’s seat of government), 
cigarettes in China have acquired an 
almost benign, even revolutionary im-
age. And behind the scenes, concerns 
about public health have also had to 
contend with the fact that a govern-
ment monopoly on tobacco means that 
cigarette sales contribute directly to 
state coffers. 






































While past attempts at banning 
public smoking in the nation’s capital, 
most recently during the 2008 Olym-
pics, failed to dent Beijingers’ predi-
lection for lighting up wherever and 
whenever—partly because the fine 
was a laughable ten yuan—the new ef-
fort appears to be backed by increased 
resolve. In 2013, the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party and State 
Council jointly released regulations 
banning officials from lighting up in 
public. Under new legislation, offend-
ers will be fined 200 yuan and busi-
nesses that fail to stamp out smoking 
on their premises could be fined up 
to 10,000 yuan. Repeat violators will 
be named and shamed on an official 
website. Violations can be reported 
via a call to a government hotline and 
pictures of offenders can be sent to a 
public WeChat account. Within a day 
of the regulations coming into effect, 
inspectors fined their first offender: a 
branch of Sichuan Haidiliao 四川海底
捞, a popular hotpot chain.
Within a month, health authori-
ties declared the ban’s result ‘satisfac-
tory’, and there appears to be wide ad-
herence to the new law in eateries and 
The roll out of Beijing’s new anti-smoking law involved a highly visible public awareness cam-
paign, which included draping the iconic Bird’s Nest in anti-smoking signs
Source: chinanews.com
bars across the city. But when author-
ities panned the film, Mr. Six 老炮儿, a 
runaway success in 2015 that brilliant-
ly captured Beijing’s urban culture, 
for featuring a smoking scene every 
1.3 minutes (the most of any Chinese 
film in 2015), the director shrugged off 
criticism: he had, he explained, simply 
wanted to depict Beijing life accurately. 
















































IN 2015, Tu Youyou 屠呦呦 became the first Chinese citizen to receive a 
Nobel Prize in medicine for her contri-
butions to discovering the antimalari-
al drug artemisinin 青蒿素. She shared 
the prize with William C. Campbell 
and Satoshi Ōmura for their work in 
finding a novel therapy against round-
worm parasites. 
Tu’s discovery has its roots in a 
secret military program. On 23 May 
1967, Mao Zedong launched Project 
523 to find a cure for drug-resistant 
strains of malaria that were taking a 
huge toll on China’s Viet Cong allies in 
the Vietnam War. In 1969, the govern-
ment requested help from the China 
Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences 
(formerly China Academy of Tradition-
al Chinese Medicine) 中国中医科学院. 
China was in the midst of the Cultur-
al Revolution; many of the country’s 
top scientists, including those that had 
trained overseas, had been persecuted 
and sent off to labour camps. Tu, who 
at thirty-nine held only an undergrad-
uate degree from Beijing Medical Uni-
versity’s School of Pharmacy and had 
never studied abroad, was chosen to 
lead the program at her institute.
Building on previous research, 
Tu and her team scoured ancient texts 
and interviewed traditional medicine 
T U  YO U YO U  AWA R D E D  

















































practitioners to compile over 2,000 
potential anti-malarial recipes. An ex-
tract from sweet wormwood or Arte-
misia annua 青蒿 produced promising, 
but inconsistent results when tested on 
malaria-infected mice. 
Tu credits a recipe from a manual 
written more than two millennia ago, 
Ge Hong’s 葛洪 Handbook of Prescrip-
tions for Emergencies 肘后备急方 for 
inspiring the breakthrough that would 
lead to the discovery of artemisinin. 
Ge’s recipe called for patients 
to drink the juice from sweet worm-
wood soaked in water. Tu realised that 
boiling the plant might have been de-
stroying its active ingredient and thus 
switched to a low temperature tech-
nique, which produced an extract that 
completely inhibited parasite growth 
in animal trials. 
Premier Li Keqiang called Tu’s 
Nobel prize ‘an expression of the huge 
contribution that Chinese traditional 
medicine and pharmacy has made to 
the health of humankind’. The award 
has not been without controversy, in-
cluding over whether it vindicated 
Chinese medicine per se or the sci-
entific method used to identify active 
compounds from traditional remedies. 
Project 523 was also a massive govern-
ment undertaking that involved over 
500 scientists from sixty military and 
civilian institutions; Tu was one of 
many working on the project. Tu her-
self has told The New York Times that 
she considered the honour of the No-
bel to belong collectively to herself, her 
team, and the nation. 








































FOUR DECADES OF RAPID ECONOMIC growth 
has resulted in wide-ranging environmental 
damage across China (and beyond), from smog-
ridden skies to contaminated rivers, toxic 
soils and ‘cancer villages’. These increasingly 
intolerable costs have emerged as a major 
source of social unrest in recent years. Premier 
Li Keqiang acknowledged this in his opening 
address to the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
on 5 March 2015: ‘China’s growing pollution 
problems are a blight on people’s quality of life 
and a trouble that weighs on their hearts.’ 



































On 28 February, six days before Li spoke to the NPC, the former investiga-
tive journalist Chai Jing 柴静 released her documentary Under the Dome
穹顶之下 on the Chinese Internet. Under the Dome vividly conveyed the 
nature of this ‘blight’ and struck a chord: its mainland Chinese audience 
exceeded 200 million people. Yet within two weeks of its release, it was no 
longer possible to download it in China, and official directives prohibited 
the Chinese media from any further reporting on the film. It is still availa-
ble on YouTube but, of course, this is also blocked in China. 
Clearly, the detailed, inconvenient truths laid bare in Under the Dome 
and the popular response to it were too much for the Chinese leadership 
to handle. It isn’t hard to see why. The film implicated party-state officials 
at every level in its highly critical assessment of the ‘growth at all costs’ 
industrialisation strategy of the last four decades. Its overarching message 
was loud and clear: that the central government was primarily to blame 
for blatantly failing to enforce its own environmental laws and regulations 
and call polluters to account. Whether either Premier Li or President Xi 
A still from the documentary Under the Dome with Chai Jing in the foreground
Photo: cq.house.qq.com
Jinping had seen the documentary, they seem to have got the message. Xi 
declared in his own address to the NPC meeting on 6 March that, ‘We are 
going to punish, with an iron hand, any violators who destroy the ecology 
or the environment, with no exceptions.’
The Plan: Green from the Top Down 
Fortunately, this is not the government’s only strategy for addressing Chi-
na’s environmental crisis. The central government had already produced 
an abundance of plans to tackle China’s environmental problems dur-
ing the period covered by its Twelth Five-Year Plan (2011–15). It further 
ramped up its efforts following Premier Li’s declaration of a ‘war on pol-
lution’ in 2014. In November 2014, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) 国家发展和改革委员会 released the National Plan for 
Responding to Climate Change (2014–2020) 国家应对气候变化规划. This 
outlines strategies including strengthening laws and regulations on cli-
mate change and limiting large-scale industrialisation and urbanisation. It 
also proposes defining ‘ecological red lines’ (a baseline level of ecological 
health that must be maintained) for key areas including the headwaters 
of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. Other strategies include limiting total 
coal consumption, and actively promoting cleaner energies. The language 
of ‘strengthening’, ‘limiting’, ‘defining’, ‘controlling’, and ‘promoting’ is 
indicative of the central government’s intention to drive China’s climate 
change agenda from the top down. 
In February 2015, the NDRC published its roadmap for a nation-
wide emissions trading scheme (ETS). This will build on the seven pilot 
programs that have been implemented since 2013 in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Chongqing, Shenzhen, and Tianjin, as well as Guangdong and Hubei prov-
inces. Together they comprise the second largest ETS in the world after 
that of the European Union. The national scheme, to be launched in 2017, 


































In his March 2015 report to the NPC, Premier Li committed the gov-
ernment to a wide range of specific energy conservation and emission 
reduction measures as well as environmental improvement plans and 
projects. These support China’s official quest for ‘green, low-carbon and 
recycled development’ 绿色低碳循环发展, the catch-phrase for its envi-
ronmentally-friendly growth strategy. They include an action plan for 
preventing and controlling air pollution, upgrading coal-burning power 
plants to achieve ‘ultra-low’ emissions similar to those produced by gas, 
promoting clean-energy vehicles, and improving fuel quality to meet the 
new ‘National V’ standard by which the sulphur content in fuel must be 
less than ten parts per million. There are also ambitious plans to develop 
renewable energies including wind power, photovoltaic power, biomass 
energy, and hydropower, as well as safe nuclear power. Li also announced 
that the energy conservation and environmental protection industry 
would become a ‘new pillar of the economy’ 经济新支柱 and that ‘green 
consumption’ 绿色消费 would become the path to stimulating the domes-
tic consumer economy.
The following month, the Chinese government committed to estab-
lishing a ‘green financial system’ 绿色金融体系. A report produced by ex-
perts from the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), the China Banking Regula- 
tory Commission, the Ministry of Finance, other Chinese banks, the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences, universities, think tanks, and more laid 
out the blueprints for this system. In his foreword to the report, Pan Gong-
sheng 潘功胜, Deputy Governor of the PBoC refers to the ‘opportunity’ he 
had to watch Under the Dome, an interesting choice of words. In a key pas-
sage, he reinforces the message that in China, change must come from the 
top down: ‘For policymakers, these worsening environmental problems 
require the further enhancement of top-level design and the improvement 
of market mechanisms and policy support systems, so as to provide the 
conditions necessary for various stakeholders to participate in environ-
mental management and protection. 
Wang Renzheng, a Chinese performance artist better known as Nut Brother, with the industrial vacuum cleaner 
he uses to suck up smog and turn it into ‘smog bricks’
Photo: tech.163.com
China also introduced numerous plans to tackle climate change 
on a global level in the period leading up to COP21—the Conference of 
Parties meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)—in Paris in December 2015. In June, China submitted 
its ‘Enhanced actions and measures on climate change’ to the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. These provided the basis for the country’s ‘intended nationally 
determined contributions’ (INDC) to the negotiations. They set out the 
target of reaching peak CO2 emissions around 2030. By that time, carbon 
intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) would be reduced by sixty to 
sixty-five percent from the 2005 levels, and the share of non-fossil fuels in 
primary energy consumption would increase to around twenty percent 


































The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020)—the first one produced 
under the leadership of Xi Jinping—will emphasise government 
commitment to environmental protection when it is formally adopted in 
March 2016. The draft proposal, released in November 2015, names the 
environment as one of the ‘five key points’ of the economy. It stresses 
‘green’ and ‘sustainable’ development and the Party’s intention to promote 
a ‘low-carbon energy system’. It is possible that a cap on coal use or a 
ban on new coal-fired power plants will become part of China’s long-term 
development strategy. Given its global economic clout, a greener China 
could become a catalyst for worldwide change.
The Reality: Smog from the Bottom up
As Under the Dome made abundantly clear rules, regulations, and plans 
have so far failed to green China. The documentary exposed both industry’s 
and local governments’ notoriously low compliance with central govern-
ment regulations, pointing to problems at every level. These include  fail-
ures in co-ordinating action among ministries with conflicting interests; 
the blind pursuit of rapid economic growth by provincial governments; 
the vested interests of powerful, corrupt, and monopolistic state-owned 
energy and power companies; and the self interest of tens of millions of 
new car owners, many of whom run their vehicles on low-standard fuel 
that fails to reach national standards. As Chai succinctly sums it up: ‘No 
regulations, no authority, no law enforcement—the conundrum of envi-
ronmental protection right there’.
One of the many damning examples Chai Jing uses to illustrate her 
point begins with a visit to a truck tolling station, where trucks are checked 
to see if they are complying with emission standards. Many of the truck 
drivers fail the test. In one case witnessed by Chai, the official in charge 
does not impose the requisite on-the-spot fine because he notes that the 
truck is carrying food that is part of the city’s supply system—and local 
regulations stipulate that such transport cannot be disrupted. 
 Chai Jing then reveals a thriving industry for ‘fake cars’, vehicles 
manufactured without the required emission controls devices in the first 
place, and which produce emissions that can be 500 times the national 
standard. In theory, the ‘Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act’ 大气污染
防治法 of 2002 could be used to shut down the manufacture of such cars, 
but Chai discovers that no government department has been charged with 
enforcing the act. She records an official at the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) saying, ‘As far as we know, it’s not us.’ One from the Min-
istry of Industry and Information Technology tells her, ‘It’s definitely not 
us.’ A third from the General Administration of Quality Supervision and 
Inspection insists, ‘It should be all three of us.’ Finally, she calls an official 
at the National People’s Congress who tells her: ‘The issue of the execu-
tion of this law is indeed unclear.’ He acknowledges that they’d made it 
that way on purpose because so many government departments opposed 
the act. The result puts manufacturers in a corner. As one of the factory 
owners explains: ‘If we build real trucks and others build fake trucks, we 
FOOD SCANDALS, by Aiden Xia
In a national crackdown on dangerous 
foods in June 2015, authorities seized over 
100,000 tonnes of frozen chicken wings, 
beef, and pork worth up to AU$264 million 
in Hunan province that were were nearly 
forty years old—packed and stored when 
Mao Zedong was still alive. That particular-
ly foul haul reportedly came from the bor-
der area with Vietnam: officials explained 
that smugglers bought cheap meat abroad, 
and smuggled it in via Hong Kong and Viet-
nam in unrefrigerated vehicles.
Since 2008 alone, China has experienced scandals including the addition of industrial 
chemical melamine to dairy products including infant formula (killing at least six babies and 
making 300,000 people ill); watermelons exploding due to the injection of growth accelera-
tor chemicals; and carcinogenic additives in pork. 
June 2015: Chinese authorities seized decades old 



































would be bankrupt tomorrow.’ An MEP official admits, ‘Not enforcing the 
law forces people to cheat.’ 
Chai then turns to the issue of why Chinese fuel standards are set so 
low compared to those elsewhere. She asks why fuel required to reach the 
then-highest National Standard Four was still in such low supply, account-
ing for just three percent of all available fuels. Yue Xin 岳欣, a director of 
the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences, informs her 
that representatives of China’s oil industry dominate the standards com-
mittee. Neither the MEP nor the NDRC have the power to enforce higher 
standards. Baffled, Chai Jing questions Cao Xianghong 曹湘洪, head of the 
National Fuel Standards Committee and former chief engineer at the state-
owned China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec). Cao defends the role 
of the oil industry in setting fuel standards because, he tells her, he doesn’t 
believe that people from the MEP understand the oil refining business.
As if that unblushing insult to the state ministry tasked with China’s 
environmental protection wasn’t enough, Cao then addresses the question 
of whether Sinopec, the second largest company on the Fortune Global 
list in 2014 and described by Fortune as the ‘king of China’s state-owned 
hierarchy’, should have to take greater responsibility for its impact on the 
environment. ‘Sinopec’, he says, ‘is huge, like a person, very big, but it’s all 
fat and no muscle’, implying a lack of will, if not ability. 
Chai Jing then addresses the issue of corruption in the energy indus-
try’s relations with the party-state. Citing the views of an official convicted 
According to Under the Dome, Beijing’s daily PM2.5 level is five times that of China’s average
Photo: fotomen.cn
for corruption, she describes the links forged in recent years between peo-
ple in the National Energy Administration, Sinopec, electricity distribution 
firms, and the coal and mining industries. The film raises serious ques-
tions about Sinopec’s involvement in setting the standards for fuel that it 
both produces and sells in a highly concentrated, state-dominated market. 
 Other stories told in Under the Dome illustrate the connection be-
tween industrial emissions and the ‘unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated 
and unsustainable’ development model of the past. The film also high-
lights the urgent need for China to rebalance its economy away from en-
ergy-intensive production, as well as to price energy according to market 
principles, to eliminate subsidies for ‘dirty’ industries, and to tackle pow-
erful state–owned enterprises (SOEs) (like Sinopec) whose vested interests 
are at odds with the central government’s green growth agenda. While 
the plans for action announced in 2015 are encouraging, clearly far more 
remains to be done.
A Case of Consumption
Within days of the release of Under the Dome, the newly appointed Minister 
for Environmental Protection, Chen Jining 陈吉宁, praised its ‘important 
role in promoting public awareness of environmental health issues’. He 
saw it as encouraging individuals to play their part in improving China’s 
air quality. In fact, very lit-
tle of the film focuses on the 
responsibility of individual 
citizens, until the concluding 
ten minutes when Chai Jing 
notes that ‘Even the most 
powerful government in the 
world can’t control pollution 
by itself.’ Turning her atten-




































‘ordinary people, like you and me’, she urges her viewers to take public 
transport, walk, ride bikes, and avoid burning low-quality coal, as well as 
to report polluters and boycott the goods of listed polluting manufactur-
ers. According to Chai Jing, with collective action, and ‘a little thought and 
care, the smog will start to clear’.
If only it were that simple. 
China’s plan to rebalance the economy towards domestic consump-
tion is coupled with its National New-Type Urbanisation Plan (2014–2020) 
国家新型城镇化规划. The plan aims to raise the urban proportion of the 
population from fifty-three percent in 2013 to sixty percent in 2020. If 
successful, this will create a middle class the size of which the world has 
never seen before. The global environmental consequences of hundreds 
of millions of new urban consumers will be unavoidable and immense—
whether their rising demand is satisfied by China’s domestic production 
or elsewhere.
The number of cars in China, for example, has increased by around 
one hundred million in the last decade. In cities including Beijing and 
























Figure 1. Household per capita emissions by income percentile
Development Research Centre of the State Council predicts that there will 
be 400 million private vehicles in China in fifteen years time. Car owners 
don’t only consume energy directly in the form of petroleum at the pumps. 
The production of cars requires energy as an input, and other inputs that 
use energy as an input (most obviously steel), and so on down the chain. 
More generally, individuals consume energy directly in the form of 
coal, natural gas, petroleum, and electricity and indirectly through the 
many goods and services that require energy. Indirect energy consump-
tion—and associated emissions— is likely to grow substantially in China 
in the years ahead. 
In researching this topic, I calculated the direct and indirect energy 
use and subsequent emissions per capita of 33,000 urban Chinese house-
holds. The graph opposite illustrates the results, plotted across income per-
centiles (ranging from the poorest to the richest one percent of the sample 
population). As seen, total energy consumption, and therefore emissions, 
increases as income rises. This may be an obvious point: richer people have 
more to spend, so they tend to consume more of just about everything. But 
people can only consume so much energy directly, no matter how rich 
they are. More importantly, the figures show that indirect emissions rise 
even more when income increases. At higher levels of income, indirect 
emissions are an even greater problem than direct emissions. 
On the other hand, consumer choices can change, and production 
technologies and environmental policies can make the production of all 
goods and services greener over time. Given its population size, and its 
global emissions ranking, no country has a greater incentive than China 
to turn this potential into reality. Yet it needs to make serious efforts to 
address such fundamental issues like the legal ambiguity, bureaucratic 
buck-passing, and corporate bullying as described above. Otherwise it is 
highly unlikely that a program of promoting a ‘green, low-carbon, healthy, 
and civilised way of life and consumption patterns’ together with the kind 
of personal activism advocated by Chai Jing will be enough to tackle the 



































Chai Jing borrowed the name Under the Dome from a US television series 
about a small town upon which a dome descended out of nowhere, cutting 
it off from the rest of the world, providing no way out. Yet this is not a 
perfect metaphor for China’s reality. In an increasingly integrated global 
economy—in which China is both the largest exporter and one of the larg-
est overseas investors—we are all effectively living under the same dome. 
The Chinese government played a critical role at the COP21 meeting 
that, as the official agreement states, marked ‘a change in direction, to-
wards a new world’. The Paris agreement confirms the target of keeping 
the rise in global temperature below 2°C, and ideally 1.5°C, with 186 coun-
tries publishing ‘action plans’ for achieving targeted reductions in green- 
house gas emissions. The agreement asks all countries to review these 
plans every five years beginning in 2020, not to lower their targets where 
possible, to reach peak emissions ‘as soon as possible’, and to ‘achieve car-
bon neutrality in the second half of the century’.  
November 2015: As world leaders converged on Paris for the World Climate Change Conference 2015, residents 
of Beijing and other cities in eastern China faced the most severe air pollution the nation saw that year
Photo: earthobservatory.nasa.gov
The impetus for finding a 
global solution to what is clearly 
a global problem gathered mo-
mentum in Paris. Yet the chal-
lenges of implementation remain 
huge, for at least two reasons. 
First, in all of its policy doc-
uments, China stresses its status 
as a developing country and the 
principles of ‘equity and com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’. These 
principles were a dominant theme at the twentieth BASIC (Brazil, South 
Africa, India, and China) Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change in June 
2015. It called on developed countries to take the lead in emission re- 
ductions and provide financial support to developing countries for green 
technology and capacity building, as well as to mitigate against and adapt 
to climate change. COP21 confirmed that developed countries remain 
committed to raising US$100 billion per year by 2020 from public and pri-
vate sources to address the needs of developing countries. Yet developed 
countries have collectively failed to provide this funding since 2010 when 
the commitment was first made—falling short, according to World Bank 
estimates, by about US$70 billion per year. 
Second is what is known among economists as the ‘pollution haven 
hypothesis’. This suggests that foreign investors will be drawn to countries 
where environmental regulations are weak and production costs are rela-
tively low. As China tightens up on its own environmental regulations, its 
‘dirty’ industries are likely to try and relocate offshore. There’s no reason 
to think that the Chinese multinationals will be any better than Western 
ones at resisting the option of looking for ‘pollution havens’. These are 
most likely to be found in other developing countries, where the urge for 
stronger environmental regulation often loses out to the pressing need for 
economic growth. 
November 2015: President Xi Jinping delivers a speech 
for the opening day of the World Climate Change Con-



































This hypothesis will be tested as China rolls out its One Belt One Road 
Initiative, (OBOR), which refers to the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt and Twen-
ty-First Century Maritime Silk Road’ 丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之
路. OBOR aims to enhance China’s connection and co-operation with oth-
er parts of Asia, Europe, and Africa through increased regional trade as 
well as cultural exchange. It requires the construction of an infrastructure 
network, including new ports, railways, roads, and so on throughout the 
region, as well as improvements to existing infrastructure. This will be 
by its very nature energy intensive, just as China’s internal infrastructure 
expansion has been in the past. While official policy documents stress that 
the initiative will ‘promote green and low-carbon infrastructure’, it will 
take concerted bilateral and multilateral efforts to turn these ambitions 
into reality. 
The problem of ‘pollution havens’ extends beyond developing coun-
tries. In 2014, then Australian prime minister Tony Abbott publicly stat-
ed that coal is ‘good for humanity’, and the ‘foundation of prosperity for 
now and the foreseeable future’. This was the opposite view to that of the 
United Nation’s top climate official, Christiana Figueres, who warned that 
most of the world’s coal must be left in the ground if we are to prevent 
December 2015: Chinese 
authorities issue their first 
ever ‘red alert’ for Beijing as 
acrid smog enveloped the 
capital
Photo: bj.jjj.qq.com
CROP TOP: POTATOES IN FASHION, 
by Xiaonan Wang
The potato, introduced to the coun-
try about 400 years ago and called by 
many different names in China includ-
ing ‘earth bean’ 土豆, ‘foreign taro’ 洋芋 
and ‘horse-bell’ tuber 马铃薯, will soon 
become the fourth most popular staple 
food in China after rice, wheat, and corn. 
The Ministry of Agriculture an-
nounced on 6 January 2015 that the 
government planned to nearly double 
the land area devoted to the cultivation of potatoes from just over five million hectares 
to ten million by 2020. At the World Potato Congress held in Yanqing County, Beijing, in 
July, Chinese officials stated their goal of raising the annual total yield from the current 
ninety-five million tonnes, already the world’s highest, to 130 million tonnes by 2020. The 
initiative aims to ensure food security, alleviate pressure on the environment and increase 
the income of farmers.
China’s grain output has grown over the past decade partly thanks to the government’s 
subsidies to farmers, but this is not sustainable. Urbanisation, pollution and limited water 
supply has put huge pressure on domestic farming; the production of grain can’t keep up 
with demand, leading to a surge of grain imports that challenge China’s self-sufficiency. 
Potatoes are more productive than other staple crops, they adapt better to environmen-
tal stress, and they are relatively easy to store. Nor does planting potatoes interfere with 
cultivation of the other three staples, as the government has promised to grow potatoes 
only on land unsuitable for growing grains.
Public opinion, however, is divided. While many have embraced the potato, Chinese 
people traditionally consider it a vegetable, rather than a staple. What’s more, widespread 
public prejudice associates the potato with foreignness, poverty, and the cuisines of ‘back-
ward’ ethnic groups in relatively undeveloped provinces like Yunnan and Guizhou. The gov-
ernment’s potato push has even led some people to suspect an imminent food crisis. 
To boost the image of the humble tuber the Ministry of Agriculture has launched a web-
page promoting the potato’s nutritional qualities and sharing cooking tips. The state media 
has also given generous coverage to the policy as well as promoting food products made of 
potatoes. There has even been an officially backed documentary called Potato on the Tip of 
the Tongue 舌尖上的马铃薯. Feng Xiaofeng, a potato entrepreneur, has become a television 
variety show star and Weibo staple herself under the name Sister Potato.  
Not everyone is swallowing the pro-potato propaganda. Analysts have noted that struc-
tural problems in grain production and a consumerist ethos that leads to an enormous 
waste of food pose fundamental threats to the nation’s food security that can not be solved 
just by growing more potatoes. Chips with that, anyone? 



































catastrophic global warming. Abbott’s pronouncement, and his climate 
change policies generally, received much criticism both within Australia 
and overseas, including from China. Yet even Abbott’s successor as Prime 
Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, who once supported the introduction of an 
ETS, now appears to shares his predecessor’s aversion to ‘green tape’ 
(environmental-based regulations). The Turnbull government has giv-
en conditional approval to the Chinese state-owned company Shenhua 
Watermark to open a highly controversial coalmine in the fertile Liver-
pool Plains area of New South Wales. Shenhua, which is the world’s larg-
est coal supplier, plans to invest AU$1.2 billion in the mine, from which 
it intends to extract ten million tonnes of coal per year for thirty years. 
Unless there is an unexpected change in policy direction, Australia could 
soon find itself home to some of China’s dirtier industries in the future —in 
short, a pollution haven.  
Will Beijing escape from underneath its ‘smog dome’?
Photo: Ernie/Flickr
On 8 December, as 2015 was drawing to a close, the Beijing author-
ities issued the first ‘red alert’ for air pollution since the introduction of 
an environmental emergency response system in late 2013. A red alert— 
declared if Air Quality Index readings of PM2.5 exceed 200 milligrams per 
cubic metre or more for at least three days in a row—places temporary 
restrictions on the city’s cars, factories and construction sites, and shuts 
down schools. Yet critics accused the city’s environment bureau of tak-
ing too long to issue the alert, given that in the week preceding it, PM2.5 
levels had been close to 1000, forty times the World Health Organisation’s 
guideline limit of twenty-five. But Beijing’s ultimate decision signalled that 
it was capable of choosing the environment over the economy, at least in 
desperate circumstances. 
The rhetoric of the highest levels of government, including its threat 
of ‘iron-handed punishment’ for environmental lawbreakers, signals a 
sincere interest in tackling China’s environmental problems. Yet without 
a more systemic program of environmental management within China, 
similarly strong commitments by all the nations of the world, and sub-
stantial personal efforts on the part of the world’s 7.3 billion individuals 
(especially the billion or so richest ones) it is hard to imagine an escape 
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D O N ’ T  TO U C H  T H E  WAT E R ! 
P O L L U T I O N  A N D  T H E  F U T U R E 
O F  C H I N E S E  A G R I C U LT U R E
Luigi Tomba
IS FARMING STILL WHAT Chinese peasants do? In most of the country-
side, the income generated by farming 
remains far below what can be earned 
in even low-paid industrial or services 
jobs in the cities. For rural youth, the 
simplest path to social mobility contin-
ues to be migration to industrial areas.
For the people who stay, often the 
elderly or those with limited skills, few 
are willing to invest their savings in 
farms that are held on thirty-year leas-
es on collectively-owned land and gen-
erally produce meagre incomes. Even 
the high-risk gamble of the stock mar-
ket is more likely to appeal to farmers 
than the purchase of next-generation 
tractors. During 2014 and 2015, when 
the Chinese stock market was most 
bullish, many villagers diverted cash 
and time from farming to the dazzling 
experience of betting on China’s ‘red 
chips’. Excluded from the urban real 
estate market that in two decades had 
turned many urban employees into a 
new propertied middle class, many 
farmers blithely disregarded the risks 
of stock market speculation until the 
June 2015 crash, when the Shanghai 
Composite Index lost thirty percent of 
its value within one month. 
The question is why, given the 
growing demand for quality food 
from China’s rapidly increasing mid-
dle classes and in its fast-growing ur-
ban areas, is agriculture not seen as 
an economic opportunity? There are 




















(whether or not the land was suitable) 
and produce bumper harvests forced 
farmers into over planting, over fertil-
ising, and ultimately depleting already 
nutrient-poor soil and limited water 
resources. 
In the Maoist past, when things 
went badly, such as during the three 
years of mass crop failure and famine 
from 1959–61, farmers starved. They 
could not leave the land, though. In-
ternal migration from the rural to the 
urban areas was severely restricted. 
Today, farming is again in crisis, 
for different reasons. With increased 
mobility, more young rural people 
Idyllic Maoist propaganda of labouring heroes and bumper harvests was a far cry from the reality in the  
Chinese countryside in the 1950s and 1960s
Source: upload.m4.cn
extremely simple: plants require land 
and water to grow. 
China has never been a country 
rich in either land or water. Agricul-
ture has always been highly labour 
intensive and, as a result, it used to 
command respect. In Confucian times 
(from 551 BC to 479 BC), farmers were 
second only to scholars in the social 
hierarchy, above artisans, merchants, 
and soldiers. Revolutionary mythology 
elevated farmers (农民often translated 
as peasants) to the status of labouring 
heroes, part of a holy trinity along-
side workers and soldiers. But politi-









































are simply abandoning the fields. Ag-
riculture contributes only nine per-
cent of the country’s economic out-
put. (Services, by comparison, make 
up forty-nine percent). What is more, 
agricultural land is the main takeover 
target of aggressively urbanising local 
governments. Meanwhile, much of 
the land that is left to grow plants and 
raise animals, and most of the water 
available to irrigate it, is poisoned by 
pollution from chemical fertilisers and 
pesticides as well as poorly regulated 
local industry and construction. 
A recent national survey of agri-
cultural land suggests that an average 
of 16.2 percent of all rural land is con-
taminated. That percentage grows to 
19.4 when you exclude grasslands and 
forests and only consider arable land. 
The survey is extensive and national, 
as it is based on samples from about 
two-thirds of all agricultural land in 
China. The most common pollutants 
are inorganic, suggesting that indus-
trial development is the main cause of 
such pollution. The worst contamina-
tion is found in the traditional bread-
baskets of the Yangtze Delta and the 
Pearl River Delta as well as the north-
east of the country, all of which have 
experienced high levels of industriali-
sation in recent decades. 
August 2015: Following the deadly chemical warehouse 
fires in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin, large num-
bers of dead fish were found in the city’s Haihe River 
Photo: pbs.twimg.com
What the survey does not reveal 
is the potential impact of pollution on 
the quality of the produce. The release 
of these numbers, which had long re-
mained a ‘state secret’, is enough to 
concern the urban consumers of local-
ly grown agricultural products. 
Even more alarming is the qual-
ity of China’s water, three-quarters of 
which is used for agriculture. Authori-
ties are working to improve the quality 
of drinking water in cities to accommo-
date the growing numbers of people 
living in urban areas. Yet one estimate 
suggests that over seventy percent of 
river water in the country may be unfit 
for human contact, let alone drinking, 
and its use in agriculture a danger to 
public health. In some areas, record-
ed lead levels in rivers have reached 
forty-four times the accepted nation-
al standards. Officials admit that over 
sixty percent of underground water is 
46
47
also polluted. The historically uneven 
water levels of Chinese rivers increase 
farmers’ reliance on wells, height-
ening the risk of crop contamination 
from polluted aquifers. Only one-fifth 
of the water flowing underneath the 
North China Plain (the area around 
the lower Yellow River, its tributaries 
and the land north of it) is deemed safe 
for human consumption.
The government has launched op-
timistic campaigns to clean up China’s 
land and water. It hands anti-pollution 
targets to local cadres, which in reality 
become one more item in already long 
to-do lists, often in contradiction with 
other targets, for example, economic 
growth, social stability, and urbanisa-
tion.  Bureaucratic inertia, the size and 
cost of the clean up, the lack of skills 
and technology, and the long time 
frame required for such transforma-
tion suggest that things may get worse 
before they get better. 
Agricultural production contin-
ues to grow in China, but at an even 
slower rate than the rest of the econ-
omy. A recent report from Deutsche 
Bank dispels the myth that low produc-
tivity can be blamed solely on limited 
land and water. Comparing China’s 
water and land resources with those 
of South Korea, DB notices that South 
Korean farmers have an even great-
er shortage of natural resources, yet 
they invest almost six times as much 
in machinery than their Chinese coun-
terparts, and are more than eighteen 
times more productive per capita. 
The Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences believes that Chinese agricul-
ture lags behind that of other world 
powers, specifically, 108 years behind 
June 2015: Blue-green algae covers Chao Lake in 
Anhui province 
Source: blog.sina.com.cn
June 2015: Pollution has turned the Lian River 



























































the US and thirty-six years behind 
South Korea. An American cow pro-
duces four times more milk than a 
Chinese cow, and the US per hectare 
production of soy beans is double that 
of China; China has become the larg-
est soy bean importer in the world. 
China still produces almost a quarter 
of the world’s food on seven percent 
of the world’s arable land, a remark-
able achievement, but one that cannot 
guarantee self-reliance.  
Productivity relies on investment, 
but the small size of family plots in 
Chinese villages, limited interest from 
agribusiness, and collective ownership 
add up to significantly less investment 
than is needed. Collective ownership 
prevents farmers from taking out 
loans with their land as collateral. 
Public ownership of land as a pil-
lar of the socialist market economy at 
least protects farmers from the vagar-
ies of land speculation (see the China 
Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising China, 
Forum ‘A New Land Reform’, pp.234–
241). Under the current regime, while 
farmers don’t own the land they work, 
they enjoy exclusive land use rights 
for a period of thirty years. In Janu-
ary 2015, the government drafted new 
guidelines that allow farmers in thirty- 
three counties to trade these land use 
rights. Previously, such rights were 
inalienable. There are still significant 
limitations on the trade: villages will 
be allowed to trade land only where 
it has been clearly redefined as ‘non- 
agricultural’ and where collectives 
have adopted a shareholding struc-
ture for ownership. The pilot areas are 
scattered across every single province 
in the country, including all provincial- 
level municipalities.
The experiment was inspired by 
Chongqing’s experiment with ‘land 
tickets’ beginning in 2010 to facilitate 
the expropriation of land for urbani-
sation. The local government provided 
‘land tickets’ to collectives that allowed 
them to trade available land on a lim-
ited market. Huang Qifan 黄奇帆, the 
Chinese dairy farmers are facing difficult times; some 




Chongqing’s experiment with ‘land tickets’
Photo: cq.xinhuanet.com
mayor of Chongqing, recently suggest-
ed that land use rights valued at more 
than RMB 30 billion have changed 
hands since 2010 thanks to this sys-
tem—and that Chongqing (which has 
eighteen million farmers and 300,000 
hectares of rural land) experienced no 
loss of farmland in the process. The 
state’s argument is that urbanisation 
leads to more efficient management 
of land.
To supplement the pilot scheme, 
the government is also carrying out 
a survey of ‘permanent farmland’—
high-quality agricultural land that 
should never be converted. Previously, 
it had spoken of drawing a ‘red line’ 
under the loss of arable land to pur-
poses other than agriculture so that 
there would always be at least 120 
million hectares available for farming. 
The need to preserve agricultural land 
and the trade in it are in obvious con-
tradiction, as the most immediately re-
warding way of using land is to convert 
it to industrial or construction use.  
It is difficult to see a solution to 
China’s farming problems, or a suc-
cessful way forward for its agriculture. 
Changing consumption habits in the 
cities, however, suggest a way forward 
for growers in search of higher returns 
from small plots. Years of continuous 
and high profile food scandals have 
generated a greater demand among 
middle-class and wealthy consumers 
for organic and premium agricultur-
al products. The amount of certified 
organic produce in China has tripled 
since 2007, but still only represents 
about one percent of total national 
production.
For the moment, organic prod-
ucts are still easier to source from 




























































and baby formula scandals of 2008 and 
beyond, foreign dairy farms have been 
high on the list of acquisition targets 
for Chinese investors. The assumption 
is that accessing existing production 
facilities overseas, even at a premium 
(Chinese investors recently ploughed 
US$43 billion into a Swiss agricultural 
company) is a better deal than trying 
to convert China’s contaminated soil to 
the level of purity required for organic 
production.
Australia, which possesses over 
half of all the certified organic land 
in the world, remains the third larg-
est exporter of agricultural products 
to China, after the US and Brazil. Its 
export of dairy products to China has 
grown threefold from 2007. Demand 
for organic Australian produce from 
overseas markets including China 
is already forty percent higher than 
what Australian farms can supply. 
While Chinese companies own only 
one percent of all Australian agricul-
tural land, China offers Australia’s 
farmers a fast-growing export market 
for quality food. All large agricultural 
producers have benefited from China’s 
increasing hunger for quality produce, 
with the US exporting about twenty-six 
billion dollars worth of agricultural 
goods to China (now its top destination 
for agricultural exports).
In Australia, the sale of the na-
tion’s oldest and largest dairy farm, 
Tasmania’s Van Diemen’s Land Com-
pany to Chinese investors generated 
heated discussion about whether the 
sale was in Australia’s ‘national inter-
est’. The ratification of a bilateral free 
trade agreement in December means 
there are likely to be even greater ef-
forts by Chinese investors to acquire 
agricultural assets that produce the 
goods that are increasing greater Chi-
nese demand for the goods themselves. 
The Chinese urban consumer is both 
wealthy enough and eager enough 
to pay premium prices on quality 
products and, however the free-trade 
agreement plays out, Australian organ-
ic farmers, in particular, are likely to 
do very well in the coming years. 







































ON 16 JUNE 2015, the Shanghai Composite Index, a measure of 
the price of all stocks traded at the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, reached an 
all-time high of 5,166 points. Share 
prices began falling the next day in a 
series of dramatic drops interrupted 
by occasional recoveries, dipping as 
low as 2,964 on 24 August and ending 
the year on 30 December at 3,572.
China’s other stock markets fol-
lowed the same pattern. After years of 
modest if sometimes sluggish growth 
since the 2008 global financial crisis, 
a season of exuberant rallies begin-
ning in the late summer of 2014 turned 
stock market mania into a cultural 
phenomenon. According to Bloom- 
berg, more than forty million new 
stock trading accounts were added 
between May 2014 and May 2015. The 
Yangcheng Evening News 羊城晚报 re-
ported on the plight of ‘stock market 
widows’ 股市寡妇—women whose 
husbands spent all their waking hours 
staring at screens showing market 
movements. The Wuhan Evening Pa-
per 武汉晚报 reported that one wife 
threatened to divorce her husband un-
less he invested his stock market gains 
in a house for their son. A man on Wei-
bo recounted giving ninety-nine stock 
shares to his wife for Valentine’s Day. 
State media contributed to the hype, 
urging investors on and dismissing 
fears that the picture of unlimited gain 
was too good to be true. In April 2015, 
the People’s Daily article declared 
‘4,000 points is just the beginning!’ As 
stories of small-time investors hitting it 
big spread, media outlets gave a name 
to the craze: the Stock Market Dream 





















股市梦, an adaptation of the govern-
ment’s much vaunted ‘Chinese Dream’.
The major cause of the frene- 
tic trading activity was probably the 
easing of restrictions on trading with 
borrowed money (known as margin 
financing). Following a pilot program 
in 2010, the Chinese Securities Regu-
latory Commission (CSRC) 中国证券监
督管理委员会 sanctioned this practice 
in 2011, but restricted it to investors 
who had maintained an account with 
a registered securities company for at 
least eighteen months, with the value 
of cash and stock in the account of at 
least RMB 500,000. But it loosened re-
quirements in 2013. As stock prices 
rose, inexperienced individual inves-
tors borrowed money, driven by the 
fear of missing out on the opportuni-
ty to get rich quick. In stock markets 
like those of Shanghai and Shenzhen, 
which are dominated not by institu-
tional investors but individual retail 
investors with a taste for speculation, 
this can lead to instability. 
In early June 2015, when the CSRC 
announced new restrictions on mar-
gin financing, the market panicked, 
dropping 8.5 percent in a day. Instead 
of rallying as predicted, though, the 
market kept dropping. The govern-
ment responded with heavy-handed 
rescue measures, including propping 
up stocks with government funds in an 
unsuccessful attempt to restore inves-
tor confidence. By 8 July, the Shanghai 
stock index had lost thirty-two percent 
of its value at its peak.
Although the market failed to re-
spond to government intervention, the 
government continued to react, this 
time punitively. On 25 August, a day 
after yet another market dip which 
newspapers around the world dubbed 
‘Black Monday’, public security offi-
cials arrested Caijing journalist Wang 
Xiaolu 王晓璐 for ‘spreading false in-
formation’ in connection with an arti-
cle he wrote claiming CSRC was plan-
ning to withdraw its support of the 
stock markets. A report on 30 August 
in the Financial Times, citing senior 
officials, stated that the government 
was in fact abandoning its attempt to 
prop up the markets through buying 
In the Chinese stock market, red indicates a gain in 



















stocks—though it was evidently not 
abandoning its attempt to strike out 
against those it suspected of spreading 
harmful information. A few days after 
his arrest, Wang confessed on state tel-
evision, apologising for causing ‘panic 
and disorder’.
To the Gallows
Throughout the summer, many Chi-
nese Internet users responded to the 
stock market misery with gallows hu-
mour and satire. ‘Last month, when 
the market was rising, the dog ate the 
same as I ate. Last week, when the 
market fell, I ate the same as the dog 
ate. This week I might eat the dog,’ 
one joke went. In another joke, posted 
on Weibo, an investor boasts that one 
reason he survived the latest market 
crash is that he studied past market 
fluctuations, monitored economic fun-
damentals, and read Marx’s Das Capi-
tal. The second reason: the last market 
crash had already wiped out all of his 
savings. Some playfully counterpoised 
China’s mythicised past with financial 
market developments. Cartoons de-
picting ironically repurposed images 
of Communist liberation circulated on 
social media: in one, China’s SOE in-
vestment fund is portayed as brawny 
communist troops arriving to shore up 
stock prices. In another, a girl stands 
over a fallen solider, saying ‘Awake, 
comrade, the stock market is rebound-
ing’. After more than a year of stock 
market mania, China’s ‘stock market 
dream’ had become a nightmare.








































The People’s Daily and other state media 
encourage investors to keep buying stocks, 
arguing that prices will keep rising.
12 June 
Shanghai Composite Index peaks at 5,166 
points.
27 June 
China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) cuts its benchmark lending 
rate to a record low and reduces reserve 
requirements for some banks.
29 June 
Pension funds managed by local govern-
ments are allowed to invest in the stock 
market, unlocking up to one billion RMB to 
invest in the equity market.  
Stocks continue to drop. The Shanghai Com-
posite Index drops 8.5 percent in a day.
1 July 
The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchang-
es announce plans to lower securities trans-
action fees by thirty percent.
2 July 
The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion (CSRC) lowers the threshold for margin 
financing  for individual investors. 
The CSRC sets up a team to investigate ille-
gal manipulation of stock prices.
4 July 
China’s top twenty-one securities brokerag-
es pledge to invest at least 120 billion RMB, 
or fifteen percent of their net assets, to sta-
bilise markets. 
Regulators halt new initial public offerings 
in an effort to shore up liquidity. 
5 July 
PBOC announces that it would provide  
liquidity support to the state-backed margin 
finance company, China Securities Finance 
Corp.
6 July
Over the course of a few days, the China Se-
curities Finance Corp (CSF) buys at least one 
trillion RMB worth of shares in an effort to 
stabilise markets.
8 July
The Shanghai stock index plummets thirty- 
two percent from its peak.
9 July 
The Ministry of Public Security says it will 
help the CSRC investigate short selling of 
stocks and indexes.
20 July
Caijing journalist Wang Xiaolu publishes an 
article claiming the CSRC plans to withdraw 
funds from the stock market.
STOCK MARKET CRASH TIMELINE 2015, by Lorand Laskai
11 August 2015: China carried out the biggest 




The CSRC announces that it will allow the 
market to play a bigger role in determining 
stock prices, signalling that the government 
might reduce its role in propping up the 
markets.
24 August 
Shanghai’s main share index loses 8.49 per-
cent of its value. Xinhua—an organ not giv-
en to hyperbole when reporting bad news 
out of China—dubs it ‘Black Monday’.
The PBOC cuts interest rates and reserve 
requirement ratio for the second time.
25 August 
Wang Xiaolu is detained by police. The 
search term ‘stock market collapse’ is 
censored on Baidu. The front page of the  
People’s Daily contains no news regarding 
the stock market. 
8 July 2015: The Shanghai stock index loses thirty-two percent from its peak
Source: china_ask.com
30 August
The Public Security Bureau announces 
that it has punished 197 people as part 
of a ‘special campaign’ associated with 
‘spreading rumours’ online about the 
stock market crash.
31 August 
Wang Xiaolu confesses on state televi-
sion to making ‘irresponsible’ and ‘sen-
sational’ remarks in his writing about the 
stock market.
14 September
















































DURING THE HEYDAY OF China’s economic miracle, being a patriot 
and a good businessman were one and 
the same. In late September, legendary 
Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka-
shing 李嘉诚 encountered the wrath of 
China’s state media and nationalistic 
netizens when he moved his invest-
ments away from China. 
A self-made business tycoon, Li is 
the second-richest person in Asia ac-
cording to Forbes. His universally rec-
ognised business acumen endows his 
investment decisions with heavy sym-
bolism; the extent of his investments 
in China had lent China’s economic 
miracle a kind of additional legiti- 
macy. But in 2013, Li Ka-shing’s 
Cheung Kong Holdings began slow-
ly restructuring its holdings in the 
Mainland. It sold off real estate, re-
tail chains, and other assets, shifting 
its investments to Europe. This sent 
shock waves through China’s business 
community. Wang Shi 王石, president 
of Vanke (one of China’s largest real 
estate developers), wrote on Weibo 
that ‘The very shrewd Mr. Li Ka-shing 
is selling properties in Beijing and 
Shanghai. This is a signal. Be careful!’ 
In the wake of China’s summer 
stock market collapse, some were 
quick to point the finger at Li for dam-
aging the confidence of investors. On 
14 September 2015, a Xinhua affiliated 
WeChat account published an article 
titled ‘Don’t Let Li Ka-shing Run Away’. 
The article charged Li with profiting 
from China before throwing it by the 
wayside: ‘In the eyes of the people, Li 
Ka-shing has thus transformed into a 
long, sharp-toothed creature, which is 
LI KA-SHING MOVES INVEST- 





















regretful.’ The article instructed Li to 
do three things: pay the people back 
(for what, it’s unclear), keep at least 
symbolic holdings in China, and do 
more philanthropy (despite being fa-
mous for the philanthropy he does 
already, including founding Shantou 
University in Guangdong province). 
The attack triggered a deluge of online 
attacks on Li.
Perhaps fearing that drawing at-
tention to Li’s rationale for moving 
his money out of China would draw 
further attention to China’s economic 
slowdown, government censors quick-
ly called off the attack. A government 
media directive dated 18 September, 
which was later leaked, instructed 
media outlets to ‘stop hyping reports 
and commentaries on Li Ka-shing di-
vesting from mainland [China]’. State 
media quickly demonstrated a new-
found composure, exemplified by a 
piece in the Securities Times on 20 
September entitled, ‘Let Li Ka-shing go, 
the sky won’t collapse’. 
But it was too late. Cheung Kong 
Holdings issued a press statement just 
a few days later. While Li is normally 
soft-spoken and non-confrontational, 
the press statement criticised the per-
sonal nature of the attacks as showing 
a ‘cultural revolution mentality’. In the 
tone of a loyal but aggrieved subject, it 
noted that Li had not responded earlier 
for fear of causing a distraction during 
President Xi’s visit to the US (which co-
incided with the media frenzy against 
him). It drew attention to Li’s many 
philanthropic contributions in the 
Mainland. He explained his decision to 
invest abroad as consistent with official 
policy, pointing to the government’s 
‘going out’ 走出去战略 strategy and 
Xi’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (see 
Forum ‘One Belt One Road: Interna-
tional development finance with Chi-
nese Characteristics’, pp.244–250). On 
the topic of his patriotism, Li reflected 
on his childhood in Chaozhou, Guang-
dong province, growing up amid war 
and destruction, and the thirty years 
of tumult that came after. ‘Of course 
this made him unhappy,’ the statement 
read. ‘But he believes [Song and Tang 
dynasty poets’] Su Shi and Bai Juyi said 
correctly: “Where there’s home there is 
heart” and “Where my heart finds its 





































































CHINA HAS BEEN PUSHING for the internationalisation of its curren-
cy, the renminbi (RMB), since the late-
2000s. Ever since setting up the first 
RMB-denominated bond (also known 
as Dim Sum Bonds) market in Hong 
Kong in 2009, China has been building 
the financial infrastructure necessary 
to facilitate international transactions 
in RMB and to liberalise its capital 
account and capital markets. In 2015, 
China: 
 • Signed bilateral currency swap 
agreements with Surinam, South Af-
rica, Chile, and Tajikistan, bringing 
the total number of such agreements 
to thirty-two.
 • Set up RMB clearing banks in Thai-
land, Malaysia, and Chile, in addi-
tion to its twelve already established 
banks.
• Allowed more foreign investors to 
trade in its domestic, RMB-denom-
inated stock market under its RMB 
Qualified Institutional Investor 
(RQFII, 人民币合格境外机构投资者) 
program.
In October 2015, China also 
launched the first phase of its Cross- 
border Inter-bank Payment System 
(CIPS, 人民币跨境支付系统). This sys-
tem to clear cross-border RMB pay-
ments has been called a ‘milestone of 
RMB internationalisation’ by the Peo-
ple’s Bank of China (PBOC, 中国人民银
行), China’s central bank. Prior to CIPS, 
payments to and from China were cost-
ly and slow to execute. Most had to be 
re-routed through one of the above-
mentioned clearing banks, as China’s 
national payment system is incom-
patible with the internationally used 










































SWIFT system. With CIPS in place, 
the nineteen connected banks, nine 
of which are foreign institutions, can 
directly handle RMB transactions for 
cross-border trade, direct investment, 
financing and personal remittances. 
The Financial Times reports that the 
system currently only includes on-
shore entities, but that it will eventual-
ly allow offshore banks to participate 
as well, enabling offshore-to-offshore 
RMB payments as well as transfers in 
and out of China. 
Another milestone was the de-
cision by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to include the RMB in its 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) curren-
cy basket. To meet IMF’s criteria, Chi-
na pushed through multiple financial 
reforms in 2015. These included full 
liberalisation of interest rates and a 
reform of the RMB pricing mecha-
nism. This last reform was especially 
praised by the IMF as ‘a welcome step’ 
because ‘it should allow market forces 
to have a greater role in determining 
the exchange rate’. Apart from symbol-
ising China’s economic influence and 
continued integration into the world 
economy, the inclusion of the RMB into 
the SDR basket might lead to greater 
demand for RMB-denominated assets 
in the future.
According to a SWIFT report in 
January 2016, the RMB was the fifth 
most-used currency worldwide in De-
cember 2015 and even temporarily 
took fourth place in August, beating 
the Japanese yen. To put this into per-
spective, however, only 2.31 percent 
of all transactions were settled in RMB 
that month, making the currency only 
slightly more used than the Canadian 
dollar or the Swiss franc. Some for-
eign analysts believe that the recent 
increase in RMB usage is more the re-
sult of speculation than trade and in-
vestment. At the same time, a mixture 
of reforms, economic policy, and con-
cerns about possible economic slow-
down have caused major fluctuations 
in the currency’s exchange rate. While 
the RMB was relatively stable during 
the first half of the year, it dropped 
2.8 percent against the dollar in just 
three days after the PBOC announced it 
would reform the RMB’s pricing mech-
anism. It dropped sharply again in 
December, making the latter half of 
2015 one of the most volatile and bear-
ish periods in the currency’s history. 
















































THE FOG OF LAW
Susan Trevaskes and Elisa Nesossi
2
DURING HIS THREE YEARS AT THE HELM, Xi 
Jinping has championed a particular notion of the 
‘rule of law’. The October 2014 Resolution of the 
Fourth Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress 
articulated a grand plan for political and social sta-
bility that made ‘ruling the nation according to the 
law’ 依法治国 the Chinese government’s top priority. 
In late December that year, the Party declared ‘rul-
ing the nation according to the law’ one of the ‘Four 
Comprehensives’ 四个全面 that constitute Xi’s chief 
contribution to political theory. 
Protestors in Beijing












































To understand what the rule of law actually means, we need to look 
closely at the October 2014 Resolution, because it states that Party lead-
ership and the rule of law are identical. It also describes the rule of law 
as integrating two ancient traditions of law and governance: the Legalist 
tradition of ‘ruling the nation according to the law’ with the Confucian 
principle of ‘ruling the nation by morality’ 以德治国. The latter associates 
political order with the moral authority of a nation’s leaders. The interests 
of a morally upright leadership are identical to those of the people they 
govern—and so, by this logic, the law can and should be used to sustain 
the power of the ruling (Communist) party. Hence, the rule of law can be 
understood to mean Party-Rule-Through-Law.
Given China’s increasingly heterogeneous society, in which people 
may find their needs and interests at odds with those of the Party, the 
rule of law serves the practical function of controlling dissent as well. As 
we have written in previous China Story Yearbooks, over the last fifteen 
years or more, there have been many tens of thousands of public protests 
According to the multilingual animated music video, The Four Comprehensives, ‘the rule of law is guaranteed’
Photo: thenanfang.com
annually against corruption and 
abuses of power—what the Party 
calls ‘mass incidents’. President 
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao 
responded to such unrest by 
mounting campaigns to ‘maintain 
stability’: policing and judicial 
measures known as ‘stability 
maintenance’. Now, with his rule 
of law agenda, Xi Jinping has put 
‘stability maintenance’ on steroids. 
Pruning the Political 
Tree
For two years, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has targeted party officials 
accused of moral and/or material corruption. Xi has wielded the rule 
of law—in this case the Party’s internal disciplinary rules—like a blade 
with which to prune the unruly branches at the top of the political tree. 
These ‘branches’ include mid-ranking party officials as well as higher-
ups in Beijing whom he considers a potential threat to his leadership; not 
all the corrupt officials are targeted. Still, with at least one senior official 
in every province under arrest, this campaign has turned into the most 
comprehensive attack on graft since the Cultural Revolution.
In 2015, its focus turned to the business sector, including some of 
China’s biggest corporations: CNP, Sinopec, and Chinalco. The Washington-
based Eurasia Group, the world’s largest consultancy specialising in 
political risk, suggests that in 2015, no less than eighty-three Chinese 
entities—including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and institutions 
such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission—have fallen under 
investigation, compared with twenty in 2013 when the campaign began.
29 June 2015: A ‘mass incident’ in Jinshan district, 
Shanghai. Thousands of protestors gathered to pro-












































71 The ‘leniency’ of the suspended 
death sentence handed to Zhou Yong- 
kang 周永康 in June 2015 was read 
by some analysts as signalling that 
the campaign was winding down. 
Zhou, the former secretary of the 
Central Political and Legal Affairs 
Commission, was the most senior 
political figure in decades to be 
expelled from the Party and charged 
with capital offences—in his case 
bribery and abuse of power. The suspended death sentence may eventually 
be commuted to a long custodial sentence. With many observers expecting 
that Zhou would face immediate execution, the lighter punishment 
appeared to be a message that Xi was prepared to end the anti-corruption 
campaign before it could seriously threaten powerful figures, particularly 
within the military, who might have gone down fighting. 
The campaign continues to target corrupt officials who have fled the 
country. Since April 2015, five government departments—the People’s 
Bank of China, the Ministry of Public Security, the Supreme People’s Court, 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the State Administration of For-
eign Exchange—have worked jointly to track down fugitive officials and 
their illicit assets. 
Criminalising Unruliness
The 2015 Amendment to the 1997 Criminal Law, passed in August, listed 
nine types of crimes that will no longer be subject to the death penalty. 
Smuggling weapons or ammunition, smuggling nuclear materials, smug-
gling counterfeit money, counterfeiting, investment fraud and fraudulent 
Zhou Yongkang
Photo: Caixin
fundraising, organising prostitution, 
forcing females into prostitution, ob-
structing military affairs, and spread-
ing rumours, and undermining mo-
rale during wartime are no longer 
punishable by death. This brings 
down the number of capital crimes in 
China to a total of forty-three. The re-
vised Criminal Law also extends pro-
tection to some of society’s more vul-
nerable or previously ignored groups. 
New criminal offences include rape 
committed against males, the purchase 
of children even if there is no evidence 
of abuse, and actions by guardians and 
caretakers that harm those under their 
care. 
The Criminal Law has introduced twenty new criminal offences and 
the amendment has increased the seriousness of selected other offences. 
Among the newly listed crimes are contempt of court as evidenced by ‘in-
sulting a judge’, ‘disrupting court orders’, ‘reporting or revealing infor-
mation about cases not made public’, and even bringing a civil case that 
is based on ‘a distorted version of the truth’. In addition, the law targets 
forms of dissent including ‘fabricating or deliberately transmitting false 
information’ online, ‘forcing someone to wear extremist clothing or to-
kens’, ‘disrupting the work of public bodies’, and ‘organising or aiding il-
legal gatherings.’ The new crime of ‘forcing someone to wear extremist 
clothing or tokens’ appears to be aimed at discouraging Uyghur men and 
women in Xinjiang from wearing clothing such as the hijab, or Muslim 
headscarf that expresses devotion to their faith. 













































THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & THE COUNTERTERRORISM LAW, by Oma Lee
The National People’s Congress approved new National Security and Counterterrorism laws. 
Foreign media, technology companies, foreign civil society organisations, and governments 
have widely criticised the laws for conferring Chinese authorities with even greater powers 
to restrict and control the activities of non-state actors especially when coupled with the 
Law on Managing Foreign Non-Governmental Organisations and Cybersecurity Laws.
The National Security Law effectively grants the National Security Commission domain 
over China’s national security encompassing politics, the military, finance, cyberspace, 
culture, environment, ideology, and religion. It sets out the principles of security manage-
ment, including intelligence collection, risk assessments, national security reviews, 
emergency responses, and so on, and lays out the responsibilities of citizens and companies 
to assist the authorities in protecting national security and reporting potential threats. This 
applies to Hong Kong and Macau as well.
The law also requires Internet and information technology, information systems and 
data to be ‘secure and controllable’. The National Security Commission has the power 
to conduct reviews of foreign commercial investment, special technologies, Internet 
information technology products and services, and all other projects involving national 
security matters (Article 59). A broad spectrum of foreign governments, businesses, and 
civil society groups see the law as legitimising stronger restrictions on foreign business, 
social and political interests in China. 
Chinese Internet café
Photo: thecomingcrisis.blogspot.com
The Counterterrorism Law, meanwhile, proposes the establishment of a national body 
in charge of identifying terrorist activities and co-ordinating nationwide counterterrorist 
work. The first draft, issued for public comment in November 2014, drew widespread 
criticism for its vague definition of terrorism and the requirement that foreign tech 
companies provide their encryption keys to authorities and keep their servers and user 
data in China. Foreign companies and leaders, including US President Obama criticised the 
law and its potential effect on the Chinese business environment, making it less attractive 
to foreign companies. China has argued that many Western governments have similar 
requirements and that Chinese companies operating overseas are subjected to heavy 
security checks. Still, the final draft removed, inter alia, the clauses about encryption keys 
and foreign businesses keeping servers and user data in China. 
The law still requires companies to provide encryption information upon the request 
of the government. Telecommunications and Internet service providers in particular are 
also required to monitor, report, and prevent dissemination of information on terrorism 
and extremism (including activities, such as peaceful agitation for greater autonomy for 
Xinjiang or Tibet, that are not considered either terrorist or extremist outside China). 
(Article 19). 
The Chinese government has claimed that the laws will help strengthen the Party-
state’s ability to prevent, handle, and punish threats to both national and international 
security. How it will affect foreign business activities and data security in practice remains 
to be seen. 














































The rule of law agenda makes use of the revolutionary language of the 
‘mass line’ and ‘political struggle’ 斗争. By drawing on what Qian Gang 
钱钢 at the China Media Project in Hong Kong, calls ‘deep red’ Maoist dis-
course, Xi Jinping is signalling that he expects local authorities across the 
nation to crack down hard on certain types of criminals and (criminalised) 
dissenters who are characterised as ‘enemies of the people’. 
For example, speaking at the start of a new ‘People’s War on Drugs’ 
campaign launched on 26 June 2015, Xi Jinping used classic Maoist lan-
guage: ‘We will not recall our army until we have achieved total victory’ 
不获全胜绝不收兵. Another Maoist slogan, ‘strengthening the democratic 
dictatorship of the people’ 加强人民民主专政 was displayed on a banner 
25 June 2015: Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang shake hands with groups and individuals being honoured for their 
contributions to the country’s antidrug campaign in Beijing
Photo: news.cn
at a sentencing rally to publicly shame drug offenders before an audience 
of primary school children. In the post-Mao era it has been almost un-
heard of to conduct rallies in schools. But this is what happened on 26 
June in Dingan county in Tianjin, where offenders convicted of trafficking 
relatively small amounts of drugs (ten grams of heroin) were sentenced to 
eight years imprisonment in front of young children.
Xi also followed Mao’s example when he issued a special pardon to a 
limited group of imprisoned criminals to mark the seventieth anniversary 
of the end of World War II. Those he pardoned included those who had 
fought in the War Against the Japanese Occupation, for the Communist 
Party during China’s civil war or who had served in the People’s Liber-
ation Army in other wars. They also included those who were disabled, 
over seventy-five years old or who were under eighteen when they com-
mitted the crime. This pardon was only the eighth since the founding of 
the PRC; Mao was responsible for the first seven. So while more optimis-
tic commentators saw in the amnesty a positive development towards the 
realisation of human rights and the rule of law, others interpreted it as 
display of extreme confidence and power on the part of Xi.
In September 2015, Xi Jinping declared that ‘Communism is not ethe-
real and unattainable’ but the very goal towards which the Party should 
be working. Reaffirming the end-game of Communism after thirty-eight 
years of silence on the issue is part of Xi’s plan to revive the ‘Party’s na-
ture’ 党性. In this context, applying the rule of the law—including to the 
Party itself through new Party disciplinary rules 中国共产党纪录处分条
例 announced in November 2015—is one of the means by which Xi plans 
to realise Communism. The use of the expression ‘improper discussion of 
[the policies] of the Central Party’ 妄议中央 that appears in Article 46 of 
the rules has raised some eyebrows within the Party as it further institu-












































Legislating for Stability Over Society 
In April 2015, the National People’s Congress released the second draft 
of a new law on Managing Foreign Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs). It establishes procedures for foreign organisations to formally 
register with the government and conduct activities within China. It also 
puts NGOs under the supervision of public security departments within 
the State Council and imposes restrictions on Chinese NGOs that receive 
money from overseas. 
International NGOs and representatives of other foreign bodies with 
interests in or ongoing exchanges with Chinese counterparts, including 
universities, professional organisations, and business groups, submitted 
letters to the National People’s Congress expressing grave concern about 
these provisions, as well as suggestions for amendments. They worry that 
the ambiguously-worded law, which fails to provide clear definitions of 
non-profit activities, could jeopardise many kinds of foreign operations 
within China, including those of universities and think tanks involved in 
academic and cultural exchanges. 
Chinese officials answer questions about a new law regulating foreign NGOs during a press conference at the 
Great Hall of the People in Beijing 
Photo: Weibo
 Another controversial law, passed on 1 
July 2015, is the National Security Law (see 
Information Window ‘The National Security 
Law and The Counterterrorism Law’, pp.72–
73). In the view of Professor Fu Hualing 傅
華伶 of the University of Hong Kong, what 
is most significant about the new law is 
that it shifts the focus from punishment to 
prevention in such a way that justifies even 
more pervasive surveillance, particularly over 
people’s expressed opinions on the basis of 
safeguarding the country’s ‘core interests’ 核心
利益. As defined in Article 2 of the new law, these are: maintenance of the 
political system under the rule of the Communist Party, the defence of 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and economic development. 
In its preamble, the law states baldly that safeguarding the political 
regime ranks above sovereignty, national unification, territorial integri-
ty, and the people’s welfare. The implication is that any activities alleged 
to endanger the rule of the Communist Party may now be interpreted 
as a threat to national security. Vague wording makes it easier for the 
party-state to act against its internal and external ‘enemies’ on issues rang-
ing from cultural and ideological heterodoxy to cybersecurity and even 
China’s interests in space. 
Pruning Other Parts of the Tree
As suggested above, the Party central leadership is extending what it calls 
the ‘struggle’ from crime to political dissent in general. David Bandurski 
from the China Media Project has quoted from a full–page People’s Daily 
article in February: ‘China cannot and must not … slavishly copy the sys-
tems of the West. Such copying is a means proposed by unspecified ‘hostile 














































Not surprisingly, 2015 was a particularly bad year for civil society and 
human rights activism. The authorities have moved strongly to suppress 
public expressions of dissent, including those that fall within the legal or 
constitutional rights of Chinese citizens. Lawyers, labour activists, and 
people working for NGOs have all felt the heat, and there were hundreds 
of arrests of lawyers over several months in the summer of 2015 alone. 
The year began with a series of arrests and detention of a number of 
prominent civil society activists. Among the first prominent victims of the 
campaign against local NGOs and civil society activism was Guo Yushan 郭
玉闪, a Chinese scholar and the founder of the well-known think tank Tran-
sition Institute 传知行. Guo had helped the blind rights activist Chen Guang-
cheng 陈光诚 escape from house arrest in 2012 and had expressed support 
for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. He was first detained in 
October 2014. In May 2015, the Beijing Public Security Bureau recommend-
ed that the procuratorate indict Guo Yushan and his colleague He Zheng-
jun 何正军 for ‘illegal business operations’, following a pattern by which 
the Party-state, rather than directly accusing someone of ‘thought crimes’ 
and leaving itself open to the accusation that China has political prisoners, 
finds some dubious crime to pin on the accused, one that may be difficult to 
defend and which has the additional benefit of smearing their public repu-
tation. In September, just ahead of Xi’s visit to the US, Guo and He were re-
leased on bail, a gesture seen by many observers as a way of smoothing Xi’s 







‘Occupy Men’s Toilets’ Campaign in 2012
Photo: english.cntv.cn
But Guo was far from the only case that drew the attention of human 
rights advocates in 2015. Just days before International Women’s Day on 
8 March, public security forces detained five feminist activists in connec-
tion with anti-sexual harrassment demonstrations they were planning. 
The five women had led a campaign in 2012 to ‘occupy’ men’s toilets in an 
effort to persuade the government to build more public loos for women. 
Police had warned the women that further activism could get them into 
trouble. Their arrest in March made them a popular cause among human 
rights advocates at home and abroad, who used the Twitter hashtag #Free-
TheFive. In early April, Hillary Clinton tweeted that their detention was 
‘inexcusable’, and called for their release. On 13 April, the ‘Feminist Five’ 
were released en masse. 
That same month, however, Gao Yu 高瑜, a seventy-one-year-old 
journalist, was sentenced to seven years in prison for leaking state secrets 
abroad—in her case, by disclosing a Communist Party directive called 
‘Document No. 9’ to the Minjing News, an overseas news media group (see 
the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, p.319 and p.334). The doc-












































While past years have seen numerous arrests and harassment of law-
yers who defend people’s rights 维权律师, the scale and ferocity of the 
attacks on this group in 2015 were unprecedented. The crackdown began 
on 9 July 2015 with the seizures of lawyers Zhou Shifeng 周世锋 and Wang 
Yu 王宇 and other staff of the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm 北京锋锐律师事务
所. During the previous months, members of the law firm, including Wang 
Yu herself, had been involved in a number of cases deemed sensitive by 
the government, including a case in Heilongjiang of a petitioner shot dead 
by the police and the case of the ‘Jiangxi 4’, where four villagers had been 
wrongly convicted of a double murder in 2000. Involvement in these cases 
and in other prominent cases in the previous years—the defence of Fa-
lun Gong practitioners, of journalist Cao Shunli 曹顺利, and of the Uyghur 
professor Ilham Tohti 伊力哈木·土赫提—made Wang Yu an easy target. 
Without exception, those who spoke out and defended Zhou or Wang have 
been harassed or detained. In the case of the law firm headed by Li Heping 
李和平, everyone, including  Li Heping’s brother, lawyer Li Chunfu 李 
春富, has disappeared without trace. 
Arrested lawyers: (from top left) Pu Zhiqiang, Zhou Shifeng, Wang Yu (from bottom 
left) Li Heping, Wang Quanzhang, Sui Muqing
Photo: molihuazh.blogspot.com
Amnesty International’s appeal for the Feminist Five
Photo: Tumblr
FEMINIST FIVE, by Siodhbhra Parkin
As discussed in this chapter, the Feminist Five 女权五姐妹—Li Tingting 李婷婷, Wu Rongong 
武嵘嵘, Zheng Churan 郑楚然, Wei Tingting 韦婷婷, and Wang Man 王曼—were arrested in 
the middle of the night on 6 March 2015, two days before International Women’s Day. The 
arrests took place on the eve of the Five’s planned public campaign to raise awareness about 
sexual harassment on public transportation; they were charged with ’gathering a crowd to 
disrupt public order’ despite not having had the chance to gather the crowd in the first place. 
Previously Li Tingting and others had organised a movement called ‘Occupy Men’s 
Toilets’ that involved staging sit-ins at male toilets to draw attention to the relative lack 
of facilities for women. ‘Occupy’ attracted widespread international and domestic media 
attention. Another one of the women, Wu Rongrong had founded Weizhiming 蔚之鸣, a legal 
centre specialising in women’s rights, and often organised public education events. Both Li 
Tingting and Wei Tingting have also played extremely public roles in LGBT rights activism.  
The Feminist Five were released on bail within twenty-four hours of each other on 13 
April 2015. They had spent thirty-seven days at the Haidian District Detention Centre. All 
five are still officially criminal suspects, though no court dates have been set. Some of them 
have already been briefly re-detained and questioned. They also face travel restrictions, 
and are prohibited from speaking to the media. Weizhiming, the women’s legal centre, was 
forced to shut its doors in the summer of 2015, followed by the closure of the internationally 
recognised Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counselling Service Centre 众泽妇女法律咨询
服务中心 not long afterwards. ‘I’d like to thank the Chinese government for arresting me,’ 
feminist activist Li Tingting remarked in a recorded statement released on the one-year 
anniversary of her arrest. ‘Without their involvement, I think many fewer people would be 












































THE RISE OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION, by Siodhbhra Parkin
In a country where the ‘rule of law’ remains an 
embattled concept, the role of public interest liti-
gation 公益诉讼 is severely limited by the govern-
ment. However, this might be about to change. In 
the past few years, legislative and policy shifts have 
signalled a gradually widening space for the role of 
public interest litigation, and in 2015, a record num-
ber of such cases was accepted for hearing 受理 by 
China’s courts.
The term ‘public interest litigation’ refers to law-
suits brought on behalf of the general public against 
government agencies, private companies, or other 
A record number of public interest 
litigation cases was accepted for hearing 
by China’s courts in 2015
Photo: Caixin
During July and August, public security officers took into custody 
more than 250 lawyers and professional legal staff, interrogating them 
about both their own activities and those of their colleagues. A number 
of lawyers were kept in police custody for extended periods; others were 
placed under ‘residential surveillance at a fixed location’ 指定居所监
视 without access to their own lawyers. While some were released with-
in days or months according to the terms of the law, others have been 
charged with the crime of ‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’ 寻衅
滋事罪 or ‘endangering state security’ 危害国家安全罪. 
To support the campaign, Chinese official media published articles 
outlining the threats that such lawyers allegedly posed to social stability. 
In the weeks leading up to and following the crackdown, the People’s Daily 
described human rights lawyers as a dangerous criminal ‘gang’ 圈子 that 
has been undermining the social order since 2012. The articles resurrect 
Maoist tactics of public shaming to justify repression against alleged dis-
senters. As of 11 December 2015, twenty-five lawyers and their associates 
remained under ‘residential surveillance at a fixed location’, the majority 
held in unknown locations without the ability to access either legal advice 
or make contact with their families. 
organisations whose actions have violated the interests of society through environmental 
pollution, for example. Until 2012, the courts did not accept most public interest suits filed 
by public interest lawyers or NGOs.
However, as pollution and consumer protection scandals increased in frequency and 
severity, along with public outrage, things began to change. In 2011, a Chinese court in 
Yunnan province accepted the first environmental public interest lawsuit in China. In 2012, 
the Chinese government added a provision to the Civil Procedure Law that permitted 
‘lawful agencies and related organisations’ to file public interest lawsuits; the definition 
of lawful agencies was later expanded to include certain types of environmental and 
consumer protection NGOs. Yet that first public interest case filed back in 2011 remains 
unresolved, and continues to navigate its way through a complex legal landscape. Whether 
public interest litigation will prove genuinely effective or yet another social management 
tool co-opted by the government remains to be seen.
Police also harassed the lawyers’ families and peers. They repeatedly 
interrogated Wang Yu’s sixteen-year-old son and confiscated his passport. 
In October, the boy crossed the border into Myanmar, but was arrested 
there and taken back to China, where he was put under house arrest. 
Many lawyers and activists have been prevented from leaving the country 
under the pretext that their going abroad would endanger the security 
of the state or the like. At the same time, China arranged for the deporta-
tion back to the country from Thailand of two veteran Chinese dissidents, 
who were registered as refugees there, in a covert security operation that 
involved co-operation between the two countries in violation of interna-
tional legal standards. 
‘Picking quarrels and provoking troubles’ is the official phrase used to 
criminalise dissent. In November 2014, lawyer and human rights activist 
Guo Feixiong 郭飞雄, arrested in August 2013 on suspicion of ‘gathering 
crowds’ was tried, convicted, and sentenced to six years in prison. To the 
surprise of Guo and his defence team and in violation of procedural rules, 
the judge announced during the trial that ‘picking quarrels’ had been add-
ed to the initial charge, which resulted in the addition of two more years 












































Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court found lawyer Pu Zhiqiang 浦
志强, one of the most outspoken of the human rights lawyers of the group 
detained in May the previous year (see the China Story Yearbook 2014: 
Shared Destiny, p.265, pp.278–279, p.290, and p.335), guilty of ‘inciting eth-
nic hatred’ 煽动民族仇恨罪 and ‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’. 
They sentenced Pu, who had already been detained for eighteen months, 
to a three-years ‘suspended’ 缓刑 jail sentence, which he will most proba-
bly spend outside jail, and suspended his licence to practice law.
Nearly thirty international associations of lawyers and jurists and nu-
merous international organisations including the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Bar Association and 
the Law Council of Australia have condemned the actions of the Chinese 
authorities. The United Nations Committee against Torture, in its fifth pe-
riodic report on China, which was released in December 2015, strongly 
denounced the crackdown. It also requested a ‘prompt, thorough and im-
partial investigation of all the human rights violations perpetrated against 
lawyers’.
Conclusion 
Developments in 2015 make it difficult to argue that there has been a shift 
to a rule of law, at least as understood in countries such as Australia or 
the US. Mao’s legacy is clearly visible in the party-state’s approach to the 
administration of justice and criminal punishment under Xi Jinping, par-
ticularly in the politico-legal language it is using, with its references to 
struggles, wars, and social contradictions.
Middle: the Chairperson of the UN Committee against Torture, Claudio Grossman
Photo: UN photo/Loey Felipe
On the one hand, political and judicial authorities are promoting the 
rule of law as a way of strengthening what they call ‘institutional credibili-
ty’ 公信力, openly implying that it is legitimacy that is sorely lacking in the 
legal system following a decade of Stability Maintenance in the Hu Jintao 
era. They have made some improvements to increase the credibility of the 
courts such as making court rulings more transparent (see the China Sto-
ry Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, Chapter 6 ‘The Sword of Discipline and 
the Dagger of Justice’, pp.260–283) and introduced laws to protect some 
of society’s more vulnerable citizens—an impressive and much needed 
development.
On the other hand, Xi is using Party-Rule-Through-Law to impose a 
clear political agenda on both the Party machinery and criminal justice 
agencies. Both internal Party regulations and criminal laws place a priori-
ty on protecting the state and preserving political stability (i.e. the contin-
ued rule of the Communist Party). They aim to thwart corruption, improve 
the efficiency of government, and enhance judicial fairness—but also to 
suppress dissent, even when it is in the form of arguing for the rights of 
citizens under China’s own laws and constitution. As a result, Xi’s years in 
power will almost surely be remembered far more for his intolerance of 
discordant voices than for any rule of law. 
GREEN GOOD NEWS, 
by Susan Trevaskes and Elisa Nesossi
At the end of October 2015, two green NGOs won 
China’s first environmental public interest case. The 
Nanping Intermediate People’s Court of Fujian Prov-
ince issued a judgment in favour of the two environ-
mental NGOs, Friends of Nature and Fujian Green 
Home. The case, which concerned an illegal mining 
site, was heard under China’s new Environmental 












































A YEAR OF DISAPPEARING BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, by Lorand Laskai
In 2015, China’s anti-corruption drive reached China’s business class. Many executives were 
taken unannounced, what the media and their staff described as shilian 失联, ‘losing con-
tact’. A number of top Chinese executive from both private and state-owned enterprises 
‘lost contact’, taken abruptly to ‘assist in investigations’, leaving empty boardrooms and 
panic-stricken investors. Some reappeared after a period of time as if nothing ever hap-
pened; others faced corruption charges; still others remain missing in action. 
Many disappearances were the work of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspec-
tion (CCDI), the secretive and ruthless body charged with carrying out President Xi Jinping’s 
anticorruption drive. However, since many disappearances in 2015 occurred without public 
notice or explanation, the connection between many disappeared businessmen and the 
CCDI’s anti-corruption efforts are often tenuous and unclear. Often, the businessmen are 
just disposable pawns, brought in suddenly for interrogations; authorities looking to build 
a case against a political patron or high-up Party members often target the businessmen 
they support. Soon after Fosun Group’s chairman Guo Guangchang 郭广昌 ‘lost contact’, 
another prominent business executive, Feng Lun 冯仑 of Vantone Holdings 万通, wrote on 
his blog: ‘A private tycoon once said, “In the eyes of a government official, we are nothing but 
cockroaches. If he wants to kill you, he kills you. If he wants to let you live, he lets you live.” ’
Mao Xiaofeng 毛晓峰—president of Minsheng Bank 中国民生
银行
In late January, the CCDI detained Mao Xiaofeng, the youngest 
president of a publically listed Chinese bank, in relation to the 
ongoing investigation of Ling Jihua 令计划, a former high-rank-
ing official, for corruption. Mao resigned from his post a few 
days later, citing personal reasons. Mao had served in the Com-
munity Youth League prior to joining Minsheng. Chinese media 
reported that he had close ties to Ling Jihua’s wife as well as the 
wife of another official under investigation, Su Rong 苏荣.
Lei Jie 雷杰—chairman of Founder Securities 方正证券
In late January, Founder Securities announced that it had lost 
contact with its chairman Lei Jie, who had asked for sick leave 
through relatives. Founder Securities is a joint venture be-
tween Swiss Credit Suisse Group AG and state-owned Founders 
Group. In light of Lei’s continued absence, the board of Founder 
Security appointed a replacement CEO in February. In Novem-
ber, international media reported that Lei Jie had been released 
by authorities. Lei was not reappointed as CEO and his current 





Wang Yaoting 王耀庭—vice president of Hua Xia Bank
华夏银行
On 4 May, state-owned Hua Xia Bank announced that its 
deputy chief Wang Yaoting was under investigation for 
‘violating discipline’. Media reports at the time pointed 
to Wang’s role in the restructuring of Shanxi Liansheng 
Energy 陕西联盛能源. Another Chinese media outlet re-
ported that the investigations were in fact related to 
Wang’s outsourcing of IT support for Hua Xia’s online 
banking operations. Wang’s current whereabouts and the 
status of his case are unclear. 
Guo Guangchang 郭广昌—chairman of Fosun Group 复
星集团
The disappearance in December of Guo Guangchang, 
the CEO of Fosun Group and China’s seventeenth richest 
man, often referred to as ‘China’s Warren Buffet’, was 
especially shocking given his status as one of China’s most 
prominent business figures. Chinese media reported on 
10 December that Fosun executives had ‘lost contact’ 
with their CEO. The same day the company said Guo was 
‘assisting in an investigation’ and suspended trading of 
its shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. After four 
days, Guo resurfaced without explanation. One day later, 
he was spotted dining at a restaurant in New York. Fosun’s 
stock dropped ten percent once trading resumed.    
Li Yifei 李亦非—chairman of Man Group’s China unit
At the time of the 2015 stock market crash, news circulated 
that Li Yifei, the Chinese head of the international hedge 
fund Man Group, had been taken into custody. A week later 
she wrote on social media that she had gone on holiday 
to ‘meditate’. A subsequent comment by her husband 


















































Cheng Boming 程博明, Chen Jun 陈军, and Yan Jianlin 闫建霖—CITIC Securities 中信证券
In mid-September, officials launched a probe into Cheng Boming, the president of China’s 
biggest brokerage firm CITIC Securities, for financial wrongdoings in connection to that 
summer’s stock market crash. While the specific nature of the probe remains unclear, 
Cheng’s detention came weeks after a report on Xinhua implicated high-level executives 
at CITIC Securities in inflaming stock market turbulence earlier that summer through 
insider trading and short selling. The allegations led to a series of executive departures. On  
6 December, CITIC said it had ‘lost contact’ with two senior executives, Chen Jun and Yan 
Jianlin. The status of the cases against Cheng and other CITIC executives is unclear, though 
they were removed from their positions at CITIC.   
Zhao Dajian 赵大建—honorary chairman, Minzu Securities 
民族证券
Founder Group was struck again by investigators when director 
of Founder Securities Zhao Dajian, who served simultaneously 
as the chief executive of Minzu Securities, was detained at the 
end of September. Founder Securities reported that they had 
lost contact with their director on 22 September. The reason for 
his detention remains unclear, though state media reported that 
an official probe had been launched into the embezzlement of 









A YEAR OF DISAPPEARING BUSINESS EXECUTIVES (cont’d)
Chen Hongqiao 陈鸿桥—president of Guosen Securities 
国信证券
Chen Hongqiao, the president of state-owned Guosen 
Securities, was found dead from an apparent suicide in his 
Shenzhen house on 22 October. His death came little over a 
month after the CCDI announced that his former boss Zhang 
Yujun 张育军, the former assistant chairman of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission 中国证监会, had been put 
under investigation for ‘severe violation of discipline’. Chen 
had served as a deputy general manager of the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange before joining Guosen Securities in 2014.
Xu Xiang 徐翔—general manager Zexi Investment 泽熙投资
Nicknamed ‘Hedge Fund Brother No. 1’, the head of the wildly 
successful hedge fund Zexi Investment, Xu Xiang, was arrested 
in November on the G15 Expressway over the Hangzhou Bay 
Bridge. Authorities stopped Xu’s car and arrested him for 
insider trading and stock manipulation. The preternaturally 
good performance of Xu’s hedge fund, which yielded on 
average 249 percent annual returns had led to suspicion that 
Xu was engaging in insider trading or had powerful political 
connections which helped him manipulate stocks for gain, 
a relationship of convenience that ultimately went awry. In April 2016, Xu was formally 
charged with ‘stock market manipulation and insider trading’, according to Xinhua. 
Yim Fung 阎峰—chairman of Guotai Junan International  
國泰君安國際
Shares of Hong Kong-listed Guotai Junan International dropped 
seventeen percent in mid-November after the brokerage firm 
announced it could not reach its chairman Yim Fung. Yim sur-
faced more than a month later after ‘assisting in certain investi-
gations’ in the Mainland and resumed work. The Guotai Junan’s 
stock rallied in the wake of Yim’s return, though the company’s 









































PULLING APART •  剥











































































P O L L U T I O N  M I G R AT E S  TO 
T H E  W E S T
Wuqiriletu
I N MONGOLIAN, Tengger means both ‘heaven’ and ‘huge’. Most of China’s 
Tengger Desert 腾格里沙漠 falls in In-
ner Mongolia, but it also extends into 
the northwestern provinces of Ningxia 
and Gansu. At 36.7 thousand square 
kilometres, it is China’s fourth largest 
desert. It is dotted with hundreds of 
freshwater lakes surrounded by fertile 
areas of grass and vegetation that have 
sustained nomadic herders and their 
animals for thousands of years. 
However, beginning in the late 
1990s, the local governments of In-
ner Mongolia and Ningxia have been 
building industrial parks in the desert, 
including many chemical manufactur-
ing plants. These enterprises discharge 
untreated wastewater into the desert, 
polluting groundwater resources and 
destroying desert ecosystems, threat-
ening the survival of local herders, 
their families, and their animals. 
The local people’s complaints 
have fallen on deaf ears. In 2011, after 
one herder, Urhaan, failed to get any 
meaningful response from local gov-
ernment, he erected a board by a road 
near to his home on which he wrote: 
‘Dear leaders, the pollution is serious!’ 
各位领导, 污染严重.




ground water threatens the survival of 
both animals and people.
Journalists were aware of the 
issue. In 2011, the Times Weekly 时代
周报 reported on it in detail. Two years 
later, on the UN-sponsored World 
Water Day (22 March), China Central 
Television (CCTV) broadcast a report 
they titled ‘abscess in the desert’. 
Yet nothing changed until Septem-
ber 2014, when two influential news 
media organizations, The Beijing News 
新京报 and the Southern Weekend 
南方周末 fiercely criticised the local 
authorities for their inaction. Soon af-
ter that, the central leadership stepped 
In 2013, another, younger Mongol- 
ian herder named Batuu addressed an 
informal seminar in Beijing on ground-
water pollution that was organised by 
journalists, scholars, and environment- 
al activists. He noted that the number 
of chemical factories in the Tengger 
had increased within a decade from a 
few to dozens. He described how these 
enterprises discharge wastewater di-
rectly into the desert, burying any 
residue after the water evaporates or 
seeps into the sand. After a few windy 
days, the polluted area ‘disappears’ 
completely. Water is already sparse 
in the desert; pollution of the under-
Pollution of the Tengger Desert






































in. Xi Jinping and other central leaders 
ordered the party committees and gov-
ernment of the Inner Mongolian au-
tonomous region to halt the pollution 
of the Tengger Desert. 
The Supreme People’s Procura-
torate of China, meanwhile, investigat-
ed criminal breaches of environmen-
tal law, listing four ‘key’ cases from 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Gan-
su. On 7 May 2015, it fined the Ming 
Sheng Dyeing Company 明盛染化公司 
five million yuan, additionally fining 
Lian Xinzhong 廉兴中, the company’s 
responsible executive, fifty thousand 
yuan and giving him a suspended sen-
tence of eighteen months. This was 
named one of the ‘hottest’ ten cases 
of the year by Sina.com’s news centre. 
Comments on the Chinese Internet not-
ed the absurdity of the authorities hav-
ing to wait for an instruction from the 
highest leadership before acting.
Worse, more and more polluting 
industries are relocating to remote 
parts of western China with the ap-
parent intention of avoiding the in-
creasingly stringent anti-pollution 
measures in economically developed 
regions of the east—a phenomenon 
dubbed Pollution Migrates to the West 
污染西迁. Indeed, on 17 November 
2015, official media announced that 
7 May 2015: the Ming Sheng Dyeing Company was 
fined five million yuan for breaching the environ-
mental law
Photo: Xinhua
between 2013–2015, Beijing had suc-
cessfully eliminated 1,006 of its pol-
luting enterprises. The report did not 
say where these enterprises had gone. 
A year earlier, when a person in Inner 
Mongolia posted his fears that they 
were simply moving to Inner Mon-
golia, he was detained by local police 
for ten days and fined 500 yuan for 
‘spreading rumours’. 
In May 2015, when I was in Inner 
Mongolia, I heard many people voice 
their fears that the number of power 
plants being built there meant ‘you 
will never see the sun again in the 
grasslands’. I heard some say that ‘In-
ner Mongolian people are like candles, 
burning themselves to provide illumi-
nation for others’, referring to the fact 
98
99
that coal-fired electricity is produced 
in Inner Mongolia for use in Beijing 
and elsewhere.  
These rumours, if that’s what 
they are, are not totally groundless. 
As early as 2013, the National Business 
Daily 每日经济新闻 reported that 
while the Air Pollution Prevention 
Action Plan restricted the building 
of new coal-fired power projects in 
eastern regions such as Jing-Jin-Ji (See 
Chapter 5 ‘The City that Ate China—
Restructuing and Reviving Beijing, 
pp.178–201), they were springing up in 
western provinces including Shanxi, 
Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia. 
According to China Energy News 中
国能源报, 120 new plants have been 
approved (another source says 155), of 
which forty-eight are to be located in 
western China and seventeen of these 
in Inner Mongolia. 
Already, Asia’s largest coal-fired 
power plant is located close to Hohhot, 
the capital city of Inner Mongolia, 
which is already plagued with heavy 
smog in winter. Built in 1995, its main 
task according to Wang Dongsheng 
王东升, the party secretary, in 2015, 
is to ‘ensure power supply to Beijing 
without polluting Inner Mongolia’. 
If you substitute ‘western China’ for 
‘Inner Mongolia’, that is the challenge 
in a nutshell. Pollution Migrates to the West 
Source: news.163.com




















































































IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2013, the new admin-
istration of Xi Jinping banned university lectur-
ers as well as popular and academic media from 
discussing ‘constitutionalism’ (the notion that the 
Chinese government and laws must be guided by 
the Chinese constitution). It also instructed them 
not to mention the ‘Seven Speak-Nots’ 七个不要讲 
(七不讲 for short): universal values, freedom of the 
press, civil society, civil rights, historical mistakes 
by the Party, judicial independence, and [the exist-
ence of the] Party-elite capitalist class 权贵资产阶
级. As of early 2016, these prohibitions remained in 
place with one small but crucially suggestive differ-
ence—in 2015, the government began referring to 
the ‘Seven Speak-Nots’ as ‘Western values’.











































The first assault on ‘Western values’ in 2015 
was on 29 January when China’s Education 
Minister Yuan Guiren 袁贵仁 addressed Chi-
nese university leaders and education officials 
at a national meeting in Beijing. Yuan called 
for vigilance in ‘ideological management, es-
pecially of textbooks, teaching materials, and 
class lectures’. He declared an ‘absolute pro-
hibition’ 决不允许 on: ‘textbooks promoting 
Western values’; ‘remarks that slander the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 
or that vilify socialism’; ‘remarks that vio-
late the country’s constitution and laws’, and 
‘remarks by teachers giving vent to personal 
grudges or expressing discontent in the class-
room, thereby transmitting all manner of 
unhealthy feelings to their students’. On the 
Internet in the Mainland, these were quickly 
dubbed ‘The Four Absolute Nos’, written as 
either 四个绝不 or 四个决不, which all uni-
versities were to observe in order to prevent 
the dissemination of ‘Western values’ and to 
secure ‘The Three Bottom Lines’ 三条底线 in 
the areas of politics, law, and ethics.
The Beijing forum at which Yuan spoke 
had been convened to discuss a document 
titled ‘An Opinion on Strengthening and Im-
proving Propaganda and Ideological Work 
in Higher Education Under the New Circum-
stances’ 关于进一步加强和改进新形势下
高校宣传思想工作的意见 (hereafter ‘Opin-
ion’). This document, drafted by the General 
An Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving Propaganda and Ideo-
logical Work in Higher Education 
Under the New Circumstances
Source: chinadigitaltimes.net
Office and the State Council of the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP), had been 
published ten days earlier. The ‘Opin-
ion’ refined the arguments of similar 
directives issued during Xi’s first year 
in office such as the ‘Sixteen Sugges-
tions of the Chinese Communist Party 
on Strengthening Ideological and Political Work among Young Teachers in 
Higher Education’ 中共16条意见加强高校青年教师思想政治工作, which 
was published on 28 May 2013.
Outside China, Yuan’s anti-Western invective drew a flood of critical 
responses from online and print media as well as within academia, much 
of it on forums like Twitter that are blocked in China. Within China itself, 
media censorship ensured that domestic voices critical of Yuan’s speech 
went largely unheard, with the notable exception of three pointed ques-
tions posted online by Shen Kui 沈岿, a professor and vice-dean at Peking 
University’s Faculty of Law whose specialty is constitutional and adminis-
trative law. The questions were: ‘How do we distinguish “Western values” 
from “Chinese values”?’; ‘How do we 
distinguish “attacking and slandering 
the Party’s leadership and blacken-
ing socialism” from “reflecting on the 
bends in the road in the Party’s past 
and exposing dark facts”?’ and ‘How 
should the Education Ministry that you 
lead implement the policy of governing 
the country according to the Constitu-
tion and the law?’ 
Pro-government commentators attacked Shen for posing what they 
characterised as misleading rhetorical questions. On the Communist 
Youth League website, two articles described Shen’s post as, respective-













































Shen’s post using the same stylised four-character phrase, ‘Shen Kui’s 
Three Questions’ 沈岿三问. Four-character phrases abound in Chinese as 
concepts, literary allusions, proverbs, and slogans. Official speeches make 
ample use of them, for their association with venerable traditions suggests 
that what they are saying is self evident or true. Besides, they are easy to 
memorise. ‘Absolute prohibition’ and ‘The Three Bottom Lines’ are exam-
ples of four-character phrases that the minister employed in the speech to 
which Shen was responding, as is ‘The Four Absolute Nos’, which online 
commentators used to describe Yuan’s speech.
Zhu Jidong 朱继东, Deputy Director and Party 
Secretary of the State Cultural Security and Ideol-
ogy Building Research Centre 国家文化安全与意
识形态建设研究中心 of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, went even further. Accusing 
Shen of distorting Yuan’s remarks to generate 
‘ideological chaos’ 思想混乱, he called on ‘the rel-
evant government agencies’ to investigate, pros-
ecute and severely punish both Shen and others 
like him. 
The controversy continued for a month or so. 
But media outlets were warned not to publish any more criticisms of Yu-
an’s speech. Consequently, on the Internet in the Mainland, denunciations 
of Shen, mostly appearing on state-sponsored websites, greatly outnum-
bered reports of Shen’s post and other commentaries critical of Yuan. The 
result was a carefully managed ‘struggle for public opinion’ 舆论斗争 (yet 
another four-character expression), as the state defended the unpopular 
directive and instructed its citizens precisely how it ought to be understood.
As noted in the 2014 Yearbook, the government under Deng Xiaoping 
introduced the phrase ‘the struggle for public opinion’ (one source dates 
its first appearance to a People’s Daily editorial in 1980), launching a full-
scale propaganda campaign against ‘Western spiritual pollution’ in 1983. 
Then, ‘Western spiritual pollution’ was presented as an external threat. 
By 2013, the government had begun to perceive the threat as coming 
from within. For commentators in and outside China, the renaming of the 
Zhu Jidong
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‘Seven Speak-Nots’ to ‘Western values’ in 2015 did not so much signal an 
ethnocentric, even xenophobic, attitude towards education so much as a 
crackdown on ‘liberalism’ in general.
The attack on ‘Western values’ is not a negation of the entire spectrum 
of ideas that have originated in Western countries. Academics in favour of 
one-party rule vigorously promote anti-liberal Western thinkers such as 
Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, for example. Above all, the Party-state seeks 
to bolster its particular interpretation of Marxism as a kind of inoculation 
against what is alternatively called, in the foreign-image-conscious, Eng-
lish-language Global Times, ‘suspicious values’. 
On 5 May 2015, one day after Youth Day, the Party Secretary of Pe-
king University laid the foundation stone for a new building on campus 
to be named after Karl Marx. The building is one of the university’s ‘Six 
Marx Projects’ 六马工程. First announced at a national forum on Marx-
ism in higher education held at Peking University on 30 March, the six 
projects include the establishment of a new research centre on ‘The Chi-
nese Path and Sinicised Marxism’; the compilation of ‘The Treasures of 
Marx’ 马藏, envisaged as the world’s most comprehensive collection of 
writings by Marx and studies of Marxism in Chinese and other languages; 
the founding of a centre housing materials on international Marxism; the 
hosting of the first-ever World Congress on Marxism (which took place on 
10–11 October, with over 400 invited participants from more than twenty 
countries); the establishment of 
a website devoted to Marxism, 
and, of course, the construction 
of the Marx Building. The Ba-
oshan Bank reportedly donat-
ed 100 million yuan towards 
the building. Yuan called in 
his speech for ‘the main teach-
ing materials produced by the 
Marx Projects to be the key in-
dex for evaluating all teaching’.










































The intensification of state-led initiatives to strengthen Marxism 
reflects the authorities’ growing fear that exposure to liberal ideas will 
encourage citizens to demand greater freedoms and to exercise their 
constitutional rights in ways that undermine the one-party system. Yuan 
was not proposing an outright ban on the study of such ideas, which can 
range from the kind of rights-based liberalism of the American philoso-
phers Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls to the left-leaning defence of the 
public sphere mounted by the German social theorist Jurgen Habermas 
and his followers. Yuan wants people to conclude for themselves that 
Western liberalism is unsuitable for China. Yet the Party has its work cut 
out. Yuan and other leaders are aware that the internationalisation of 
the curriculum at Chinese universities, opportunities to study and travel 
abroad (opportunities eagerly taken up by many of their own children), 
as well as access to TED talks and MOOCs are just some of the many ways 
by which Chinese citizens can acquire knowledge about the full range of 
‘Western values’. 
The current assault on ‘Western values’ is only the latest of the cam-
paigns against Western ideas since the founding of the People’s Republic 
in 1949. Like previous ideological drives, the 2015 campaign is conceived 
of as a form of intellectual hygiene. ‘Western values’ transmit ‘unhealthy 
feelings’. Only if everyone adheres to ‘The Four Absolute Nos’ and ‘The 
Three Bottom Lines’, can the country ‘secure a clean and upright atmos-
phere in our classrooms and lecture theatres’. 
Socialist Hygiene
At the height of Russia’s civil war in 1919, there was a typhus epidemic. 
Lenin warned, ‘Either the lice will defeat socialism, or socialism will defeat 
the lice’. The remark has become a locus classicus for socialist hygiene. 
Disease and filth must be purged not only from physical bodies and envi-
ronments but hearts and minds as well. 
UNIVERSITY STUDENT SELF-STUDY 
ROOM AND OTHER PROBLEMS, 
by Lucille Liu
China’s Ministry of Culture banned 120 
Internet songs 网络音乐产品 in August 
for content that promotes ‘obscenity 
and violence, incites criminal behaviour 
or harms social morality’. Websites and 
entertainment venues such as karaoke 
bars and cafés were given two weeks 
to remove the blacklisted titles or face 
severe penalties. The songs were also 
barred from commercial performances and from appearing in audio-visual publications. 
Items one through seventeen on the list are from one band: Beijing hip-hop trio In3 
阴三儿, which formed in 2006 and rose in prominence during the 2008 Olympics with ra-
dio hit Welcome Back to Beijing 北京欢迎你回来. Among their banned songs is the popular 
Beijing Evening News 北京晚报, which intersperses lyrics about local nightlife with social 
commentary on corruption and welfare: ‘some sleep in underpasses, while some dine on 
government expenses’, for example.
Once featured in a milk tea commercial, I Love Taiwanese Girls 我爱台妹 by MC HotDog 
and Ayal Komod 张震岳 with lyrics including ‘I don’t love Chinese ladies 小姐 (also slang for 
prostitutes), I love Taiwanese girls, may they reign forever’, also appeared on the blacklist. 
Ayal Komod (of Amis, or indigenous Taiwan nationality) also saw his Fart 放屁 and Cheating 
Couple 狗男女, which the musician claimed he had not performed in at least a decade, wiped 
from the Internet. 
The blacklist contained a mix of household names and obscure Internet artists. Some 
of the more eye-catching titles include Suicide Diary 自杀日记 by Beijing rap group Xinjiekou 
新街口组合, Fly to Other People’s Beds 飞向别人的床 by Internet rap artists Ceekay 沉珂 and 
Light Shen MC 光光, and the seemingly innocuous University Student Self-study Room 大学
生自习室, about the difficultly of finding a quiet space for studying, by then-student Hao Yu 
郝雨. As the list of banned songs circulated over the web, some Internet users sarcastically 
thanked the ministry for its recommendations. 












































In her 1987 novel, Bathing 洗澡 (the published English translation is 
titled Baptism), the eminent writer Yang Jiang 杨绛 explored how socialist 
hygiene changed China during the PRC’s first ‘thought reform’ campaign, 
the ‘Three Antis Campaign’ 三反运动 of 1951. It was anti-corruption, an-
ti-waste, and anti-‘obstructionist bureaucratism’. The process of self-ex-
amination and ordeals of public ‘self-criti-
cism’ and confession by which the accused 
(many of whom were university educated) 
were required to undergo ‘self-criticism’ to 
show they were no longer germ ridden was 
informally nicknamed ‘bathing’. The type of 
intellectual hygiene demanded by the Xi-led 
party-state today involves none of the phys-
ical and emotional rigours of Maoist ‘bath-
ing’: compliance with official directives is all 
that the authorities can hope to expect. But 
such campaigns can increasingly appear 
Bathing by Yang Jiang
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JOURNEY TO THE WEST: CHINESE SCIENCE FICTION IN TRANSLATION, 
by Nick Stember
In August 2015, something previously unthinkable happened: a translation of a popular 
Chinese novel won one of the most prestigious awards in world science fiction. By taking 
home the Hugo at the Seventy-Third WorldCon, Ken Liu’s translation of Liu Cixin’s 刘慈欣 
The Three-Body Problem 三体 (Tor Books, 2014) demonstrated that popular Chinese litera-
ture was finally reaching an audience outside of China. 
 Liu Cixin is often called one of the ‘three generals’ of Chinese sci fi (the other two are 
Wang Jinkang 王晋康, known for his think pieces, and the famously acerbic Han Song 韩松). 
Liu is perhaps the most beloved writer of speculative fiction writing in China today, often 
compared to authors of ‘hard’ science fiction such as Isaac Asimov and Arthur C Clarke. An 
engineer by day, aside from his ambitious, award-winning trilogy, Liu Cixin has penned a 
number of short stories and novellas that grapple with the thorny ontology of human civili-
sation in the face of political and social collapse. Shortly after the Hugo announcement, the 
second volume of The Three-Body Problem, titled The Dark Forest 黑暗森林. was released 
by Tor Books. 
In September 2015, Liu Cixin and a group of sci fi writers met with Chinese Vice-President 
Li Yuanchao 李源潮, with Li urging the writers to use their work to promote the cause of 
‘national revival’ and inspire interest in 
science among the youth.
Although some individuals have cau-
tioned readers against overly simplis-
tic interpretations of Chinese science 
fiction as criticism of the Chinese gov-
ernment, given the state of the natural 
environment and limitations on free-
dom of speech, it is hard not to see social 
criticism in works such as Chen Qiufan’s 
陈楸帆 The Smog Society 霾 and Ma Bo 
yong’s 马伯庸 The City of Silence 寂静
之城. Liu’s The Three-Body Problem it-
self starts with a gruesome scene from the Cultural Revolution, which ultimately provides 
the premise of the trilogy’s story. For his part, Ken Liu (also the co-translator with Carmen  
Yiling Yan of the first story, and translator of the latter story) argued in an essay from late 
2014 that given the impressive diversity of Chinese fiction we might instead see such works 
as an expression of global humanism rather than domestic satire.
Lui Cixin and his Hugo award-winning book, The Three-
Body Problem
Source: youtube.com
anachronistic to a population growing better educated and more cosmo-
politan all the time. 
Their defenders can also appear more than a little desperate. One of 
Shen Kui’s critics stated that Shen’s questions were as pointless as asking 
‘why the American President must oppose terrorism, or why the people of 
Great Britain must pledge allegiance to the Queen’. But to liken ‘Western 
values’ to ‘terrorism’ or monarchism to a national creed is poor logic, and 
unlikely to convince the unconvinced.
 The Party is certainly aware of the gulf between itself and the people, 
amply illustrated by ceaseless online ridicule of official mottos and slogans 
(see the 2012 Yearbook, Chapter 2 ‘Discontent in Digital China’, pp.118–
141). In launching its ‘Mass Line Education and Practice Campaign’ in June 
2013, Xi’s government aimed to close the gap, or at least prevent it from 
widening. The ‘Opinion’ of 19 January 2015 recognises the importance of 
winning over China’s intelligentsia. A key goal it lists is to ‘realistically 
strengthen the Party’s direction of propaganda and ideological work in 
higher education’, noting that this was a task of ‘extreme importance and 









































The state handsomely funds research into the topic of ‘Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’. Party theorists and pro-government academics 
and writers have produced a prodigious number of books and articles 
on the subject. But the Chinese public’s reception of such works extends, 
in the main, from indifference to ridicule. There’s no guarantee that the 
Marx Projects will fare any better. 
A Cancelled Reception
When ‘good cop’ ideological persuasion strategies don’t work, the Party 
employs punitive ‘bad cop’ backup tactics like censorship, harassment, in-
timidation, and even arrest and detention. The nationwide crackdown on 
feminists, rights defence lawyers, and others in 2015 (see Chapter 2, ‘The 
Fog of Law’, pp.64–89) attracted international attention and condemna-
tion. 
Less well known is the case of the influential monthly Yanhuang 
Chunqiu 炎黄春秋 (sometimes translated as China Through the Ages or The 
Chronicles of China). Founded in 1991 by veteran Communist Party mem-
bers as a forum for independent intellectual inquiry, Yanhuang Chunqiu 
enjoys considerable authority in mainland intellectual and elite political 
circles. It is famous for pub-
lishing critical accounts of 
Party history written by re-
tired senior officials with in-
timate first-hand knowledge 
of the events they discuss. 
Authors include Li Rui 李锐, 
former personal secretary to 
Mao Zedong, and Sun Zhen 
孙振, former editor-in-chief 
at Xinhua’s Sichuan bureau, 
who worked under Premier 
Yanhuang Chunqiu
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Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳, and 
who died under house ar-
rest in 2005. Sun’s published 
defence of his former boss’s 
reputation infuriated Party 
leaders. 
The seniority within the 
Party of many of Yanhuang 
Chunqiu’s editorial staff and 
contributors has made the 
magazine unusually resilient in the face of censorship. Even among the 
present-day Party leadership, few would wish to be remembered for pub-
licly attacking elderly Communists who had played major roles in national 
and Party history. Despite occasional attempts to interfere with its mast-
head and organisation, and the temporary suspension of its website in 
January 2013 following the publication of an editorial in support of con-
stitutionalism, the Party-state has never banned or closed down the pub-
lication. 
Every year, for the twenty-three years of its existence, Yanhuang 
Chunqiu has held a fellowship reception around the time of Spring Festival 
celebrations. In addition to staff and regular contributors, the invitees typ-
ically include China’s leading liberal thinkers, advocates for political re-
form, and rights activists. The 2015 reception, with 240 invitees, was origi-
nally planned for 11 March. The magazine’s supervisory organisation, the 
Chinese National Academy of Arts, relayed instructions from unnamed 
authorities ‘有关部门’ for the event to be postponed to 18 March, until af-
ter the conclusion of the annual two-week meeting of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress (NPC). Whether under further orders or of its own volition, 
Yanhuang Chunqiu reduced its guest list to 130 as well. On 17 March, it 
was informed by the restaurant at the China Science and Technology Hall, 
where the reception was to have been held, that the event could not pro-
ceed after all. The organisers made a final appeal via the Chinese National 










































Academy of Arts on 17 March but were 
refused. One invitee remarked that no 
one knew if the order had come from the 
Ministry of Culture, the Propaganda De-
partment or the Public Security Bureau. 
This was unprecedented. Through-
out 2015, the government policed the 
magazine more strictly than ever before. 
Finally, on 1 July 2015, its editor-in-chief, 
Yang Jisheng 杨继绳, a former Xinhua 
journalist and the celebrated author of Tombstone 墓碑, about the Great 
Famine of 1958–1961, was forced to resign. 
What’s in a Name?
Yanhuang Chunqiu had previously avoided trouble for two reasons. First, 
it never challenged the legitimacy of Communist Party rule. Second, the 
ideology of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, if sacred, has been 
open to relatively fluid interpretation since it was introduced in 1982. It is 
unlike in the Mao era, when phrases like ‘class struggle’ and the ‘Dictator-
ship of the Proletariat’ for example, were rigidly defined by Mao himself. 
‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ initially described an attitude of 
cautious experimentation under one-party rule: ‘crossing the river by feel-
ing the stones’ 摸着石头过河, to quote Deng Xiaoping quoting fellow Party 
elder Chen Yun 陈云. Since Xi assumed power in November 2012, howev-
er, the party-state’s tolerance for open discussion and debate on matters 
of public interest has shrunk and its appetite for ideological consolidation 
has grown.
In 2008, Yanhuang Chunqiu’s long-time publisher Du Daozheng 杜导
正 described the magazine’s policy as ‘adhering to the big picture while 
opening up the small picture’ 大框框守住，小框框放开. The ‘big picture’ 
Yang Jisheng
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TOMBSTONE, by Gloria Davies
Yang Jisheng 杨继绳, former editor of Yanhuang 
Chunqiu magazine, is the author of Tombstone 墓
碑, a detailed and richly sourced documentation of 
the Great Famine of 1958–1961. The book was never 
published or legally distributed in mainland China, 
but released in Hong Kong in 2008. An English trans-
lation was published in 2012. 
In December 2015, Yang was awarded the Louis 
M. Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Jour-
nalism by the Nieman Fellows at Harvard. He was 
invited to Harvard to accept the award in March 
2016, but in February 2016, Yang said that his for-
mer employer, Xinhua News Agency, had forbidden 
him from travelling to the ceremony. In 2015, Yang 
travelled to Sweden to accept the Stieg Larsson prize, 
and in 2013, he had travelled to the United States to 
receive the Manhattan Institute’s Hayek Prize.
Tombstone by Yang Jisheng
Photo: youtube.com
stands for the legitimacy of Party rule and ‘Socialism with Chinese Char-
acteristics’. The ‘small picture’ refers to the specific matters of public and 
historical interest explored by the magazine’s contributors. In 2011, Du 
advised that the Party needed to ‘do three things: implement intra-party 
democracy, undertake systemic reform of the National People’s Congress, 
and open up public opinion’. Du’s words carry weight: he joined the Party 
in 1937 and, in the 1980s was director of the General Administration of 
Press and Publications (GAPP), the state agency responsible for regulating 
public culture in that first decade of reform.
 Party leaders and state media have used the term ‘intra-party de-
mocracy’ 党内民主 widely since the late 2000s. It refers to concepts such 
as competition and merit guiding official appointments, transparency in 
governance, and the sort of internal checks and balances that would mit-
igate against corruption and the abuse of power. ‘Intra-party democracy’ 









































val party factions. Those who openly promote ‘intra-party democracy’ are 
generally perceived—as is Yanhuang Chunqiu by most of the international 
media—as liberal leaning and on the Party’s ‘right’. 
But political distinctions of ‘left’ and ‘right’ are often misleading in 
relation to the CCP. The ‘left’ usually describes people who defend Mao 
Zedong Thought and the Maoist legacy of central planning, and who seek 
to strengthen the power of the party-state and place high importance on 
propaganda and ideological work. Yet many on the ‘right’ also support 
these ideas. Similarly, if the ‘right’ refers to those who seek to advance 
China’s market economy and strengthen intra-party democracy, then all 
high-ranking Party leaders qualify as ‘right’. Like its predecessors, Xi Jin-
ping’s government displays ‘left’ and ‘right’ tendencies at different times 
in relation to different issues. 
In official discourse, ‘faction’ is a pejorative term. The Party is sup-
posed to be a factionless organisation whose members are fully unified in 
their beliefs and values. Party factions are best understood, not in terms 
of ‘left’ and ‘right’ but as alliances based on personal networks formed 
around a central individual of influence and power. The US-based politi-
cal scientist Cheng Li 李成 argues that elite politics in China revolves es-
sentially around two of these ‘informal coalitions’. One is led by ‘prince-
lings’. Also known as ‘Red Second Generation’, they are the descendants 
of historical CCP leaders and include Xi Jinping, son of Xi Zhongxun 习仲
勋, as well as the now-disgraced and imprisoned former Party secretary of 
Chongqing, Bo Xilai 薄熙来, son of Bo Yibo 薄一波. The other coalition is 
that of the ‘populists’, sometimes referred to as ‘shopkeepers’: party mem-
bers from humbler origins who worked their way up through the system, 
such as Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and Zhou Yongkang 周永康, the latter to date the 
highest ranking official to be jailed for corruption. 
An illustration of official use of the word ‘faction’ comes from a Xin-
hua article dated 4 January 2015. It named, for the first time, what it 
called ‘Three Notorious Factions’ 三大帮派 (the ‘Petroleum Faction’, the 
‘Secretary Faction’, and the ‘Shanxi Faction’), as well as the disgraced offi-
‘Three Notorious Factions’: 
the ‘Petroleum Faction’ in 
the blue circle, the ‘Secretary 
Faction’ in brown, and 










































cials associated with each of these. Xinhua’s explicit reference to ‘factions’, 
five months before the start of the trial of Zhou Yongkang, aimed to show 
how successfully Xi’s Anti-Corruption crusade had exposed and eradicat-
ed the rot from within.
The type of exposé for which Yanhuang Chunqiu is famous is altogeth-
er different. The magazine specialises in evidence-based narratives of 
events and persons that official accounts have distorted or suppressed. In 
2014, the respected historian and public intellectual Zhang Lifan 章立凡
described Yanhuang Chunqiu as allied with Xi’s faction. Xi’s late father, Xi 
Zhongxun 习仲勋, was one of the magazine’s early supporters. Yet in Sep-
tember 2014, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, 
and Television (SAPPRFT) ordered the magazine to affiliate with an agency 
under the Ministry of Culture, and demanded far stricter standards of ac-
ceptable content. In an interview with the South China Morning Post on 19 
September 2014, Zhang suggested that the magazine ‘might have become 
a pawn in the power struggle between Xi and his political enemies, as the 
new affiliation order was made when Xi was on a tour of South Asia’.
In 2015, however, it became clear that Xi would offer the magazine 
no special protection. Following the cancellation of Yanhuang Chunqiu’s 
annual fellowship reception in March, on 10 April 2015, SAPPRFT noti-
fied the magazine that of the eighty-six articles published in the first four 
issues of 2015, thirty-seven violated state regulations. The offending arti-
cles addressed ‘topics of grave importance’ 重大选题 (the official term for 
censored or ‘sensitive’ topics) but had not been submitted to SAPPRFT for 
prior approval. The notice warned that further violations would not be 
tolerated. 
On 3 June 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Daily posted an article on 
its Weibo account attacking Yanhuang Chunqiu for ‘spreading confusion 
and deceiving ordinary citizens, especially retired cadres’. Titled ‘Getting 
to the Bottom of Yanhuang Chunqiu’ 起底炎黄春秋, the article accused the 
magazine of ‘blackening Mao Zedong’s name, blackening the memory 
of the nation’s heroes and martyrs, and making history meaningless. In 
truth, it nullifies the history of New China and uses public opinion to try 
and drag China back to capitalism.’ The article was widely relayed on the 
Internet in the Mainland, attracting an overwhelming number of positive 
comments on state-sponsored websites, with only a minority defending 
the magazine. It was another well-orchestrated triumph in the party-
state’s ‘struggle for public opinion’. On 25 December 2015, when Xi posted 
his very first Weibo message, he chose to do so on the People’s Liberation 
Army Daily’s Weibo account; the message was unremarkable (‘…realise 
the China Dream and the dream of a strong army!’ etc) but the media he 
chose to make it in was significant. 
In two open letters written on 30 June 2015 and published online to 
mark his departure from Yanhuang Chunqiu on 1 July, Yang Jisheng con-
firmed that he had been forced to resign. He feared for the magazine’s 
future, noting that it had, from its inception, observed the ‘Eight Avoids’ 八
不碰, carefully circumventing all references to ’June 4’, the separation of 
powers, Falun Gong, incumbent state leaders, the families of incumbent 
leaders, the transformation of the PLA from a Party to a state army, ethnic 










































THE PARTY ARGUES BUDDHIST REINCARNATION  
WITH THE DALAI LAMA, by Matt Schrader
China’s ongoing war of words with the Dalai Lama took a 
new turn in 2015. In a mid-December 2014 interview with 
the BBC, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader dropped a 
bombshell with his remark that his reincarnation was not 
a certainty. Whether or not he had an officially designated 
successor, he said, would be ‘up to the Tibetan people’, 
adding that, ‘the Dalai Lama institution will cease one day. 
These man-made institutions will cease’. 
How the Tibetan people would make clear their 
choice, the fourteenth and longest-serving Dalai Lama did 
not explain. But as he approached his eightieth birthday in 2015, his words were clearly a 
shot across the bow of the PRC government, which has long claimed its authority to desig-
nate the Dalai Lama’s reincarnated successor, in line with its requirement that all religious 
practitioners inside China recognise the ultimate authority of the Communist Party.
It was not the first time the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama had clashed over 
issues of succession. When, in 1995, the Dalai Lama named a young Tibetan child as the re-
incarnation of the Panchen Lama (the second most revered position in Tibetan Buddhism’s 
hierarchy), Beijing promptly took the child into ‘protective custody’, and named another. 
The government’s chosen Panchen Lama now fulfills the public role of that position within 
China; the Dalai Lama’s choice, the government claims, lives a guarded but more-or-less 
normal life somewhere in Tibet.
In early 2015, at a press conference on the sidelines of the annual gathering of China’s 
two legislatures in Beijing, Zhu Weiqun 朱维群, the chair of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Congress’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, accused the Dalai Lama of 
not showing a ‘serious or respectful attitude’ on the issue of reincarnation, and reiterated 
that ‘the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama has to be endorsed by the central government, not 
by any other sides’. 
Seemingly undeterred, in a July interview with Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times 
the Dalai Lama hinted that he had in mind a referendum of some kind among Tibetans to 
clarify the question of his succession. He also had a laugh at the CCP’s expense, saying the 
Party was ‘pretending that they know more about the reincarnation system than the Dalai 
Lama’, and suggesting that the CCP ‘should recognise the reincarnation of Chairman Mao 
Zedong, then Deng Xiaoping. Then they have the right to involve themselves in the Dalai 
Lama’s reincarnation’.
The government was not amused by the suggestion. Writing in the Chinese-language 
Global Times in late November, Zhu Weiqun emphasised historic precedents for the govern-
ment’s position, highlighting the important role the Qing government had also played in the 
process; his claim, however, that this demonstrated China’s sovereignty over Tibet glossed 
over the fact that over the course of the almost three-century-long dynasty (1644–1911), 
Beijing’s say over this matter waxed and waned along with its influence in Llasa, and was 
often subject to highly contentious political maneuvering.
Compromise does not seem to be on either side’s agenda. In the same article, Zhu made 
clear how the government views the stakes in this theological debate when he wrote that 
‘the power of the central government to decide in matters of living Buddhas [such as the 
Dalai Lama] cannot only not be allowed to weaken, but must be strengthened to ensure 
victory in the struggle against separatism’.
The Dalai Lama
Photo: en.wikipedia.org
conflicts, and foreign relations. Yet this 
clearly was not enough. As of January 
2016, a tightly constrained Yanhuang 
Chunqiu was still publishing. 
How to be a Good  
Communist 
September 2015 marked the centenary 
of the founding of Youth magazine (re-
named New Youth in 1917), two of whose 
founding members, Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 
and Li Dazhao 李大钊, were also found-
ers of the Chinese Communist Party in 
1921. New Youth and the New Culture Movement it initiated are widely 
perceived in mainland intellectual circles as the prologue to the found-
ing of the CCP. At a forum convened in August 2015 to commemorate this 
centenary, the eminent historian Lei Yi 雷颐 mused that while the New 
Culture Movement (also known as the May Fourth Movement) is typically 
described as the starting-point of a fundamental rejection of traditional 
ideas, it was much less radical than its predecessor, the movement for con-
stitutional monarchy led by Kang Youwei 康有为 and Liang Qichao 梁启
超 during the last two decades of the Qing dynasty, from about 1890–1911. 
Lei argued that the final decades of the Qing represented a unique period 
in which Chinese intellectuals, including those in exile, began to discard 
the moral and political principles underpinning a disintegrating dynastic 
system. No longer in awe of the so-called ‘sacred decrees’ 圣旨 as a re-
sult of the Qing’s apparent inability to meet the challenges of the modern 
world, they were emboldened to challenge its authority. 
Within ten years of the fall of the Qing, by 1921, the Nationalist Par-
ty (KMT) and the CCP had become China’s two dominant political organ-
isations. Both were Leninist in structure and sought to achieve one-par-






















described how in the Re-
publican era, there was 
immense pressure on 
intellectuals to choose a 
side—CCP or KMT—even 
if they disagreed with 
both. The result was ‘an 
inner contradiction and 
an inner tension. Intellec-
tuals were concerned about politics but lacked the power to produce polit-
ical change. The parlous state of their society made it impossible for them 
to keep quiet. They felt compelled to do something but they also worried 
about their own professional careers.’ Worrying was justified, as neither 
party was kind to dissidents.
Among the examples provided by Lei was the case of Zhang Shenfu 
张申府 (1893–1986). Zhang played a key role in the early dissemination of 
Marxism in China. He and Li Dazhao 李大钊 co-founded the Communist 
Small Group 共产党小组 at Peking University in 1920 and it was Zhang who 
recommended Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (China’s Premier from 1949 to 1976 and 
Deng Xiaoping’s mentor) for Communist Party membership. Lei noted that 
although Zhang fiercely advocated party discipline, he ultimately found it 
impossible to relinquish his intellectual independence and resigned from 
the CCP by 1925. After the Communist victory in 1949, Zhang obtained a 
position at the National Library in Beijing with Zhou Enlai’s help. Despite 
attempting to stay out of trouble, he was punished in 1957 as a ‘rightist’. Lei 
stated that Zhang embodied ‘the intellectual’s spirit of pursuing truth for 
its own sake’ and that he ‘never learned how to be agreeable’. Zhang was 
not politically rehabilitated until three years after Mao’s death, in 1979. 
Lei and others who spoke at the commemorative forum made no 
mention of their own situation. Nothing was said of ‘The Four Absolute 
Nos’, the intensification of ideological instruction on university campuses 
or the plight of Yanhuang Chunqiu. However, the contemporary relevance 
of Lei’s remarks was not lost on forum participants. Historical innuendo is 
a well-established critical art in China. 























Under Xi, party propagandists 
have produced numerous slogans 
describing the qualities the Party 
requires of its officials. One widely 
used four-character slogan in 2015 
was the ‘Three Stricts and Three 
Genuines’ 三严三实: be strict with 
oneself in ‘moral cultivation, the 
use of power, and in the exercise of 
self-discipline’, while ‘planning and working in genuine ways and genu-
inely striving to be a decent person’. First used by Xi Jinping in a speech of 
17 March 2014, official websites heavily promoted the slogan in June 2015. 
It was also the focus of the speech Xi delivered on 29 December 2015 at the 
‘Democratic Life Meeting’ of the twenty-five-member Politburo. Xi told his 
colleagues to uphold the highest standards of ethical conduct and ‘strictly 
educate, manage and supervise’ erring family members and colleagues, to 
ensure their wrongdoings are ‘resolutely corrected’. 
Another slogan, ‘It is unacceptable to be a nice guy’ 好人主义要不得, 
appeared in many articles published on official websites in 2015. Lei Yi 
had suggested that Zhang Shenfu’s inability ‘to be agreeable’ was a mark 
of his personal integrity. But the party’s idea of ‘not being a nice guy’ has 
nothing to do with speaking truth to power. It warns officials against abus-
ing their power by ‘being nice’ to greedy relatives and friends. 
In his famous 1939 tract ‘On the Self-Cultivation of Communists’, writ-
ten when he was a leader of the Communist underground. Liu Shaoqi 刘
少奇 urged his fellow Party-members to be fearless, selfless, and willing to 
die for the Communist cause: 
As we Communists see it, nothing can be more worthless or indefensi-
ble than to sacrifice oneself in the interests of an individual or a small 
minority. But it is the worthiest and most just thing in the world to 
sacrifice oneself for the Party, for the proletariat, for the emancipation 
of the nation and all mankind, for social progress and for the highest 
interests of the overwhelming majority of the people.
29 December 2015: Xi delivers speech at the ‘Democratic 










































THE WHITE-HAIRED GIRL AND PENG LIYUAN, by Emily Feng
On a dark and stormy night in pre-Liberation 
times, landlords from a town in Shaanxi gather 
in the mountains to pray to their ancestors. A 
sudden thunderclap, and a flash of lightning 
suddenly illuminates the visage of a wom-
an with translucently white hair, her clothes 
reduced to rags. Mistaking her for a vengeful 
spirit, the men run screaming from the temple, 
never to return. 
So goes the revolutionary opera The White 
Haired Girl 白毛女, first performed in 1945 in Yan’an. Its climactic revenge scene is meant to 
represent the symbolic triumph of the peasantry against the landed gentry and to foreshad-
ow the eventual triumph of communism over feudalism. 
The story is based on Chinese folktales that themselves were inspired by true events. 
They told of ghostly women with pure white hair despite their youth, thanks to malnutrition 
and lack of salt (and iodine), who roamed the mountains after fleeing a despotic landlord. 
The writer Li Mantian 李满天 wrote a short story based on these folktales in 1944 and pre-
sented it to the Communist cultural official Zhou Yang 周扬, who would later become the 
chairman of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. The story went through sev-
eral edits, transforming from a simple ghost story into a politically symbolic tale of libera-
tion. The opera based on the story combines vocal styles from Western opera with stylised 
movements inspired by Peking opera, a theatrical embodiment of the Party’s efforts to 
engineer a modern aesthetic wedded to ideological principles. 
The narrative centres on Xi’er 喜儿, the daughter of a poor farmer in Shaanxi province. 
When her father is unable to pay back the debts he owes to Huang Shiren 黄世仁, the local 
landlord, Huang seizes Xi’er, who is betrothed to another poor farmer, Wang Dachun 王大
春, to be his concubine. She escapes and flees into the mountains, where she survives for 
years before being found again by her fiancé, who had joined the Communists’ Eighth Route 
Army and fought in the Anti-Japanese War. They rejoice.
Mao was reportedly moved to tears the first time he saw the opera. In 1950, it was 
turned into a movie of the same name, becoming one of the classics of revolutionary Chi-
1985: Peng Liyuan as Xi’er in The White Haired Girl
Photo: wyzzwk.com
Several articles published on official websites in 2015 described Xi’s 
‘Three Stricts and Three Genuines’ as an exemplary emulation of the 
ideals presented in Liu’s 1939 tract. Yet none mentioned what Liu con-
sidered ‘worthiest and most just’. Words like ‘sacrifice’, ‘the proletariat’, 
and ‘the emancipation of all mankind’ have rarely appeared in official 
discourse since the 1990s. The goals of today are more vague, wordier, 
more practical, and more narrowly nationalistic: ‘to establish a well-off 
society and to fully realise the China Dream of reviving the greatness of 
the Chinese nation’ 建成小康社会，最终实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦. 
nese film and named one of the ‘eight model revolu-
tionary operas’ during the Cultural Revolution. Later, 
The White Haired Girl was adapted for Peking opera 
(1958) and the ballet (1965). 
Fast forward to the twenty-first century. In Octo-
ber 2014, Xi Jinping delivered a speech on the role of 
literature and arts in China that was a conscious echo 
of Mao’s original ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Art 
and Literature’. In it, Xi stressed that art and culture 
was to serve the people: ‘Art and culture will emit the 
greatest positive energy when the Marxist view of art 
and culture is firmly established and the people are their focus’. He criticised the ‘cultural 
garbage’ that results when artists fail to live up to such standards and ‘indulge in kitsch’. In 
other words, artists and the arts must obey and support Communist rule. 
Shortly after Xi’s speech, China’s Ministry of Culture announced a revival tour of The 
White Haired Girl, which opened in Yan’an in November 2015 and finished in Beijing in 
mid-December. It underwent a makeover to appeal to modern audiences, including 3D 
visual effects. Xi’s wife, the singer Peng Liyuan served as the production’s artistic director; 
in the 1980s she herself played Xi’er, a highly coveted role, when she was a star performer 
with the People’s Liberation Army song-and-dance troupe.
A pared-down orchestral version of The White Haired Girl also enjoyed a one-off perfor-
mance in March 2016 at The National Centre for Performing Arts in Beijing. After previous 
performances, Chinese news reports described audience members young and old raving 
about the undiminished emotional power of the opera, even seventy years later. But here, 
even among the fifty and sixty year olds in the audience, who had seen the original pro-
duction in their youth, audience members chuckled during otherwise serious moments at 
some of the more outlandish and clichéd elements of the plot and presentation, including 
the extremely tattered clothing of the peasants. As the music swelled, people checked their 
phones. Yet in the final scene, when Xi’er and Wang Dachun embraced after years of separa-
tion, any remaining cynicism gave way to a collective moment of silence as woman, soldier, 
and peasants linked arms and waved, the picture of a happy family.
Launching his ‘Mass Line Education and Practice Campaign’ in June 2013, 
Xi spoke about self cultivation in a distinctly banal register. He asked Party 
members to ‘look in the mirror, make themselves presentable, take a bath 
and cure what ails them’ 照镜子、正衣冠、洗洗澡、治治病. In education 
and public culture, the Party-state under Xi’s leadership has used the rhet-
oric of ‘socialist hygiene’ to justify its intensification of censorship. Yet, 
Xi’s somewhat jocund remark reflects the predicament of a government 
whose legitimacy rests on its Communist past but for whom the very idea 
of being a good Communist has lost all meaning.










































XI’S CATCHPHRASES IN 2015, by Lorand Laskai
Political discipline and rules 政治规矩
‘Political discipline and rules exist to enable CPC cadres to defend the authority of the CPC 
Central Committee and cadres must follow those rules, aligning themselves with the com-
mittee in deed and thought, at all times and in any situation. Party unity must be ensured.’
At the fifth plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
(CCDI) in January, Xi said that to preserve party rule, cadres had to obey ‘political discipline 
and rules’. This included ‘unifying and concentrating power in one leader’.
New normal 新常态
‘China’s economic development has entered a “new normal”. The rate of economic growth is 
shifting to a medium-to-high rate, the model of large-scale quick growth is shifting towards 
a quality-centred model of intensive growth, and the momentum from investments is tran-
sitioning towards towards innovation driven growth.’
Although Xi’s signature term to describe China’s economic slowdown, ‘the new normal’, was 
coined in 2014, it remained a centrepiece of the Chinese president’s policy speeches in 2015, 
including the one given at the Boao Forum in March. By one scholar’s estimation, by March 
of 2015, Xi had already used the term ‘new normal’ over 160 times since the 18th Party 
Congress.
Critical minority 关键少数
‘Governing the country according to comprehensive rule of law must capture a “critical mi-
nority” of the leadership cadre.’
At a session for leading provincial-level cadres in February, Xi said a ‘critical minority’ of 
leading cadre was required to promote the rule of law and strengthen national defence and 
the military, among other goals. Xi has used the term repeatedly to emphasise the need for 
a disciplined vanguard within the top levels of the Party. 
Feeling of progress 获得感
‘Reform must be carried through from the first to last kilometre, breaking through obstruc-
tions and preventing omissions. The gold content of reform must be fully displayed so the 
people can have a feeling of progress.’
At the tenth meeting of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms 
on 27 February, and perhaps in an acknowledgement that fast-paced economic develop-
ment does not objectively benefit everyone equally, Xi suggested using the people’s ‘feeling 
of progress’ as a barometer for success. He later used the term when discussing cross-Strait 
trade dialogue with Taiwan: people on Taiwan, he said, needed the ‘feeling of progress’ if 
they were to ‘close the distance between compatriots on both sides of the Strait’. 
Purify the political ecology 净化政治生态
‘When the political ecology is dirty, the environment becomes vile; when the political ecol-
ogy is bright and clean, the environment is first rate. Political and natural ecology are the 
same—neglect it even a little and it will very quickly become polluted. Once problems ap-
pear, recovery demands a large price.’
First coined last year, Xi has since used the concept of ‘political ecology’ on a number of oc-
casions, including during the 2015 meetings of the National People’s Congress and Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference. 
Toilet revolution 厕所革命
‘Along with the quickened pace of agricultural modernisation and new rural construction, 
we must launch a “toilet revolution” to ensure the rural masses have access to sanitary 
toilets.’
Xi raised the need to make dramatic improvements to rural sanitation facilities on a num-
ber of occasions including during a visit to Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture in July. 
China’s first ‘toilet revolution’ was in 1965; there have been at least three others since the 
1980s. 
Supply-side reform 供给侧改革
‘At the same time as appropriately increasing demand, we must try hard to increase struc-
tural supply-side reforms, raise the supply system’s quality and efficiency, and strengthen 
the momentum for sustainable economic growth.’
Xi first used the term ‘supply-side reforms’ during a meeting of the Leading Group for Fi-
nancial and Economic Affairs on 11 November 2015 and has since used it repeatedly to 
underscore the government’s resolve to curb oversupply and push through new structural 
reforms during the period of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan.
‘Four-iron’ cadres ‘四铁’干部
‘In order to build a prosperous society and realise the Chinese dream of national rejuve-
nation, we must groom officials to be as strong as iron in their belief, faith, discipline and 
sense of responsibility.’
At the National Party School Work Conference in December, Xi coined this new term to 
describe the calibre of cadre the country needs. The meeting came a few months after the 
party released new strict disciplinary regulations for party members.
Community of shared destiny in cyberspace 网络空间命运共同体
‘Cyberspace is humanity’s commons. The future of cyberspace should be in the hands of 
all nations. Each country should step up communication, broaden consensus and deepen 
co-operation, in order to jointly build a community of shared destiny in cyberspace.’
During the keynote address to the Second Wuzhen World Internet Conference in December, 
Xi adapted another favorite catchphrase, ‘common destiny’, to the politics of global Internet 




































A New Cultural Ecology? 






































































C U LT U R E — C L E A N I N G  U P
Linda Jaivin
T OWARDS THE END OF 2014, Xi Jinping addressed a meeting of 
‘arts and culture workers’ 文艺工作者
座谈会 for two hours. Moving beyond 
his prepared script, he spoke glow- 
ingly of the influence of art and 
literature on himself as a youth and 
argued that culture is crucial to the 
realisation of the China Dream. Not 
just any culture, however: Xi evoked 
both the ancient notion of ‘culture 
with moral purpose’ 文以载道 as 
well as the Soviet concept of artists 
as the ‘engineers of human souls’. Xi 
also noted the importance of culture 
to Chinese soft power, stating that 
‘historically, the position and influence 
of the Chinese people’ in the world 
was due not to military might but the 
strong appeal of Chinese culture. 
Chinese cultural soft power re-
ceived an unexpected boost when Liu 
Cixin 刘慈欣, the author of The Three 
Body Problem, became not only the 
first Chinese but first Asian writer to 
win the international Hugo Award for 
best science fiction or fantasy in 2015. 
Official soft power strategy that relies 
on a spreading network of Confucius 
Institutes around the world has done 
less well: in late 2014 and into 2015, 
a number of prestigious tertiary in-
stitutions including the University of 
Chicago and Stockholm University 
have either shut down or refused to 
host Confucius Institutes, citing their 
incompatibility with the principles of 
free intellectual inquiry. And while 
the Chinese publishing industry’s 
500-strong delegation may have been 
134
135
Woeser from prison and house arrest. 
Protesters held up a sign: ‘Govern-
ments make bad editors’.
That may be so, but the Chinese 
government shows no sign of putting 
down its red pen. If anything, 
censorship of media and literature 
intensified in 2015. The Party-state 
has long justified censorship with the 
use of environmental metaphors—the 
elimination of filth and pollution—
as in 1983’s ‘anti-Spiritual Pollution’ 
campaign. In April 2015, it launched 
BookExpo America, June 2015
Source: news.xinhuanet.com
the special guests of the publishing 
trade fair BookExpo America in June 
2015, US media were more interested 
in an anti-censorship rally organised 
to coincide with the book fair and at-
tended by the Chinese writer Murong 
Xuecun 慕容 雪村 along with Jonathan 
Franzen and other notable American 
writers. The demonstration, organised 
by the PEN American Center, called for 
the release of Chinese writers includ-
ing Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo 


































its latest ‘anti-porn’ campaign. (Only 
three months later, a couple uploaded 
a video of themselves having sex 
in a changing room in a branch of 
popular clothing chain Uniqlo in 
Beijing’s Sanlitun Shopping Village: 
by the following day, some 2.5 million 
searches and posts made the amateur 
porn video the top-trending item 
on WeChat.) In June, the censors 
proscribed thirty-eight Japanese anime 
including titles such as High School of 
the Dead and Psycho Pass as well as 
others with anti-authoritarian themes. 
The following month, the authorities 
cancelled a Shanghai concert by the 
American band Maroon 5, reportedly 
because one of the band members had 
tweeted a happy birthday message 
to the Dalai Lama. In August, the 
Ministry of Culture banned 120 songs 
from the Internet on grounds of 
promoting obscenity, violence, crime 
or harm to social morality, including 
Taiwan pop singer Chang Csun Yuk’s 
张震岳 comedic ‘Fart’. In September, 
it axed Bon Jovi’s September tour 
to Beijing and Shanghai—five years 
earlier, Bon Jovi had displayed the 
Dalai Lama’s picture while playing 
in Taiwan. Taylor Swift, scheduled 
to visit China as part of a global tour 
in November, gave the authorities a 
Uniqlo in Beijing’s Sanlitun Shopping Village, where 
a couple filmed themselves having sex in one of its 
changing rooms
Photo: gawker.com
fresh headache when several months 
beforehand, she revealed her latest 
‘merch’, t-shirts, hoodies, and more, 
displaying her initials and the year of 
her birth—T.S. 1989, unintentionally 
evoking the events of Tiananmen 
Square twenty-six years ago. The 
Minister for Education Yuan Guiren 
袁贵仁, meanwhile, was busy fighting 
pollution on another front, writing 
Taylor Swift’s clothing line ‘TS 1989’—an uninten-




in early 2015 that universities should 
scrap texts that promoted ‘Western 
values’. (See Chapter 3 ‘Intellectual 
Hygiene—Mens Sana’, pp.100–127.)
Artists and writers who have run 
into difficulty exhibiting or publishing 
at home have long relied on outlets and 
markets outside China. In 2014, the 
authorities literally pulled the plug on 
the Eleventh Beijing Independent Film 
Festival by cutting off the electricity 
supply. In August 2015, Cinema on the 
Edge: Best of the Beijing Independent 
Film Festival 2012–2014 screened in 
New York City across a number of 
venues including the Asia Society. 
Meanwhile, in June, Ai Weiwei 
艾未未, China’s most famous artist-
provocateur, was allowed to exhibit 
in China for the first time since his 
imprisonment for eighty-one days in 
2011 and subsequent house arrest. In 
July, the authorities handed him back 
his passport. He travelled abroad, 
spoke about government control and 
repression in the mildest possible 
terms, attended a major show of his 
work at London’s Royal Academy of 
the Arts, and returned to China with-
out incident before travelling again, 










































































A NUMBER OF CHINESE ARTISTS and academics are seeking the 
answers to a suite of related environ-
mental issues, including overzealous 
urbanisation, food safety, sustainable 
development, and cultural heritage 
preservation, in a renewed engage-
ment with the Chinese countryside. 
Since the mid-2000s in particular, this 
new ‘ruralist movement’ 农村运动, has 
sparked over two hundred initiatives 
in the field of rural reconstruction, or 
literally, ‘village construction’ 乡村建
设 (sometimes abbreviated as 乡建). 
Perhaps the best known of these 
initiatives, outside of China anyway, 
is the Bishan Commune 璧山共同体 in 
Bishan Village, Yi County, Anhui prov-
ince 安徽省黟县璧山. The commune 
is led by the writer, curator, and film 
maker Ou Ning 欧宁, and his friend, 
fellow curator and educator Zuo Jing 
左靖. In 2011, the pair began by or-
ganizing the ‘Harvestival’ 碧山丰年
庆, a festival of music, poetry, film 
workshops, and local performers. 
While participants also came from 
elsewhere, they invited the whole vil-
lage to attend. That year Ou decided to 
move there from Beijing with his fam-
ily, renovating a traditional farmhouse 
to live in. 























While most other rural recon-
struction projects try to reinvigorate 
the locality through economic and 
social enterprises, in Bishan, Ou, Zuo 
and a growing network of collab-
orators from China and abroad 
focussed on art and culture. The 
project saw the conversion of a disused 
ancestral hall into a bookshop and café, 
operated by Nanjing’s Librarie Avant-
Garde bookshop 先锋书店; the opening 
of modest ‘rural-chic’ guesthouses, 
and the launch of commune-branded 
stationery and apparel devised by 
designer-collaborators as a means of 
securing ongoing funding as well as 
creating a marketable identity. As Ou 
has explained: ‘Since the 1970s many 
[rural] people have moved to urban 
areas and a lot of villages are now 
empty—there are only old people and 
children. There is no public life and 
so what we did is to try to bring [in] 
more artistic and cultural events for 
the villages’.
In 2012, Ou and Zuo launched 
the stylishly designed Bishan journal, 
which publishes articles, photo essays, 
and a wide range of other material 
connecting the project to modern prec-
edents, complemented by related texts 
and images about art, agriculture, and 
architecture in China and overseas. In 
June 2015, Denmark’s Ovo Press pub-
lished Ou’s own notebook on the devel-
opment of Bishan under the title Bis-
han Commune: How to Start your Own 
Rural Utopia, together with an English 
translation, in which Ou characterises 
Bishan as under the banner of ‘Rural-
ism + Anarchism’.
Some articles in the Bishan journal 
have highlighted the pioneering eff-
orts of earlier generations of Chinese 
intellectuals who have engaged with 
rural reform. Issue 2, on the theme of 
‘Back to the Countryside’, reprinted 
a 2001 lecture by literary historian 
Qian Liqun 钱理群 that describes how 
successive generations of modern 
Chinese intellectuals have engaged 
in rural reform. For Qian, the first 






















of the May Fourth Movement, including 
writer Zhou Zuoren 周作人 (brother 
of Lu Xun 鲁迅), rural educator Yan 
Yangchu 宴阳初, and philosopher 
Liang Shumin 梁漱溟. The second 
consisted of the early Communists 
and ‘rural reconstructionists’ 乡村建设
派 of the 1930s; the third the Yan’an era 
youth of the 1940s; and the fourth, the 
generation of post-1949 intellectuals 
who actively participated in the 
collectivist policies of the 1950s and 
1960s. Qian sees the fifth generation as 
the ‘educated youth’ 知识青年 who went 
(or were sent) ‘down to the countryside’ 
to learn from the peasantry during the 
Cultural Revolution, a generation that 
includes Qian himself. This genealogy 
writes recent projects like Bishan into 
an intellectual narrative that is not 
necessarily at odds with official history.
Tension has always existed be-
tween the visions of urban intel- 
lectuals for a re-invigorated country-
side and what farmers or villagers in 
the countryside want for themselves, 
which is often straightforward eco-
nomic and infrastructural develop-
ment. Yet projects such as Bishan, 
despite involving some degree of ur-
ban idealisation of traditional village 
life, are also critical of contemporary 
trends in rural and ethnic tourism that 
turn villages into ticketed theme parks, 
forcing villagers to ‘act’ as themselves, 
everyday—such as has happened in 
the nearby towns of Xidi and Hongcun, 
both UNESCO listed ‘Ancient Towns 
Ou Ning’s notebooks
Source: catalystreview.net
of Southern Anhui’, since 2000, and 
which receive bus loads of day-trip-
pers from nearby Huangshan.
In China, as in other industrial-
ising economies since the nineteenth 
century, urbanites may entertain a 
yearning for a lost or imagined rustic 
past, which they believe they can find 
in less economically developed areas, 
particularly those where there are ‘au-
thentic’ and ‘minority’ cultures. Such 
rural nostalgia tends to affirm their 
urban middle-class status and values, 
which might be expressed as a taste 
for rustic or ethnic food experiences, 
such as ‘farmhouse joy’ 农家乐 restau-
rants, commonly marketed as serving 
more local, ‘traditional’, environmen-
tally friendly fare, or ‘ethnic’ music. 
So, while new cultural initiatives like 
Bishan may benefit from the interest 
of middle-class urbanites, who are 




















eign books in the Anhui countryside, 
this potential contradiction, or per-
haps compromise, has not been lost on 
Bishan’s founders.
Middle-class urbanites with rus-
tic aspirations are now just as likely, 
for example, to indulge in ostentatious 
tea connoisseurship involving expen-
sive teas and tea-making and serving 
accoutrements, including rare im-
ported items from Taiwan and Japan. 
Some have taken to wearing faux-an-
cient hanfu 汉服 ‘Chinese’ clothing that 
manages to simultaneously suggest 
aesthetic sophistication, patriotism 
and opulence, while being less out-
wardly extravagant—and therefore 
politically safer—than such things as 
designer watches, French red wines, 
and Italian sports cars. 
At the same time, independent ru-
ral reconstruction initiatives, and the 






















appear to be in step with such govern-
ment policies as the anti-corruption 
and pro-austerity campaigns as well as 
Xi’s call for ‘art and media workers’ to 
spend time in rural areas (directly re-
calling Mao’s lecture in May 1942 at the 
Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art), 
and even the demand that intellectuals 
and others be on guard against ‘West-
ern influences’. However, because they 
tend to be driven by urban academics 
and creative communities, with a sus-
picious cohort of collaborating foreign 
institutions and individuals, such ini-
tiatives risk being perceived as a sub-
versive critique of the central govern-
ment’s failure in rural communities, 
particularly since party-state policies, 
especially under Xi, leave scant room 
for autonomous zones of culture. 
Therefore, while many initially court 
local government support, they always 
face the risk of censure or co-option. 
Many initiatives, however, are in fact 
affiliated to university-based research 
labs or individual professors, and so 
are already directly linked to an arm of 
government. 
No less significant a challenge is 
the need to navigate the expectations 
of locals, including cadres and other 
government officials, whose main in-
centive in such intellectual and cul-
tural experiments is their potential to 
raise local incomes and create employ-
ment without attracting undue atten-
tion from the centre. 
STOP PRESS: 
Increasingly in Xi’s China there is a 
price to pay for international recog-
nition: on 2 May 2016, several foreign 
media outlets reported that nervous 
Party cadres shut down parts of the 
Bishan commune’s water and electric-
ity supply. At the time of publication, 
Ou had gone quiet.































































THE CRYSTAL-CLEAR WATERS OF THE 
CHINESE INTERNET
Jeremy Goldkorn and Lorand Laskai
4
THE TOP RESULT ON A GOOGLE SEARCH FOR 
‘Internet pollution’ in English is an article on 
Wikipedia about ‘information pollution,’ which 
is defined as ‘the contamination of information 
supply with irrelevant, redundant, unsolicited and 
low-value information’. The rest of the top Google 
results concern the carbon emissions caused 
by the electricity used by Internet servers and 
environmental degradation caused by electronic 
waste. 






























































Chinese language searches for 
‘Internet pollution’ 网络污染 on 
Baidu 百度, China’s leading search 
engine, as well as on Google, pres-
ent a slightly different definition. 
The top result on both is a long 
page on Baidu’s own Baike 百科 
(a kind of commercial Wikipedia) 
that notes the following: ‘For most 
Internet users these days, many 
Chinese websites have more and 
more “Internet pollution” that, like 
psoriasis, causes endless annoy-
ance.’ 
The Baike entry then notes that because the Internet and mobile net-
works are developing so rapidly, governments are always playing catch 
up with their regulation. Before describing the Chinese situation or even 
defining what exactly Internet pollution means, it provides a list of Inter-
net ‘management’ strategies used in the USA, UK, South Korea, Japan, and 
France, followed by several paragraphs on Chinese government measures 
to control the Internet. The entry quotes from a 2010 speech by Liu Zhen-
grong 刘正荣, then deputy director of the State Council Information Office 
Internet Bureau (one of the organisations responsible at that time for on-
line ‘public opinion guidance’, aka propaganda) on the need for govern-
ment regulation and management to continuously keep up with the rapid 
development of the Internet. 
The article says the problems of Internet pollution include threats 
to national security, pornography, the spread of rumors, and the ‘mali-
cious spread of harmful information’ 恶意传播有害信息, fraud, privacy 
infringement, dating scams, and ‘Internet violence’ 网络暴力, which is 
probably best rendered in English as cyberbullying. 
Internet pollution: in this cartoon a computer is 
pouring vulgar words into the head of the user
Image: img5.imgtn.bdimg.com
All of this is of a piece with a strategy that is old as the Chinese Inter-
net itself. In 1997, when only a few hundred thousand people were online 
in China, Geremie Barmé and Sang Ye published an article in Wired mag-
azine titled ‘The Great Firewall’. It was the first published use of the now 
common phrase that describes the cordon sanitaire that Chinese censors 
have erected to block Chinese Internet users from accessing, inter alia, all 
major international social media services and many foreign news sites. 
Barmé and Sang described early work on what Chinese Internet users now 
refer to by the abbreviation GFW:
In an equipment-crowded office in the Air Force Guesthouse on Bei-
jing’s Third Ring Road sits the man in charge of computer and Net 
surveillance at the Public Security Bureau. The PSB—leizi, or ‘thunder 
makers,’ in local dialect—covers not only robberies and murder, but 
also cultural espionage, ‘spiritual pollutants,’ and all manner of dis-
sent. Its new concern is Internet malfeasance.
A computer engineer in his late 30s, Comrade X (he asked not to be 
identified because of his less-than-polite comments about some Chi-
nese ISPs) is overseeing efforts to build a digital equivalent to China’s 
Great Wall. Under construction since last year, what’s officially known 
as the ‘firewall’ is designed to keep Chinese cyberspace free of pollut-
ants of all sorts, by the simple means of requiring ISPs to block access 
to ‘problem’ sites abroad.
State rhetoric about purifying the Internet intensified in 2012, the 
year that Chinese social media’s ability to challenge the official narra-
tive was probably at its lowest point to date. Calls to cleanse the Internet 
of ‘poisons’ and ‘pollutants’ have grown increasingly shrill every year, 
as documented in every edition of the China Story Yearbook since then. 





























































February that year quoted Xi Jin-
ping as saying that cyberspace 
should be made ‘clean and chip-
per’ (in the Xinhua News Agen-
cy’s translation). Elsewhere Xi 
has called cyberspace an ‘ecolo-
gy’ 生态 that should be developed 
in the image of ‘crystal-clear wa-
ter and lush mountains as an 
invaluable asset’ 绿水青山就是
金银山. To purify the ecological 
system, authorities run cam-
paigns like the ‘Clean Internet 
2015’, which closed down tens 
of thousands of websites featur-
ing allegedly pornographic and 
obscene content. The rhetoric is 
accompanied by offline crack-
downs, including arrests, the 
shutting down of Internet servic-
es, and police investigations. The 
year 2015 was no exception. But 
if official statements focus on clamping down on crime, including the dis-
semination of pornography, official actions often aim at the censorship of 
political ideas and restricting independent political activities.
For several weeks in January 2015, the technicians of the Great 
Firewall interfered with VPNs, or Virtual Private Networks, popular tools 
for getting around the obstructions to browsing foreign sites. Most VPN 
services were throttled to the point of being unusable. VPNs are not illegal 
per se—but Chinese law requires companies and individuals using them 
to register with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. 
The Great Firewall (GFW) in operation in China
Image: The South China Morning Post
In July, a draft Cybersecurity Law 
was published that made a range of 
Internet-based activities illegal and 
required tech companies operating 
in China, if asked, to provide law 
enforcement with technical assistance, 
including decryption of user data. The 
final version of the law went into force 
on 1 January 2016. 
In August 2015, meanwhile, the 
Ministry of Public Security announced the ‘punishment’ of at least 197 
people for ‘spreading rumours’ online and said they had shut down 165 
‘online accounts’. The ‘rumours’ were related to China’s stock market tra-
vails, the explosions at the port in Tianjin and the military parade to com-
memorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. In December, 
the activist lawyer Pu Zhiqiang 浦志强 went on trial in Beijing for his on-
line social commentary; the Second Intermediate Court of Beijing found 
him guilty of ‘picking quarrels and inciting ethnic hatred’, and gave him a 
suspended three-year prison sentence.
The Communist Party under Xi Jinping sees free expression and 
political organising on digital platforms within China as a threat. It is 
also wary about foreign countries, particularly the US, using the Internet 
both to undermine the Party ideologically and for espionage and cyber-
warfare. Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations about the global surveillance 
activities of the American National Security Agency (NSA) changed the 
conversation about Internet security and technology controls in China 
almost overnight. The Snowden revelations provided compelling proof 
of the American intentions that Chinese Internet regulators had long 
warned about. It became much tougher for Google to claim no political 
agenda and for the US State Department to reassure countries like Russia 































































THE ANTHEM OF THE CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA,
by Lorand Laskai
Beijing Internet Association’s Lunar New Year gala: ‘An Internet power: 
Tell the world that that the Chinese Dream is uplifting China
Photo: youtube.com
During the talent show section of the Beijing Internet Association’s 
Lunar New Year gala, the Cyber Administration of China (CAC) 
presented a paean to the country’s Internet prowess and the 
greatness of Internet regulation titled: ‘An Internet power: Tell the 
world that the Chinese Dream is uplifting China’.
For its anthem, CAC reportedly enlisted the help of Zhao Jialin 赵
佳霖, one of the artists behind China’s summer 2014 pop hit ‘Little 
Apple’ 小苹果. At the centre of the anthem is the concept of the country 
becoming an ‘Internet power’ 网络强国, a term that encompasses 
Internet infrastructure, business, culture and governance, and 
































Devotedly keeping watch over the space every day,
Taking up our mission as the sun rises in the east,
Innovating every day, embracing the clear and bright,
Like warm sunshine moving in our hearts.
Unified with the strength of all living things,
Devoted to turning the global village into the most 
beautiful scene.
An Internet power: Where the Internet is, so is the 
glorious dream.
An Internet power: From the distant cosmos to the 
missing home.
An Internet power: Tell the world that the Chinese 
Dream is uplifting China.
An Internet power: I represent my nation to the 
world.
In this world all rivers flow to the sea,
Assuming the measure of Chinese civilisation.
Five thousand years of history condensed to illumi-
nate innovation,
Integrity is the clear ripple of a nationality.
We are unified between heaven and earth,
Faith and devotion flow like the Yellow River and 
Yangtze.
An Internet power: Where the Internet is, so is the 
glorious dream.
An Internet power: From the distant cosmos to the 
missing home.
An Internet power: Tell the world that the Chinese 
Dream is uplifting China.






























































The Snowden Papers were hardly the 
first revelations to alarm China about the 
potential harm of the global Internet. In 
June 2012, The New York Times published 
an article claiming that the malicious 
computer worm Stuxnet was a jointly 
built US-Israeli cyber-weapon designed 
to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program. 
Previously, American social media sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter had been 
widely heralded as major factors in the Arab Spring protests of 2010–
2012—leading to Adam Segal, author of The Hacked World Order, calling 
the period (from June 2012 to June 2013) ‘Year Zero’ of the dramatic 
reassertion of national controls over cyberspace. Of all the states and 
ruling parties, China was perhaps the most concerned and best prepared 
for this project. 
In 2014, the Party-state established the Central Leading Group for 
Internet Security and Informatisation 中央网络安全和信息化领导小组 
with, significantly, Xi Jinping himself at its head. One of the members of 
the leading group was Lu Wei 鲁炜, who became Xi’s able lieutenant as the 
head of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) 中央网信办, also 
established in 2014 to centrally manage Internet censorship and control. 
The CAC took over the functions of the State Council Information Office 
Internet Bureau (for more on this subject see the China Story Yearbook 
2014, Chapter 3 ‘The Chinese Internet ‘Unshared Destiny’, pp.106–123).
The CAC has some elements in common with a dynamic Internet start-
up. The average age of its staff (37.8 years old) is young, at least by the 
standards of a Chinese government agency, and CAC officials are known 
to work long hours thanks to the organisation’s quickly expanding man-
date. Within two years of its founding, the CAC has taken a central role in 
implementing Xi’s vision of the Internet, giving Lu Wei a prominent me-
dia profile. A key part of this vision is the concept of Internet sovereignty, 
Lu Wei
Photo: img4.imgtn.bdimg.com
which emphasises the authority of a nation-state to regulate cyberspace in 
its own unique way. 
By the time Xi Jinping made his state visit to the United States in 
September 2015, with Lu Wei in his delegation, he was well prepared to 
meet the Obama government’s criticisms about alleged Chinese hacking 
of US government and commercial websites with vague promises of co-
operation on cybersecurity issues.
His confidence was due in no small part to China’s huge, dynamic and 
expanding Internet community. At the end of 2015, the country’s popula-
tion of Internet users had grown to around 700 million. China is the only 
country whose Internet companies can rival the titans of Silicon Valley, 
whether measured by user numbers, scale or revenues. 
Alibaba was originally an ecommerce company offering services 
similar to Amazon and Ebay. It used some of the US$25 billion war chest 
generated by its September 2014 listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
to rapidly expand into a huge variety of new businesses from consumer 
credit and mobile payments to film production. In 2015, the search engine 
Baidu grew a mobile phone- and online-based food delivery service from 
nothing to a business reportedly worth RMB 8 billion (US$1.2 billion). By 
the end of 2015, Tencent’s WeChat mobile messaging service had more 
than a billion accounts with users active each month totalling nearly 
Xi Jinping and Lu Wei meet with the CEOs of US Tech Giants





























































700 million. The service offers a combination of messaging (similar to 
WhatsApp), mobile payments, flight and train ticket booking, car hailing, 
Facebook-type social media feeds, and many other apps and services. 
WeChat is perhaps the first Chinese Internet or mobile product that has 
a real international presence: one out of every four users is non-Chinese. 
Facebook and other Silicon Valley companies are studying it as a potential 
model for future development. Didi Dache, a car-hailing app (renamed 
Didi Chuxing in early 2016 after a merger with a rival), is the world’s 
largest company of its kind and the only serious global rival to Uber. In 
2015, Xiaomi, an upstart Chinese company founded in 2011, became the 
world’s fifth largest smartphone maker, selling 70.8 million units. 
It is not only giant companies that are powering the dynamism of the 
Chinese Internet and its broader economy: in November 2015, Bloomberg 
reported that China was a world leader in entrepreneurship, ‘spawning 
4,000 new businesses a day’. Many of these are tech companies, including 
everything from one person boutiques selling handmade dresses on Alib-
aba’s Taoabao platform to companies like HaoBTC, a Bitcoin mining firm 
with servers in the mountains of west Sichuan that give them access to 
cheap hydroelectric power. 
All this means that the government can laugh off criticism that gov-
ernment censorship and regulation of the technology industry hampers 
innovation and prevents China’s Internet companies from achieving glob-
al significance. 
During Xi’s 2015 state visit to the US, he visited the Microsoft head-
quarters in Redmond, where he and Lu Wei posed for a photograph with 
the grinning CEOs of Apple, Facebook, IBM, Cisco, Amazon, Intel, and Air-
bnb. Despite the fact that many of these companies are blocked from op-
erating in China or subject to protectionist regulations, none of their exec-
utives could resist a meet and greet with the Chairman of Everything and 
his head cyberspace administrator. 
ALIBABA BUYS THE SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, by Aiden Xia
Alibaba, China’s biggest ecommerce 
company, announced on 14 December 
2015 that it would buy the South China 
Morning Post (SCMP), Hong Kong’s 
premier English-language paper, for 
US$266 million. 
Tse Tsan-tai 谢缵泰 and Alfred 
Cunningham founded the SCMP in 
1903. Companies controlled by Rupert Murdoch bought a majority stake in it in 1987, and 
then sold a controlling interest to Malaysian Chinese tycoon Robert Kuok 郭鹤年 in 1993. 
Despite its reputation as one of Asia’s most authoritative periodicals, the paper today has a 
relatively small subscription base of around 100,000 print and digital subscribers, and fall-
ing profit margins. Penetration into the mainland Chinese market would be at the price of 
the paper’s editorial independence and often critical coverage of the Chinese government. 
Already, there have been conflicts between the news staff and Kuok, who is seen as sympa-
thetic to the Chinese government. The internal dynamics at the paper have been tumultu-
ous in recent years, leading to a turnover rate of ten chief editors in eleven years since 2000. 
News of Alibaba’s acquisition of SCMP marked a tightening of Beijing’s grip around the 
prestigious publication. In a statement and Q&A published in the newspaper, Joseph Tsai, 
executive vice chairman of Alibaba vowed that SCMP would remain ‘objective, accurate 
and fair’. He said that the acquisition aimed to combine Alibaba’s digital expertise with the 
112-year-old newspaper’s journalistic excellence to create a global media entity offering 
‘comprehensive and insightful news and analysis of the big stories in Hong Kong and China’. 
But he also remarked:
Our perspective is this: China is important, China is a rising economy. It is the second-
largest economy in the world. People should learn more about China. The coverage 
about China should be balanced and fair. Today when I see mainstream western news 
organisations cover China, they cover it through a very particular lens. It is through 
the lens that China is a communist state and everything kind of follows from that. A lot 
of journalists working with these western media organisations may not agree with the 
system of governance in China and that taints their view of coverage. We see things 
differently, we believe things should be presented as they are.
Or at least as they are through the equally particular lens of China’s own media. 
The South China Morning Post






























































CAC organised the Second Annual World Internet Conference (also known 
as the Wuzhen Summit) held in mid-December 2015 in the river town of 
Wuzhen in Zhejiang province. Some wags on the Chinese Internet dubbed 
the conference the ‘Third World Internet Conference’ because with the 
exception of Russia, Iran and South Korea, there were no government 
representatives from major countries in attendance, with officials from 
countries such as Tonga, Congo, and Guinea making up the bulk of the 
twenty-one state participants. 
Nonetheless, Chinese media reported that the event attracted more 
than 2,000 Internet professionals, officials, and experts from more than 
120 countries and regions. Guests included Chinese President Xi Jinping, 
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Alibaba founder Jack Ma, the 
CEOs of Airbnb and Netflix, as well as high-level representatives from Face-
book, Google, and LinkedIn, Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales, and Fadi 
Chehadé, the president of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), an organisation that sets standards for top-level 
domains and root servers that ensure that you are directed to the correct 
page when you type a web address into a browser.
The principal purpose behind the annual conference, according to 
Xinhua, is ‘to promote the Chinese Communist Party’s vision of Inter-
net governance 互联整理 to an international audience and to gain allies 
against the perceived Western encroachment upon China’s cyber sover-
eignty 互联主权. At the first Wuzhen Summit in 2014, attendees woke up 
to find a draft joint statement affirming China’s concept of ‘Internet sover-
eignty’ that had been slid under their hotel doors on the final night. Partic-
ipants were encouraged to sign it. But the overture did not succeed—the 
first Wuzhen Summit ended without a communiqué, and the CAC scuttled 
whatever goodwill the three-day conference had managed to cultivate 
among those participants and observers sceptical of China’s online cen-
sorship regime.
December 2015: the Wuzhen Summit
Source: cntv.cn
At the Second World Internet Conference the pitch was more com-
pelling and the staging more graceful. Whereas Xi Jinping merely sent a 
video message in 2014, in 2015 he was in attendance and delivered a key-
note speech. He outlined ‘four principles’ 四项原则 and made ‘five prop-
ositions’ 五点主张 for international Internet governance, centring on the 
idea of ‘respecting Internet sovereignty’ 尊重网络主权. 
China enjoyed a propaganda coup with cameras trained on the Silicon 
Valley executives listening to China’s vision for a clean and regulated cy-
berspace. And the Chinese government scored a significant victory at the 
end of the conference when ICANN president Chehadé accepted the role of 
co-chair of the Wuzhen Summit’s high-level advisory committee. 
Only days before the conference, the UN had approved a document 
titled ‘Ten-Year Review of the World Summit on the Information Society’, 
which sets out the processes for how the Internet is governed. The final 
text substituted, at China’s insistence, the word ‘multilateral’ for ‘multi- 
stakeholder’. The latter includes non-government agencies—civil society, 
in effect—in the discussion of how to manage the global Internet, where-
as ‘multilateral’ grants governments a privileged role and the prerogative 
to manage their own cyberspaces independently. This was a victory for the 
Chinese concept of ‘Internet sovereignty’, for it grants Chinese and other gov-
ernments fed up with the pesky inconveniences of an open Internet the mor-
al right to ‘purify’ and enclose their own cyberspaces. The Chinese govern-
ment has not yet figured out how to rid the air and soil of pollution, but it is 





























































WORSHIPPING JIANG ZEMIN’S TOAD, by Lorand Laskai
In the late summer of 2015, obser-
vant Internet users noticed the un-
canny similarities between a large, 
cartoonish blow-up amphibian, a 
‘toad’ 蛤蟆, floating on the lake at 
the Summer Palace, and the former 
president, Jiang Zemin, with his char-
acteristic thick, black spectacles and 
high-waisted pants. 
The initial commentary was mock-
ing and much of it was censored. But 
instead of fizzling out, it blossomed 
into a meme called ‘toad worship cul-
ture’ 膜蛤文化 as ‘fans of the toad’ 蛤丝 gathered on WeChat, Weibo online community Baidu 
Tieba (Baidu Paste Bar), and Q&A website Zhihu to share their favorite quotes, memories, 
and pictures of the former leader.
In one frequently shared picture, Jiang confidently combs his hair in front of the King of 
Spain. In another, he gesticulates widely next to US president Bill Clinton. In yet another, 
Jiang, in waist-high swimming trunks and goggles, beams for a picture before diving into the 
Dead Sea—a comment reads ‘I am utterly moved by the Elder’s openness and confidence’. 
To indicate laughter, fans replace the characters for ‘haha’ 哈哈 with the ‘ha’ from the char-
acter for ‘toad’ 蛤蛤.
In toad worship culture, Jiang Zemin himself is called the ‘Elder’ 长者, a reference to one 
toad fan’s favorite memory: in 2000, Jiang scolded Hong Kong reporter Sharon Cheung 张
宝华 at a press conference, referring to himself as an ‘elder’ with an imperative to impart 
some real-life experience to Hong Kong’s simple-minded media. Cheung’s Weibo account 
has become something of a virtual mecca for toad fans.
Toad worship delights in Jiang’s unselfconscious and free-wheeling nature, a strong 
contrast with Xi Jinping’s meticulously choreographed public image and self-important 
persona. Discussing the differences between Xi 
and Jiang is called xixihaha 习习蛤蛤, a pun on 
the onomatopoeia for the sound of laughter 嘻
嘻哈哈. In a thinly veiled satirical comment on 
Xi’s staged 2013 visit to a Beijing steamed bun 
shop, some toad fans posted the slogan ‘keep 
the toad, destroy the bun’ 续蛤灭包. This was 
apparently too much: soon after this slogan 
appeared, censors eliminated most of the toad 
worship culture from the Internet.
A toad (left); Jiang Zemin (right)
Source: cdn0.dailydot.com
2000: Hong Kong reporters make Jiang Zemin 
see red
Source: youtube.com
Afterword: ‘Twas ever thus
The 1997 Geremie R. Barmé and Sang Ye article mentioned above quotes 
Xia Hong, then public relations manager for a company called China 
InfoHighway Space: 
The Internet has been an important technical innovator, but we need 
to add another element, and that is control. The new generation of in-
formation superhighway needs a traffic control centre. It needs high-
way patrols; users will require driving licenses. These are the basic 
requirements for any controlled environment. 
All Net users must conscientiously abide by government laws and reg-
ulations. If Net users wish to enter or leave a national boundary they 
must, by necessity, go through customs and immigration. They will 
not be allowed to take state secrets out, nor will they be permitted to 
bring harmful information in.
As we stand on the cusp of the new century, we need to—and are 
justified in wanting to—challenge America’s dominant position. Cut-
ting-edge Western technology and the most ancient Eastern culture 
will be combined to create the basis for dialog in the coming century. 
In the twenty-first century, the boundaries will be redrawn. The world 































The Expansion of the United Front Under Xi Jinping 

































































































T H E  E X PA N S I O N  O F  T H E 
U N I T E D  F R O N T  U N D E R  X I 
J I N P I N G
Gerry Groot
X I JINPING’S RULE TO DATE has been characterised by, among 
other things, a return to the basics 
of Party rule as established by Mao. 
These include a renewed emphasis 
on United Front 统战 work, which 
Mao called one of the ‘three secret 
weapons’ 三个大法宝 (along with the 
armed forces and Party-building) that 
helped the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to power in 1949. (For an over-
view of the United Front, see the China 
Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, 
pp.128–132.) The year 2015 was the 
most important one since 1990 for the 
United Front, a collection of strategies 
overseen by the United Front Work De-
partment (UFWD) 统战部 by which the 
Party seeks to strengthen its authority 
and legitimacy, especially among the 
more marginalised, independent, and 
minority sectors of the Chinese popu-
lation. 
Today, these include professionals 
such as lawyers, business managers, 
and ‘new capitalists’—whose co-opera-
tion is crucial for the success of China’s 
new economic policies—as well as 
historic United Front targets like reli-
gious believers and ethnic minorities 
including Tibetans and Uyghurs. The 
children of China’s nouveau riche are 
another relatively new focus along 
with Chinese studying overseas. Xi had 
previously stressed the importance of 
United Front work among Overseas 
Chinese, huaqiao 华侨, a category that 
now includes Chinese citizens living 
abroad (so-called ‘new huaqiao’). 
The intensification of United 
Front efforts indicates profound con-


















































Front also affords some form of rep-
resentation or a voice within the polit-
ical system through recruitment into 
the advisory Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Congress (CPPC), a key 
United Front institution, or by other 
means. The Party, in return, gets to tap 
their diverse talents for the ongoing 
tasks of nation-building and economic 
construction. Their public expressions 
of loyalty, moreover, helps validate the 
Party’s claims to represent all of China. 
To succeed, United Front cadres 
have to be able to make friends with 
those who are not the Party’s natural 
allies, and interpret and translate Party 
policy to them in a way that can win 
them over. It can be a tricky balancing 
act with high stakes: the Party has 
long been wary of United Front cadres 
being influenced by their targets 
rather than the other way round. 
During the anti-Rightist Campaign 
of the 1950s, the Party deemed then 
UFWD head, Li Weihan 李维汉, to be 
politically unreliable and he became 
one of the movement’s victims, for 
example. The anti-Rightist purge put 
a damper on United Front work for 
almost two decades between 1957 and 
Mao’s death in 1976. Thirteen years 
later, the attempts by UFWD head 
Yan Mingfu 阎明复 to negotiate with 
that these sectors are contributing to 
the country’s political and social sta-
bility, as well as to its public image 
abroad. The Party also needs to pre-
vent such individuals or groups from 
becoming actively rebellious or con-
duits of what it considers ‘polluting’ 
Western political ideals. The latter 
include ‘universal values’, electoral 
democracy, and academic freedom 
(including the right to critique the Par-
ty’s historical mistakes). 
United Front work often takes 
the form of co-optation: by advocating 
for the Party’s views to their circles of 
influence and reporting the views of 
their circles back to the Party, targets 
are rewarded with enhanced status 
and in some cases material advantages 
as well. Co-operation with the United 
Xi Jinping at the CCP Central Committee’s Conference 
on United Front Work
Image: news.xinhuanet.com
the student protestors in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 led to his dismissal 
as well as a wider purge within the 
eight ‘United Front Democratic Parties’ 
(most of which date back to the war 
against the Japanese occupation, like 
the ‘Revolutionary Committee of the 
Kuomintang’). 
The Party convened its first na-
tional United Front work conference in 
nine years from 18–20 May 2015 under 
the title ‘CCP Central Committee’s Con-
ference on United Front Work’ 中央统
战工作会议. The citation of the Central 
Committee in the title of the confer-
ence gave it status equal to other CCP 
central-level work conferences, a ma-
jor fillip. Then, even more significantly, 
at the end of July, the Party announced 
the creation of a Leading Small Group 
(LSG) on United Front Work. Both the 
establishment of the LSG and the fact 
that the current head of the UFWD 
(since 2014) is Politburo member Sun 
Chunlan 孙春兰, one of the most sen-
ior women in the Party and the head of 
the UFWD, highlights the importance 
that Xi places on United Front work. 
The UFWD, meanwhile, has expanded 
over the last few years by some 40,000 
new cadres. Sun’s deputy at the UFWD 
is Wang Zhengwei 王正伟, the head of 
the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. 
Their personal prominence within 
the Party means that the Department 
ranks marginally ahead of both the 
Central Department of Organisation 
and that of Propaganda. United Front 
initiatives are now almost certainly go-
ing to be implemented more effective-
ly at all levels of the party-state instead 
of haphazardly as was often the case 
in the past. 
Yet, for all that, plus concrete 
measures like more generous funding 
of academic research on United Front 
topics as well as gestures such as Xi’s 
speeches and the establishment of 
the LSG, in several key areas of Unit-
ed Front work the Party seems to be 
scoring own goals, or at least making 





















































Taiwan, for example, has long been 
a major target of United Front work 
and perhaps the best known. The Par-
ty wants the government of Taiwan, 
which calls itself the Republic of China 
(ROC), to formally accept the sover-
eignty of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). This would allow it to complete 
the CCP’s self-declared ‘sacred’ task of 
unification that was partly achieved 
when Hong Kong and Macau returned 
to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and 
1999 respectively. 
On 7 November 2015, Xi held a 
surprise meeting in Singapore with 
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou 马英
九, the head of the Nationalist Party 
国民党 (GMD or KMT), the Communist 
Party’s historical enemy and rival. It 
was the first such meeting since 1949 
and one that state media, including 
China’s CCTV, declared would go down 
in history. Xi called Taiwan and China 
‘a family whose blood is thicker than 
water’ and he and Ma agreed to estab-
lish a hotline to facilitate communica-
tion in times of crisis. 
Already, the Party offers ‘Tai-
wan compatriots’ 台湾同胞 preferen-
tial treatment as tourists, students, 
and investors and it welcomes back 
old soldiers who once fought against 
it in the civil war of 1945–1949 and be-
yond. It attempts to bind Taiwan ever 
closer through trade and to encour-
age Taiwanese to see themselves as 
part of a greater China. Like the KMT, 
the CCP is increasingly worried about 
the development of distinct Taiwan-
ese identity (as opposed to a ‘Chinese’ 
identity) based on an explicit rejec-
tion of mainland China. Yet the meet-
ing itself, organised in secret and 
sprung on an unsuspecting public, 
may have simply intensified mistrust 
of the Mainland, the KMT and United 
7 November 2015: Presidents Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping meet in Singapore, it is the first such meeting since 
1949
Source: setn.com
Front work among the people of Tai-
wan. Not long after that the people 
of Taiwan voted out the KMT and re-
placed Ma with a president who is far 
less enthusiastic about cross-Strait 
ties. (See Forum ‘Purifying the Body 
Politic in Taiwan’, pp.252–260.)
Reaching out, pressing in
Tibet is another key target of United 
Front work. The Party understands 
that its treatment of Tibetans, Uyghurs, 
Mongolians, and religious believers 
generally is of great interest to many 
foreign opinion makers, foreign gov-
ernments, and international organisa-
tions concerned about human rights. 
Its crackdown on Tibetan critics of 
Chinese rule, restrictions on the use of 
Tibetan language, the intense surveil-
lance of monasteries, and continued 
denigration of the Dalai Lama (in De-
cember, the Party even accused him 
of being an Islamic State sympathiser) 
have both hardened Tibetan resistance 
within China and alarmed Tibet’s sup-
porters overseas. 
Many Tibetans and their support-
ers overseas were infuriated when a 
key Tibetan cadre within the UFWD 
declared in 2015 that the (atheist) 
Party—and not a committee of High 
Lamas, as is the historical custom—
would determine the next reincarna-
tion of the Dalai Lama once the cur-
rent Tibetan leader-in-exile passes 
away.
As this example illustrates, once a 
religious or ethnic community leader 
begins promoting the Party’s views, 
the community may trust them less, 
and once they lose the trust of their 
communities, they lose their utility 
as agents of influence or informants. 
They risk being regarded as sell-outs 
or ignored altogether. The UFWD has 
trouble selecting allies who can con-
tinue to exert influence in their own 
realm, be it religious, digital, economic 
or political, after they begin to do its 
work.
In Xinjiang, meanwhile, inter- 
ethnic tensions continue to simmer, 
with continued protests by Muslim Uy-
ghurs against Chinese rule, including 
several deadly attacks on Han Chinese 
civilians and police. The Party-state is 
keen to frame this unrest as part of an 
international Islamic terrorist problem 
rather than the consequence of its own 
repressive internal policies. In 2014, 
the government introduced a policy 
that provides cash bonuses to Uyghurs 
who marry ethnic Chinese. This is not 
exactly popular among a group that 


















































identity as well as its ownership of its 
traditional land. In January 2015, the 
city of Urumqi proscribed the burka; 
the year before, men with large beards 
were kept off public transportation at 
the time of a provincial sporting event. 
United Front work to promote ethnic 
integration is clearly under pressure 
here as well.
United Front work requires candid 
advice and objective knowledge of the 
people and situations it is attempting 
to influence. Yet the Party-state under 
Xi is increasingly forcing all analysis 
and pronouncement to conform to ide-
ological and policy needs. In Novem-
ber 2015, the Party sacked the editor 
of the Xinjiang Daily, Zhao Xinwei 赵新
慰, and expelled him from the Party for 
‘improperly’ discussing government 
policy. The former editor’s ‘words and 
deeds’ had gone against government 
attempts to rein in religious extremism 
and terrorism, the official China News 
Service Agency reported.
Under former president Hu Jintao 
(2002–2012), the Chinese government 
seemingly tolerated a greater degree of 
religious freedom, particularly among 
Chinese Christians. Tolerance was 
The newsletter of the Party’s 
Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection states that ‘Party 
members are absolutely not 
allowed to hold religious beliefs’ 
(article bottom left)
Source: csr.mos.gov.cn
believed beneficial to social stability 
and charity work. Xi, however, ap-
pears far more concerned about the 
potential of Christians to form an an-
ti-Communist fifth column (as some 
Chinese analysts believe happened in 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe). In May, the newsletter of the 
Party’s Central Commission for Disci-
pline Inspection warned that religious 
beliefs among Party members were be-
coming a matter of ‘serious concern’, 
reminding members that communism 
‘begins with atheism’ and that partic-
ipation in ‘illegal’ religious activities 
could lead to expulsion. There has 
been a widespread crackdown on ‘un-
official’ Christianity that harks back to 
Maoist policies of the 1950s. 
But the campaign of removing 
crosses and demolishing unofficial 
churches across Zhejiang Province and 
most notably in Wenzhou (part of the 
struggle against ‘foreign influence’), 
proved so unpopular that in 2015, even 
leaders of the officially-sanctioned 
churches have criticised it. If the point 
of United Front work is to foster a con-
nection and even identification with 
the Party among groups and individu-
als the Party regards as at best prob-
lematic and at worst outright hostile, 
this can be seen as a major fail for the 
United Front. 
The United Front abroad
Since the late seventies and early eight-
ies, when Chinese people began stud-
ying overseas in increasing numbers, 
the Party-state has closely monitored 
their behaviour and speech, especially 
those who have gone abroad with gov-
ernment support. Embassies and con-
sulates foster close connections with 
students via Chinese student associa-
tions and sponsored activities.
A number of these students end 
up emigrating. The post-1978 gen-
erations of mainland immigrants to 
countries like Australia, the US, and 
Removing crosses from churches in Zhejiang


















































the UK are distinct from other huaqiao 
who may have left before 1949 or were 
born elsewhere. Older generations of 
Chinese immigrants tended to form 
tight social and business communi-
ties through associations based on 
language, provincial (or hometown) 
origins as well as politics. Historically, 
these associations were extremely val-
uable to the UFWD, whether in assess-
ing the attitudes of huaqiao to the Par-
ty’s policies and actions, courting their 
support or mobilising them against the 
Party’s critics. 
The new generations of huaqiao 
do not tend to associate or even so-
cialise in the same way. The UFWD as-
sumes that these newer huaqiao share 
a ‘common sense’ of understanding of 
the world shaped by decades of CCP 
thought work 思想工作. Given that 
many of these new immigrants are 
successful in business, academia, and 
even government in their new homes, 
the CCP is eager for their practical and 
moral support. It is equally keen to 
prevent them from falling under the 
influence of what it calls anti-China or 
anti-Communist groups or elements. 
These include the Falun Gong, human 
rights organisations, and Chinese de-
mocracy activists, as well as advocates 
of Tibetan and Xinjiang independence. 
Late in 2015, Reuters reported that the 
UFWD has been supporting the anti-Da-
lai Lama Dorje Shugden Movement, 
whose members protest appearances 
by the Dalai Lama around the world.
In the UFWD’s favour, the pas-
sage of time erases or at least softens 
memories of events such as the violent 
suppression of students in Beijing in 
June 1989. The Mainland’s economic 
boom and its rising global status has 
also helped the Party establish, main-
tain, and deepen links with overseas 
Chinese by appealing to their ‘Chinese-
ness’ and bonds to their ‘motherland’ 
祖国, literally ‘ancestral’ country. The 
Chinese government supports the 
teaching of the Chinese language in 
schools overseas, including special 
‘Chinese’ schools and promotes the 
official version of Chinese culture and 
Chinese students abroad
Photo: marketingtochina.com
history via its network of Confucius 
Institutes. It sponsors initiatives by 
which young people of Chinese de-
scent can ‘return’ to study in China. 
While it also offers scholarships and so 
on to non-Chinese, its main targets are 
overwhelmingly ethnic Chinese.
Mainland media and financial 
interests, sometimes with overt state 
backing, exercise increasing influence 
over overseas Chinese-language media 
including newspapers, electronic, and 
digital media. Here the difference be-
tween propaganda and United Front 
work blurs but the aim remains the 
same—to deliver the Party’s intend-
ed message in as many ways and as 
palatably as possible. The point is 
to cultivate sympathy for the Party’s 
policies and enhance its legitimacy in 
constituencies that already have ob-
tained foreign citizenship or intend to 
do so. This is also useful for the United 
Front’s domestic objectives, for official 
media in China itself often rebroad-
casts or republishes reports from such 
overseas media as proof of support for 
the Party’s policies abroad; the ‘fact’ of 
their originating outside official Chi-
nese media enhances their credibility. 
This tendency for direct influence by 
Beijing over local Chinese-language 
media is particularly apparent in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand.
Media and organisations under 
the control of, or heavily influenced 
by the Mainland may also profile or 
praise prominent members of the 
huaqiao community for loyalty to 
their homeland. This can, however, 
backfire, as happened in the case of 
Michael Chan, Ontario’s Minister of 
Citizenship, Immigration and Inter-
national Trade. Chan was born in 
Guangzhou, the son of a KMT official. 
He immigrated to Canada at the age 
of eighteen. Since the 1980s, he has 
made over seventy visits to China and 
has spoken to Chinese media (Xinhua) 
about how, although ‘strictly speaking’ 
he was Canadian, he has never forgot-
ten his roots. 
Then, in 2015, the Globe and Mail 
reported that in 2010, Canadian intelli-
gence suspected Chan of being under 
the ‘undue influence’ of the Chinese 
government. Chan has strenuously de-
nied this, as has Canada’s intelligence 



















































ot the paper. But after a Chinese lan-
guage newspaper, The Chinese Canadi-
an Post, ran an article critical of Chan, 
the editor-in-chief, Helen Wang, was 
told by her boss to run more pro-Chan 
articles. The newspaper’s proprietor 
has close links to both the ruling Lib-
eral Party and the Chinese consulate. 
Wang insisted on telling both sides of 
the story and was eventually sacked. 
And thus what could have been a good 
United Front story—Chan’s success as 
a Canadian politician with close and 
sentimental links to China, became a 
rolling disaster in PR terms. 
Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, the UFWD is based in 
part at the Liaison Office of the Cen-
tral People’s Government in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. 
It works with Hong Kong Commu-
nists, many of whom have been un-
derground since the 1960s, as well as 
wealthy capitalists and selected public 
figures. But the rise of Hong Kong’s 
Umbrella Movement in late 2014 
and the near total failure of United 
Front-related individuals and organ-
isations to sway popular sentiment 
reflected a major weakness of the UF-
WD’s Hong Kong strategy: its reliance 
on people whom the younger gener-
ation and significant portions of the 
rest of the population do not respect 
as leaders. In particular, the cosiness 
between mainland interests and Hong 
Kong capitalists, especially in the area 
of real estate and housing, has become 
a long-standing source of discontent. 
The Party equally failed to im-
press the student protesters with its 
appeals to the public good and the 
importance of maintaining order, es-
pecially after it was widely reported 
that the Party had activated its (United 
Front-forged) connections with crim-
inal triads to get the gangsters to try 
to intimidate the protestors through 
PLA Headquarters in Hong Kong on Earth Day 
Image: hongkong.coconuts.co
violence. Deng Xiaoping sanctioned 
such connections in 1984 when he said 
that some triads were ‘patriotic’. Many 
Hong Kong academics also believe that 
United Front cadres have been behind 
attacks on pro-democracy nominees 
for key leadership positions within the 
universities. 
Challenges ahead
United Front work can no longer rely 
on the social status and guanxi 关系 
(relationships) of the kinds of people 
it has relied on in the past, at home 
and abroad, to influence wider public 
opinion. As Chinese society grows more 
complex, it becomes harder to find peo-
ple who can effectively represent both 
their communities and the interests of 
the Party. The moment the UFWD wins 
over someone they deem to be repre-
sentative within a particular circle, the 
person loses that quality in the eyes of 
their community. This has much to do 
with a crisis of trust engendered by 
such endemic problems as corruption 
and nepotism within the Party. 
Digital technology and the Inter-
net present other challenges. In his 
speech of 20 May 2015, Xi said that 
the United Front would appeal to do-
mestic Internet celebrities to help the 
government ‘purify’ the Internet of 
political rumours, pornography, dissi-
dent views, and so on. The UFWD has 
even released its own news app. But 
it’s clear that the CCP and UFWD strug-
gle to influence popular opinion in the 
digital world. 
Online or off, the fact is that in an 
increasingly market-dominated econ-
omy the state is no longer the great 
provider. Chinese society is more so-
phisticated, complex, and reliant on 
individual effort than in Mao’s day. A 
less passive population may well pre-
fer to choose its own representatives. 
The 40,000 new cadres have their work 
cut out.



























































THE CITY THAT ATE CHINA— 
RESTRUCTURING & REVIVING BEIJING
Carolyn Cartier
5
THE BEIJING CAPITAL REGION  has reached the 
limits of environmental sustainability. The roads 
are clogged up with traffic, the city’s residents 
worry about contamination of food and water, and 
air pollution in Beijing has become a deadly serious 
environmental and health issue. But Beijing’s 
problems cannot be solved by Beijing alone. Hebei 
province forms a geographical collar around both 
the inland capital and coastal Tianjin, its historical 
port. As the largest producer of iron and steel in 
China, Hebei is also the major source of industrial 
pollutants in the region. What’s more, its iron and 
steel industries consume significant quantities of 
water. Together with increased agricultural and 
urban household demand, these industries have 
created a crisis of water supply in the capital 
region. 


























































In the absence of a rigorous culture of environmental conservation, the 
Chinese government has proposed solutions that combine engineering 
(long-distance water transfers), economic restructuring (downsizing 
Hebei’s heavy industry), and the relocation of ‘non-capital functions’ 
非首都功能 of Beijing to outside the urban core. To address these complex 
problems, the government is creating a ‘new’ city-region called Jing-Jin-Ji, 
a composite of the ‘jing’ 京 in Beijing 北京, the ‘Jin’ 津 in Tianjin 天津 and 
‘Ji’ 冀, an historical name for Hebei.
This complex regional strategy seeks to transform Beijing from a 
traditional high-density city with a large, single urban core into a multi- 
centre, city-region that encompasses and integrates Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Hebei. It aims to achieve new standards of urban governance through a 
set of plans for environmental management, industrial restructuring, new 
transport infrastructure and new town development, all of which will sup-
port the relocation of Beijing’s municipal government outside the city’s 
historical core.
This ‘meta-solution’ to the region’s environmental and other com-
plex problems, including housing, transportation, and the management 
The Hebei ‘collar’: Many maps of 
Hebei erroneously omit the ‘flying 
land’ 飞抵 of Langfeng city between 
Beijing and Tianjin
Image: chinaknowledge.com
of natural resources, 
requires major chang-
es to how the region is 
administered. What is 
today called ‘rearrang-
ing the pieces’ 板块 ex-
ists in the strategy of 
‘adjusting the admin-
istrative divisions’ 调
整行政区划 by which 
the state has estab-
lished and redefined the governing space of subnational territories (such 
as provinces, prefectures, and counties) since the Qin dynasty (221–206 
BCE).
At its 30 April 2015 meeting, the Politburo formally endorsed the Jing-
Jin-Ji Co-operative Development Outline Plan for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
region 京津冀协同发展规划纲要. The concept itself had been discussed 
and deliberated for a decade and some of the components of the scheme 
were already in development. However, as of December 2015, the detailed 
plan had still not been publically released, or perhaps even finalised. 
The international media has variously and somewhat misleadingly 
described Jing-Jin-Ji as a ‘future megalopolis’, ‘new mega-region’ or ‘super-
city’. The outline plan embraces more prosaic, but important goals. One, 
easing the ‘non-capital functions of the city; two, strictly regulating the 
size of Beijing’s population; three, promoting ‘co-operative development’ 
协同发展 among the three regions in environmental protection and trans-
portation; and four, letting the colleges and enterprises of Zhongguancun 
(Beijing’s ‘Silicon Valley’) take the lead in linking Beijing with Tianjin and 
Hebei. In other words, the Jing-Jin-Ji plan will ‘spatially restructure’ the 
existing city-region to create better conditions for development in and 
around the national capital. 
The Jing-Jin-Ji Co-operative Development Outline Plan: the three oars-
men have the characters for Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei on their backs. 


























































What’s in a Name?
As mentioned above, the name Jing-Jin-Ji is a contraction of the three place 
names Beijing 京, Tianjin 津, and Hebei 冀. Where the first two are simply 
the second characters of the contemporary place names, Ji refers to an 
historic administrative division called Jizhou 冀州 in the area that today 
encompasses all three contemporary jurisdictions: Hebei, Beijing, and 
Tianjin. Jizhou first appeared in the ‘Yu Gong’ 禹貢 or ‘Tribute of Yu’ chap-
ter in the classical text Book of Documents 書經, which dates back to the 
fifth century BCE. By using the ‘Ji’ of Jizhou in its formulation Jing-Jin-Ji, 
the party-state is subtly stressing both continuity and historical legitimacy. 
China’s rulers past and present have all changed official place 
names to reflect desired political-economic transformations. After 
1949, and especially during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, the 
Party-state renamed places to make them more ‘red’; many of these qui-
etly regained their original names—or at least pre-Cultural Revolution 
names—in the early 1980s. 
Jizhou itself was not always Jizhou: the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) 
called it Zhili 直隸 (simplified as 直隶) or ‘directly ruled’ to indicate how 
the historic capital governed its surrounding region. Use of the name 
Zhili (previously romanised as Chihli) continued into the Republican era 
The Book of Docu-
ments referred to 




from Hou Renzhi (侯仁
之), ed. (1959). 中国古
代地理名著选读•禹贡 
[Selected Masterpieces 
of Ancient Chinese 




(1912–1949). But when Chiang 
Kai-shek 蒋介石 moved the 
Republican capital to Nanjing 
in 1928, the region around 
Nanjing was also called Zhili, 
more specifically, Nan Zhili 南
直隸, ‘southern directly-ruled’, 
to distinguish it from Bei Zhi-
li 北直隸, ‘northern direct-
ly-ruled’. At the same time, Bei 
Zhili was renamed Hebei 河北 
or ‘north of the [Yellow] river’.
When the People’s Republic was established in 1949, with Beijing 
as its capital, ‘new China’ inherited a set of eleven ‘provincial-level’ 
cities (cities with the administrative status of provinces) from the Re-
publican era. In 1954, the status of all but three, Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Shanghai, was scaled down to sub-provincial. Although Beijing, Tian-
jin, and Shanghai are called ‘municipalities’ in English, the translation 
can be misleading. In Chinese, in accordance with China’s system of 
administrative divisions 行政区划体系, they are called ‘directly-gov-
erned cities’ or zhixiashi 直辖市—the same zhi and the same concept as 
in Zhili. That is, they are under the direct control of, or report directly 
to, the central government. The three original zhixiashi were joined by 
Chongqing in 1997. 
In addition to the four zhixiashi and twenty-two provinces, China 
has five ‘autonomous regions’ 自治区 (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, 
Tibet, and Xinjiang) and two ‘special administrative regions’ 特别行政区 
(Hong Kong and Macao) that also have equivalent, provincial-level status. 
Theoretically, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei are all provincial-level entities 
and are therefore of equal rank. But it is clear from both the order of the 
names in Jing-Jin-Ji and subsequent official statements, including remarks 
made by Xi Jinping himself, that Beijing enjoys priority. 


























































GOLF: IT’S NOT OK, IT’S OK,
by Aiden Xia
China’s Communist Party listed play-
ing golf as a violation of discipline for 
the first time in its revised disciplinary 
code that was released on 21 October 
2015. The prohibition applies to all 
eighty-eight million party members.
The Party’s most recent crackdown 
on golf and golf courses began in 
2004. The sport had been considered bourgeois and counter-revolutionary in the first 
decades following the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, but grew rapidly 
in popularity with the newly moneyed during the 1980s and 1990s. Golf courses have 
a huge environmental impact, especially in areas where water resources are scarce. 
However, in defiance of the 2004 ban, the number of golf courses in China continued to 
grow to more than 600 in 2015.
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption teams have taken note. In March 2105, the National 
Development and Reform Commission announced the shutting down of sixty-six 
golf courses in major cities like Shanghai and Beijing and across twenty provinces. In 
Guangdong province, which boasts the world’s largest golf facility, the Mission Hills Golf 
Club, officials were banned from playing golf during work hours in December 2014. A 
vice mayor of Wuyishan city in south-eastern Fujian province, meanwhile, was sacked 
in September 2015 for belonging to a golf club and playing the game when he should 
have been at work.
STOP PRESS: 
In early April 2016, the Discipline Inspection and Supervision News 纪检监察新 , the 
flagship newspaper of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI), pub-
lished an article clarifying that ‘playing golf itself is not a wrongdoing’. Government of-
ficials will be subject to punishment, however, if they accept membership cards illicitly, 
use public money to play golf, or play during office hours. 
Golf is popular in China
Image: pixabay.com
Water availability and scarcity
Image: theatlantic.com
Environmental Challenges Facing Jing-Jin-Ji
In February 2015, Chinese media reported that of the ten Chinese cities 
with the worst air quality, only Zhengzhou in Henan province and Jinan 
in Shandong were not in the capital region. The other eight were Tianjin, 
plus seven prefectural-level cities in Hebei: Baoding, Xingtai, Shijiazhuang, 
Tangshan, Handan, Hengshui, and Langfang. Beijing did not appear on 
the list, clearly a face-saving gesture given its position adjacent to Bao- 
ding, Langfang, and Tangshan, not to mention its internationally infamous 
problems with air pollution. 
In fact, in December 2015, Beijing announced the first ever ‘red alert’ 
for hazardous smog. Some of the air pollutants in Beijing come from in-
creased car use in the capital. But much of the particulate matter found in 
its air comes from heavy industry and coal burning in Hebei. Yet because 
party officials are generally only responsible for the jurisdictions to which 
they are appointed, they historically had little incentive to co-operate 
across boundaries, even for mutually beneficial outcomes. The concept of 
Jing-Jin-Ji recognises that there can be no solution to the region’s environ-

























































Hebei produces about one quarter of China’s national steel output. 
Hebei Iron & Steel is the largest firm in China by output, and the third 
largest in the world. The iron and steel industry doesn’t only create 
noxious emissions. It also requires a lot of water: approximately 75,000 
gallons per tonne. But Hebei doesn’t have enough water resources to 
meet its combined industrial and other needs. By the mid-2000s, 
moreover, Beijing and Tianjin each had less than half the water 
resources they needed to meet local demand; Beijing has the lowest 
average per capita water availability of all of China’s major cities. 
In the 1990s, Beijing began diverting water from Hebei as well as 
Shanxi province, but this was not a long-term solution. An increasing 
appetite for water in Beijing due both to an increase in population and 
the demands of its urban lifestyle (including the maintenance of golf 
courses—see China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, p.239), has 
lowered the groundwater of the North China Plain by some 300 metres 
since the 1970s.
THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW, by Aiden Xia
China’s updated Environmental Protection Law came into force on 1 January 2015. This 
was the first time that this fundamental statute was revised since it was enacted in 1989, a 
reflection of the Chinese government’s awareness that during the past three decades, the 
country has been sacrificing environmental quality for the sake of economic development. 
A report by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency found that by 2006, 
China had become the world’s leading emitter of carbon emissions, at volumes seven per-
cent higher by volume than the United States. The new law recognises both China’s global 
responsibilities and the reality that unless China can solve or ameliorate its environmental 
problems, the Chinese Dream will become a nightmare. 
The amended Environmental Protection Law stipulates heavier fines, naming and 
shaming of companies that break the law, and punishment of local government officials 
who don’t enforce the law. It allows Chinese NGOs to file lawsuits against polluters on 
behalf of the public, and provides confidentiality to whistleblowers to encourage public 
participation. It also requires that information about environmental monitoring—
including the specific pollutants discharged, the collection and use of discharge fees and 
so on—be published.
In December 2013, after 
Hebei Iron & Steel flouted 
central government require-
ments to decrease production, 
its CEO was forced to resign 
under suspicion of corrup-
tion. In December 2014, 
the Ministry of Environ- 
ment declared Hebei the 
main target in its ‘war on pol-
lution’ 污染宣战. New quotas require Hebei to cut one-third of its steel 
and cement production and related coal burning. This is not as eco-
nomically adventurous as it may sound: declining domestic demand 
after years of expansion has resulted in over-production and falling 
prices. The steel and related heavy industries (not just in Hebei but 
China generally) have already been compelled to downsize. In Hebei, 
however, this is policy, and strictly enforced: the provincial governor, 
Zhang Qingwei 张庆伟 declared in a 2014 CCTV interview that ‘If an 
extra tonne of steel is produced, local officials will have to take respon-
sibility and be sacked’. In January 2016, Zhang reported that Hebei’s 
economic growth in 2015 had dipped to 6.8 percent, down 0.9 percent 
from the previous year, which he attributed mainly to anti-pollution 
measures.
Sensibly, the Jing-Jin-Ji plan mandates that Beijing and Hebei co-
operate on the funding of environmental management, including the 
treatment of the large amounts of wastewater that are discharged 
into the rivers feeding the regional reservoirs. Two thirds of the 
catchment area of Beijing’s Miyun reservoir lies to the north, in Hebei. 
But engineering solutions are one thing: it is still not clear how the 
three areas are to share the costs of cross-boundary environmental 
mitigation.


























































SOUTH-NORTH WATER TRANSFERS, by Carolyn Cartier
The massive South-North Water Transfer Project 南水北调工程 transports water from the 
Yangtze River system northwards via three main routes, two of which are in the east, serv-
ing the capital region. The ‘central’ route, the more westerly of the two eastern routes, 
moves water from the Danjiangkou reservoir in Hubei province along a 1,432-km-long canal 
to Beijing’s Miyun reservoir. Miyun is the main supplier for Beijing’s Water Works No. 9, 
the largest treatment plant for drinking water in China. The ‘eastern’ route diverts water 
from the Yangtze River at Jiangdu, in Jiangsu province, north along the route of the histor-
ical Grand Canal and through tunnels under the Yellow River. It forks near Jinan, capital of 
Shandong province, to supply the eastern Shandong peninsula as well. The planned ‘west-
ern’ route would move water from the headwaters of the Yangtze across the high-altitude 
watershed divide to the headwaters of the Yellow River. 
First conceived in the 1950s, the South-North Water Transfer finally received the go-
ahead from the central government in 2001, which was planning for the 2008 Beijing Olym-
pics in the midst of a water crisis. Work didn’t begin on it until the 2010s, however, and 
‘southern water’ only arrived in the capital in December 2014. But in 2015, researchers 
discovered that levels of lead in the Danjiangkou reservoir from 2007 to 2010 were twenty 
times the maximum level considered safe by international standards. The study questioned 
but did not provide information on current levels.




Lead levels in Danjiangkou reservoir, 2007–2010


























































Coverage of the Jing-Jin-Ji 
plan in the Chinese me-
dia makes little mention of 
the ‘capital’s poverty belt’ 
环首都贫困带. This consists 
of thirty-nine counties and 
county-level administrative 
districts in Hebei, some of 
them along Beijing’s border 
with Chengde 承德, Zhang 
jiakou 张家口, and Baoding 
保定, the prefecture-level 
cities to the north, west and 
south of the capital respec-
tively. The 2006–2007 Blue-
book of Regional Develop-
ment in China (2006–2007
年: 中国区域经济发展报告) 
brought the ‘poverty belt’ to 
national attention when it 
likened the capital to ‘a Euro-
pean city surrounded by Afri-
can countryside’. Among the twenty-one regions with provincial status, 
only four of them have more counties on the national list of ‘counties re-
quiring “poverty alleviation” 国家扶贫县’ than Hebei. (The province with 
the fewest poor counties is the southern island of Hainan, with only five; 
those with more are Gansu (forty-three), Shaanxi (fifty), Guizhou (fifty), 
and Yunnan (seventy-three). 
The C-shaped ring of under-development around Beijing is land that 
historically served as a kind of defensive buffer around the capital. Hilly 
in the northwest and west, it slopes downwards as it traces the northern 
edge of the North China Plain to define the city’s eastern boundaries. State 
National-level poverty counties
Image: Pu Wuzhou, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
planners have minimised industrial development in the counties upslope 
from Beijing to protect downstream populations from industrial run-off. 
Some areas of these poorer counties are designated ‘military restricted 
zones’ 军事禁区, with limited construction of even basic infrastructure.
Nonetheless, mining and the pervasive agricultural use of pesti-
cides and chemical fertilisers in the poverty belt have polluted rivers 
and streams, contributing to the ongoing crisis of water management in 
the capital region. Jing-Jin-Ji’s major reservoirs—Miyun, Panjiakou, and 
Guanting—or their catchment areas are all situated within or adjacent to 
the poverty belt. Drought, poor management (including historical failure 
to control contamination from fish farming, tourism, and agricultural 
runoff), and the pollution of the waterways have compromised the water 
quality of the reservoirs even as Beijing has depleted its own aquifers. 
For all these reasons, the report calls the poverty belt a threat to ‘po-
litical and social stability’, beneficial for neither Beijing’s world image nor 
its long-term security. Yet in the decade since the 2006–2007 Bluebook of 
Development, State Council-approved ‘poverty alleviation programs’ for 





























































THE TWO-CHILD POLICY, by Emily Feng
In October 2015, China’s National People’s Congress approved a dramatic policy change: 
the country’s controversial one-child policy was finished. In its place, the two-child 
policy, under which all married couples could have two children, would be in force from 
1 January 2016. 
The two-child policy is less the result of a sudden moral reckoning than of economic 
and demographic calculations. The one-child policy has left China with one of the worst 
gender imbalances in the world, and children without siblings are struggling to support 
ageing relatives on their own. What’s more, there are fewer and fewer younger workers 
to replace a rapidly aging workforce. On its current path, by 2050 China will have only 
1.6 workers for every retiree, a ratio comparable to Japan or Singapore. But unlike 
those countries, China, to quote a phrase frequently used by economists, may well get 
old before it gets rich. To offset population decline, China has set its annual birthrate 
target at twenty million births, an increase, according to the National Health and Family 
Planning Commission of three million additional births a year. 
In many ways, the two-child policy is an extension of what already was in recent years 
a growing body of legal exceptions to the one-child policy. Ethnic minorities were always 
exempt from the policy while, in 1987, families living in the countryside whose first child 
was a girl were also allowed to have a second child. In November 2013, couples in which 
either parent was an only child were also allowed to have a second child. However, only 
700,000 of the eleven million qualifying couples applied for permission to have a second 
child, raising questions about what percentage of the ninety million Chinese couples that 
qualify to have a second child under the two-child policy will take advantage of the new 
policy. 
There are two major reasons why Chinese couples have been slow to embrace the 
relaxation in family planning policy. They may consider the cost of raising a second child 
simply to be too great, particularly in first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai, where 
property prices are some of the highest in the world. China’s top law-making bodies have 
discussed giving two-child families economic and educational subsidies but are yet to 
implement any specific policies. 
The second reason is cultural. After almost four decades and at least two generations 
under the one-child policy, which has been not only enforced by law but normalised 
through education, media and culture, many couples no longer desire to have more 
than one child. Cash incentives, government propaganda, and slightly more generous 
vacation policies might not have any noticeable effect in changing societal attitudes. 
The two-child policy was announced in October 2015
Image: Day Donaldson, Flickr
If large numbers of couples do decide to have a second child, another possible 
problem relates to gender equality. A 2013 national survey of Chinese college-age women 
conducted by the All China Women’s Federation found that ninety percent of women had 
experienced gender discrimination while seeking employment. More generous maternal 
leave and family planning policies will make women who decide to have two children 
more expensive to hire, especially without additional state support. Without first creating 
comprehensive social programs to support working women and tackle larger issues of 
sexism in the workplace and society at large, the two-child policy could not only fall short 
of its goals but also undo years of progress in women’s rights. 
Implementation of the two-child policy has been delegated to provincial governments 
to allow for consideration of the varying circumstances of each province. Faced with 
unreliable population statistics, provinces face the daunting task of calculating reasonable 
birth targets and then calibrating social policy to achieve the desired results—a social 
engineering experiment that will have enormous implications for China’s society and 


























































Since the 1980s, the State Council has made thousands of changes to the 
administrative divisions within urban areas. The first wave re-named rural 
prefectures and counties as prefecture-level and county-level cities, thus 
transforming collective rural land into land open to urban development. 
In some cases, where the administrations of adjacent areas refused to co-
operate, the State Council simply eliminated the boundaries themselves. 
Over time, cities in China have thus become mosaics in which borders, 
administrative divisions, new towns, rail lines, industrial parks, rivers, 
and even air quality are the pieces in a puzzle that may shift about from 
one plan to the next.
Since the 1950s, the administrative divisions of Beijing and Tianjin 
have remained relatively stable, even as the rural counties surrounding 
them have undergone multiple transformations, including in the 1950s and 
1960s when they became ‘people’s communes’ and, more recently, urban 
districts. In 2009, the State Council approved the merger of three of Tian-
jin’s coastal counties-turned-districts to form the Binhai New Area, mod-
elled after Shanghai’s Pudong New Area. Beijing’s last rural counties, Mi-
yun and Yanqing, were upgraded to districts in November 2015, bringing 
them under direct administration by the Beijing municipal government.
Now, with the establishment of Jing-Jin-Ji, the ‘pieces’ need to be re-
structured once more. 
Of the four general goals of the preliminary Jing-Jin-Ji plan, the first is 
relocating ‘non-capital functions’ of Beijing outside the urban core. Beijing 
is currently home to two governments: the central, or national govern-
ment, and the city government, both situated in the urban core around 
the Forbidden City. Under the plan, Beijing’s municipal (‘non-capital’) gov-
ernment will move to Tongzhou 通州, the northern terminus of the Grand 
Canal in imperial times. 
Tongzhou is twenty kilometres southeast of the city centre. It is 
a district of 906 square kilometres with a population of more than one 
million, and it includes the vibrant Songzhuang 宋庄 art colony. Moving 
the municipal government to Tongzhou will help to relieve traffic, residen-
tial, and other pressures on the city centre. 
As early as June 2013, the Beijing Party Congress had called for a new 
‘government sub-centre’ 行政副中心 in Tongzhou. This marked a significant 
break with the Party’s decision in the 1950s to go against the advice of urban 
planners like Liang Sicheng 梁思成 and develop Beijing as a single-centre, 
high-density capital city. The Tongzhou government centre also features in 
the Beijing Planning and Exhibition Hall and in the Beijing 2004–2020 Mas-
ter Plan, which stresses green, low-carbon development, and sustainability.
Along with the municipal government, social services including 
health and education are to be developed or headquartered outside the 
city centre. This (the fourth goal of the plan) presents a special challenge 
for the elite university sector in Beijing. Beijing has eight world-ranking 
universities, a number of them on historically significant campuses. Tian-
jin has two universities and Hebei none. What will be the relationship of 
The ‘Tongzhou New City’ 通州新城 is not a city as such but a new ‘town development’. It will rise from some fifty 


























































Beijing’s universities to institu-
tions in Tianjin and Hebei? How 
will ‘non-capital functions’ be 
defined in this context? It is inter-
esting to consider that whereas 
in Brazil and Australia, national 
capitals were constructed outside 
of existing major cities, in the 
case of Beijing, the national capi-
tal will take over the historic cen-
tre of the city, while the city itself (or its organs of government and support 
services) moves into the periphery.
Transcending divides—whether educational, economic or other— 
between the three territories of Jing, Jin, and Ji will require engineering 
new transport links, establishing new eco-industrial zones and building 
new urban centres. There are already plans for twenty-seven new rail 
lines to crisscross the region, including a high-speed line between Beijing 
and the Hebei provincial capital of Shijiazhuang. 
The Political is Personal Too 
Xi Jinping has closely associated himself with the Jing-Jin-Ji plan. His rise 
to the Party leadership began in 1982 in Hebei, where he was appoint-
ed deputy party secretary of southwest Zhengding county. The National 
Development and Reform Commission first proposed to co-ordinate de-
velopment in the region in 2004, when Xi was still governor and party 
secretary of Zhejiang province. He joined the Politburo’s Standing Com-
mittee in 2007. It was the following year that ranking officials of the three 
jurisdictions met formally for the first time, in Tianjin. In 2011, by which 
time Xi had been elevated to the vice-presidency, the concept of a ‘capital 
economic circle’ appeared in the national Twelfth Five-Year Plan. Then, in 
2014, by which time he was both President and Party General Secretary, Xi 
Xi Jinping was party secretary of Zhengding county, 
Hebei, 1983–1985
Image: news.ifeng.com
Jinping called for specific Jing-Jin-Ji integration 
plans, and soon a suite of specific measures was 
announced. These included the relocation (pos-
sibly by the end of 2016) of the wholesale cloth-
ing markets in Beijing’s Dahongmen and Beijing 
Zoo to Langfeng in Hebei, removal of mobile 
phone roaming charges within the region, and 
regional coordination of airport security. 
Back in September 2013, when the central 
government approved the Action Plan for Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control in Jing-Jin-Ji 
and Surrounding Areas, Xi went to Shijiazhuang and led a widely pub-
licised ‘struggle session’ with the Hebei Provincial Party Committee in 
which he criticised provincial Party Secretary Zhou Benshun 周本顺 for 
‘not paying enough attention to work for the poor’, among other things.
On 24 July 2015, shortly after attending a Jing-Jin-Ji integration 
meeting chaired by Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli 张高丽, Zhou Benshun was 
detained and placed under investigation—the first provincial leader to 
be detained while holding office. Zhou was subsequently photoshopped 
out of the photographs of the meeting. The former Hebei Party secretary 
is an associate of Zhou Yongkang 周永康, the past head of state security 
who was sentenced to life in prison in June 2015. Thus at the same time 
as he was promoting regional co-operation, Xi removed one of the most 
powerful leaders in Hebei, conveniently ridding himself of a potential 
factional enemy in the process.
Conclusions
The capital region is reaching developmental limits that demand urgent 
and complex management solutions. The current approach, rather than 
emphasising the principle of conservation, deploys the state’s power and 
authority to rearrange or spatially restructure resources, economies, and 



























































The Party-state’s upbeat rhetoric on Jing-Jin-Ji focuses on the scale 
of the transformation itself. China has a long history of employing mas-
sive engineering projects, the Three Gorges Dam, for example, to solve 
difficult problems. Given the impact these projects tend to have on local 
populations and also the uncertainty of their outcomes, free debate might 
raise uncomfortable questions. The official media is relatively silent, for 
instance, on the challenges posed by the existence of the poverty belt to 
regional integration, possibly because the Party-state has not yet worked 
out how to solve them. 
That the Party-state is carefully managing the information around 
Jing-Jin-Ji is not unusual. The Party has controlled the narrative of China’s 
development—urban and otherwise—since the Yan’an era in the 1940s. 
It decides what information to release into the public sphere and how to 
frame it, and times its release in a strategic manner designed to bolster 
both its own legitimacy and state security. 
Given that the Jing-Jin-Ji concept has circulated for over a decade and 
much of the detail has yet to be released, or even finalised, it is useful to 
ask why it has been announced now. The central government regularly 
times such announcements to compel local governments and regional in-
terests to prepare for change and also to consider them while planning 
future projects and policies. 
It is also interesting to note that there has been little discussion of the 
lessons that the capital region might take from the development of the 
Yangtze and Pearl River deltas, both of which are highly integrated regions 
with multiple, interconnected centres, unlike the Jing-Jin-Ji region with its 
focus on Beijing. And whereas tourism into Jiangsu province from Shang-
hai continues to grow, Beijing has not generated similar synergies with 
Hebei, which has ‘wild Great Walls’, the old ‘hunting palace’ at Chengde, 
nature parks, and the beach resort of Beidaihe, among other attractions.
Isabel Hilton, the editor of the bilingual environmental website Chi-
na Dialogue 中外对话 has observed how ‘the design of China’s future cit-
ies will not only affect the health and wellbeing of their residents; it will 
also be an important factor in the battle to contain China’s soaring car-
bon emissions. These questions, therefore, are of high importance to all of 
humanity’. If Jing-Jin-Ji can help to solve, or at least mitigate the region’s 
environmental problems by remapping its boundaries and jurisdictions, 
it will strengthen and enhance Beijing as a majestic and dignified national 
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Tianjin Explosions 
·  AIDEN XIA
The Yangtze River Cruise Incident 

































































T I A N J I N  E X P L O S I O N S
Aiden Xia
A T 10:30PM ON 12 AUGUST 2015, two explosions at the port of 
Tianjin created a fireball visible from 
miles away and were strong enough to 
register as seismic activity by China’s 
national earthquake centre. The blasts 
killed 173 people, including 104 fire-
fighters and eleven policemen. Within 
minutes, footage of the blasts circulat-
ed on the Internet. 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Ke-
qiang visited the site four days lat-
er, and met some of the residents of 
nearby residential apartments who 
had been injured in the calamity. The 
authorities confirmed that hundreds 
of tonnes of highly poisonous cyanide 
had been stored at the warehouse, but 
said that most of it had dissipated with-
out contaminating the environment. 
An aerial view of a large hole in the 
ground in the aftermath of two huge 



































Local residents and owners of 
apartments damaged in the blasts 
staged small-scale protests, demand-
ing answers and compensation. Offi-
cial media reported that the municipal 
government had offered local resi-
dents compensation, and was forcing a 
total of eighty-five enterprises working 
with hazardous chemicals in Tianjin 
municipality to close, relocate, or make 
changes in their operations. However, 
there has not yet been a full or open 
investigation of the blast. 
Government censors clamped down 
on rumours about the causes of the ex-
plosions and how they were affecting 
public health, swiftly purging non-offi-
cial reports from the Internet. 
It emerged that the warehouse 
where the explosions took place be-
longed to Tianjin Dongjiang Port Rui-
hai International Logistics, a compa-
ny licensed to store, distribute, and 
import dangerous chemicals. Xinhua 
News Agency later reported that Dong 
Shexuan 董社轩, one of the largest 
shareholders of the company, is the 
son of the late police chief of Tianjin 
port, Dong Peijun 董培军. Authorities 
confirmed that the explosions were 
caused by the ignition of hazardous 
materials that had been improperly or 
illegally stored at the site. 













































AT ABOUT 9:30PM ON 1 JUNE 2015, the Yangtze River cruise ship 
the Eastern Star 东方之星 capsized in 
fifteen-metre-deep water in Jianli 
County, Hubei province. It had been 
halfway through an eleven-day, 
1500km journey from Nanjing to 
Chongqing via the Three Gorges, with 
403 tourists, forty-six crew and five 
travel guides on board. The final death 
toll of the disaster was 442, making it 
China’s worst boat disaster in over six 
decades.
The twelve survivors recalled 
travelling through pounding rain 
and lightning, when the boat sudden-
ly tilted to a ‘forty-five-degree angle’ 
and overturned in ‘about half to one 
minute’. Even if the boat had been 
equipped with enough life jackets 
T H E  YA N G T Z E  R I V E R  C R U I S E 
I N C I D E N T
Xiaonan Wang
Rescue workers on 
the sunken cruise 













































and lifeboats, most passengers, in 
their cabins at the time, did not have 
enough time to react. Two hours lat-
er, the river patrol picked up Captain 
Zhang Shunwen 张顺文 and Chief En-
gineer Yang Zhongquan 杨忠权 from 
the water after the crew of another 
boat spotted them and called for 
their rescue. Of the other survivors, 
some swam ashore, some were saved 
after hours floating with life jackets 
on the river, and some were pulled 
out from air pockets inside the hull 
by rescuers. 
The captain, who was taken 
into police custody, claimed that he 
was attempting to steer the boat but 
the wind was too strong. According 
to Xinhua, the Eastern Star sank so 
fast that it did not have time to send 
out a distress call. An angry public 
questioned why the captain didn’t 
do as other vessels on the river did 
and drop anchor after the maritime 
office issued a severe storm warning 
that afternoon.
While Chinese meteorologists 
later described the storm as a Force 
12 cyclone, and authorities described 
the weather conditions as freak-
ish and unpredictable, the public 
demanded closer scrutiny into the 
captain’s responsibilities, as well 
as the safety regulations, equip-
ment and supervision on boats and 
into the management of shipping 
and tourism generally. The Eastern 
Star, which had been in service for 
The righting of the capsized cruise ship 
Source: img3.imgtn.bdimg.com
nearly twenty years, had passed its 
annual inspections. Yet news reports 
revealed that a 1997 retrofit had left 
it with safety defects and as late as 
2013, the Nanjing authorities for 
safety violations. 
Following a familiar pattern, 
and as outrage grew, the central gov-
ernment ordered journalists to fo-
cus on the positive sides of the story, 
such as rescue efforts, and banned 
reporting by local journalists. Some 
foreign journalists too were blocked 
from entering the rescue site and 
barred from talking to relatives of 
victims. Authorities also muted crit-
icism in public forums and censored 
negative comments in social media.
In December, six months after 
the crash, a sixty-member investiga-
tive team released their report into 
the incident, which they described 
as ‘an extraordinary serious dis-
aster’. They attributed the tragedy 
to heavy rains and winds resulting 
from a rare weather phenomenon 
and asserted that the ship had in fact 
conformed to official safety criteria.
Forty-three people were held 
accountable including two crew 
members of the ship, executives of 
Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corp 
重庆东方轮船公司, the owner of the 
Eastern Star, and maritime author-
ities for their negligent management. 
The report recommended that the 
captain be investigated further but 
held that he could only be blamed 








































IN 2015, XI JINPING continued his hyperactive 
diplomacy, visiting fifteen different countries with-
in the year. He also packed in bilateral meetings 
with world leaders at multilateral gatherings, 
including with the African Union (at the China-
Africa Co-operation Forum in Johannesburg in 
December) at the United Nations General Assembly, 
the BRICS and SCO Summits and even during the 
World War II (WWII) commemorations in Moscow 
and Beijing. Just as in 2014, however, neither Xi nor 
Premier Li Keqiang visited the Middle East. 




































Throughout all of this frenetic foreign affairs activity, there has been a 
strong accent on economic diplomacy and, in particular, advancing the 
cause of China’s ‘One Belt One Road Initiative’ 一带一路 (also known as 
‘Belt and Road Initiative’ or ‘OBOR’) (See Forum ‘One Belt One Road: Inter-
national Development Finance with Chinese Characteristics’, pp.244–250). 
Belting Up
Xi had announced his idea for a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and a ‘Twen-
ty-first Century Maritime Silk Road’, without any details, during visits to 
Kazakhstan and Indonesia in September and October 2013. One month 
later, the Third Plenum of the Communist Party enshrined it as policy. It 
took until March 2015 for the State Council to publish a detailed ‘Action 
Plan’ for the policy, which had been jointly drafted by the National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission (NDRC) and ministries of Commerce and 
Foreign Affairs. In the same month, Xi outlined the plan to an internation-
al audience at the Boao forum in Hainan Island. 
The OBOR Initiative is said to have diverse aims. One is to use Beijing’s 
large foreign exchange reserves to boost exports of domestic producers 
by investing in large infrastructure projects that will create demand, an 
idea touted for several years by domestic analysts. It may also be a way 
to absorb excess industrial capacity in struggling sectors such as steel. It 
could eventually help alleviate concern in China about over-reliance on 
Malacca Strait shipping, the conduit for around ninety percent of China’s 
oil imports, by creating alternative trade routes. The parallel policy 
of creating new financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the New Silk Road Fund should help to bring more 
choice in international infrastructure financing.
Perhaps most importantly, the initiative should be a neighbour- 
friendly way of creating a more benign regional security and policy 
environment for China to get on with pursuing its domestic agenda 
without active or passive interference from the region. Supporters look 
forward to China achieving its stated goal of improved regional security 
and prosperity through ‘common development’ 共同发展. It is also a 
compelling soft power strategy, recalling China’s rich history as a trading 
nation in the era of the Silk Road. 
The State Council has published a dedicated website for the OBOR 
Initiative with maps being revised as countries express greater or lesser 
interest in being involved. Observers in some of the targeted countries, 
like India, have been skeptical about the benefits to them, even suspecting 
malign strategic intent. Foreign Minister Wang Yi 王毅 directly addressed 
Xi Jinping speaking at the Boao forum in Hainan Island
Photo: chengshiw.com




































these concerns in his annual ad-
dress to the press in March, when 
he said that the initiative was ‘not 
a tool of geopolitics’ and cautioned 
against viewing it through an ‘out-
dated Cold-War mentality’.
There is no question that China 
is showing a high appetite for risk. 
This is a difficult initiative, given 
that it relies on Chinese enterprises making major investments when 
the prospect of financial return might be at best remote, and security 
risks could be significant. According to political scientist Xie Tao 谢韬 of 
Beijing Foreign Studies University 北京外国语大学, the Chinese leadership 
has deliberately described the policy as an initiative, not a strategy, to 
avoid implying that participation will be mandatory for Chinese banks, 
enterprises, and other players.
If they do join in, there could be substantial risks to Chinese 
consulates of the kind seen in Libya in 2011 when the Chinese military 
had to manage its largest-ever evacuation (nearly 39,000 citizens) from 
a foreign country when a wave of unrest saw direct and violent attacks 
on Chinese oil and other firms there. The plan for OBOR is for large-
scale projects, likely to involve large numbers of Chinese workers. The 
only project so far initiated, a dam in the new ‘China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor’, involves a particularly unstable 
region of Pakistan. Pakistan has agreed to 
provide 10,000 troops and commandos for 
the project’s security. 
On the other hand, if China can con-
tribute to growth and stability in these dif-
ficult and volatile border areas, benefit will 
also accrue to the US, Russia, and other re-





THE ISLAMIC STATE TAKES CHINESE NATIONAL HOSTAGE, by Lorand Laskai
In mid-September, the war with 
Islamic State (IS) arrived at Chi-
na’s doorstep in the form of an 
online advertisement: ‘Chinese 
prisoner for sale’.
It featured a photograph of a 
man, Fan Jinghui 樊京辉, against 
a black backdrop. His face was 
battered and he was dressed in 
a yellow jumpsuit. The adver-
tisement listed his profession as 
a freelance consultant and his 
place of birth as Beijing, China; 
it also published his home ad-
dress.
IS held Fan Jinghui along-
side a Norwegian hostage. This 
placed the Chinese government 
in a new situation. The Chinese 
leadership’s reluctance to get in-
volved in conflicts abroad had previously sheltered its citizens from direct conflict with IS. 
Now the Chinese people demanded action.
While netizens called for Fan’s rescue and vigorously debated the correct course of ac-
tion, the Chinese government remained largely mute. Censors scrubbed the Internet of the 
most impassioned calls for intervention to save Fan.
On 18 November, IS executed Fan and posted photos of the execution online. There was 
an outpouring of grief on the Internet. Xi Jinping, in Manila for APEC, expressed sympathy 
towards the victim’s family and vowed to ‘strike against any manifestation of terrorism’. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs pledged to bring the criminals responsible to justice. Yet Chinese 
Internet users searching for Fan Jinghui’s name on Weibo found their attempts blocked, 
and posts and comments calling for military intervention or questioning the government’s 
resolve were swiftly removed.
Within the constrained media space, Chinese citizens meditated on the practical and 
principled dilemmas of China’s evolving role in the world. ‘If China was going to deploy sol-
diers, where would it put them?’ asked one commentator. ‘Russia and the US have military 
bases, does China? France sent an aircraft carrier, could China send its carrier to the Mid-
dle East? … [China’s] military capability should not be underestimated, but actual combat 
is still a weak point.’ Another post on the nationalistic blog Haijiang bemoaned that ISIS 







































There has been much discussion in China and abroad about the impact 
of a rising China on global institutions and governance. With Xi Jinping 
enforcing more and more restrictions on Chinese citizens’ access to justice 
and civil liberties and freedoms (see Chapter 2 ‘The Fog of Law’, pp.64–89), 
there is nervousness abroad about China’s intentions with regard to inter-
national institutions. 
The US government has acted on these concerns. In an embarrassing 
diplomatic failure, when China announced the creation of the Asian In-
frastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the US government lobbied its allies 
not to join despite the fact that the new bank looked set to be established 
according to international norms, and was a ‘responsible stakeholder’ 
response to a real and urgent need for infrastructure funding across the 
Asian region. The AIIB opened for business on 6 January 2016, with fif-
ty-seven founding member countries. Many US allies signed on, including 
Australia, Germany, and a particularly enthusiastic United Kingdom.
ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
The China-led international financial institution Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) formally launched on 25 December 2015 with thirty-seven regional and twenty 
non-regional Prospective Founding Members (PFM). The bank had on founding US$100 bil-
lion in capital, equivalent to two-thirds of the capital of the Asian Development Bank or 
nearly half that of the World Bank. It is the first significant multilateral lender dominated 
by a developing country. 
The US, which along with Japan and Canada declined to become a founding member, 
lobbied European countries, Australia, and South Korea not to join. Its efforts were mostly 
ignored. The former UK chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne, announced Britain’s 
application in early March, in an unusual split from the US line. Despite expressions of 
frustration from Washington, Australia and South Korea applied to join the bank later that 
same month.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement signed by twelve Pacific Rim 
countries including the US and Japan on 4 February 2016 in New Zealand, seems like a 
counter-measure to the AIIB. Despite being the largest economy in the Pacific Rim, China 
was not involved in the negotiations. In a Washington Post article on the TPP, Obama said 
‘The world has changed. The rules are changing with it. The United States, not countries like 
China, should write them.’ 
China is certainly having an impact on global institutions. One exam-
ple from 2015 is the decision in December by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to include the renminbi (RMB) as one of five currencies in its 
Special Drawing Rights basket from October 2016. This reflects the impor-
tance of the RMB to the world’s trade and financial systems. 
In a major speech in Seattle on 22 September 2015, Xi Jinping said: 
As far as the existing international system is concerned, China has 
been a participant, builder, and contributor.... A great number of 
countries, especially developing countries, want to see a more just and 
equitable international system. But it doesn’t mean that they want to 
unravel the entire system or start all over again. Rather, what they 
want is reform and to improve the system to keep up with the times.
Six days later, Xi addressed the UN General Assembly. There he called 
‘peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom’, the ‘com-
mon values of all mankind and the lofty goals of the United Nations’. 
He pledged US$1 billion over the next ten years to create a peace and 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank launched in December 2015 with 
US$100 billion in capital
Image: commons.wikimedia.org
Officially, China is staying neutral. A spokesperson from China’s Commerce Ministry 
said that China ‘always keeps an open mind toward the construction of systems that are in 
accordance with World Trade Organisation rules and are helpful for promoting economic 
integration in the Asia-Pacific region’.
State media Xinhua also said that China has already demonstrated a ‘deep-seated, 
high-standard, and comprehensive pattern of opening to foreign trade’, citing new free 
trade agreements with South Korea and Australia and the on-going Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, a free trade agreement that would include 
all ten ASEAN member states, Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand and 
encompass the OBOR Initiative as well. Xinhua added that China might seek to join the 



































development fund to support the United Nations; the establishment of a 
new standby peacekeeping force of 8,000 troops; and military assistance 
worth US$100 million over the next five years to the African Union for 
peacekeeping missions. At the UN Sustainable Development Summit the 
following day, he pledged a goal to invest US$12 billion in the world’s poor-
est countries by 2030. 
China will also use its growing influence to support its own political 
system: such as working to reduce the ability of international organisa-
tions, like the UN, to police civil rights, freedom of expression, and justice 
through the work of the Human Rights Council and the visits and state-
ments of important figures such as UN Special Rapporteurs. China con-
tinued in 2015 to take a cautious approach to the UN’s Responsibility to 
Protect, promoting a very limited range of circumstances that would make 
non-consensual military intervention an appropriate course of action. 
Friends with Benefits
Beijing often looks to Moscow for support in international relations, and 
vice versa. While Russia’s relationships with Europe and the US remain 
strained, the potential benefits of a ‘pivot East’ look significant. Putin was 
the most important guest at the parade in Beijing to commemorate the 
Chinese UN peacekeepers
Photo: news.xinhuanet.com
Xi and Putin attend the parade in Beijing to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the ‘World 
Anti-Facist War’ (WWII)
Photo: upload.icrosschina.com
seventieth anniversary of the Japanese surrender on 3 September (though 
not many other world leaders took up the invitation). Xi had been to 
Moscow in May for a similar purpose, returning to Russia for the Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China (BRICS) and Shanghai Co-operation Organisation 
(SCO) summits in July, and holding further bilateral meetings with Putin 
in the margins of other international events. Yet while official rhetoric 
speaks about the warm relationship, Chinese leaders have avoided 
explicitly supporting Putin’s domestic politics or his actions in Ukraine. 
China has no interest in full-scale confrontation between Russia and the 
West. Indeed, Chinese analysts say in private that the Chinese leadership 
would prefer Putin to stop fomenting unrest in Ukraine, and fear for the 
sustainability of Russia’s economy and society. Bilateral trade continued 
to stagnate in 2015.
On 6 May 2015, when Xi was visiting Moscow for the victory parade, the 
Rossiskaya Gazeta published an opinion piece by him titled ‘Remember his-
tory, look to the future’. Chinese analysts point to one specific phrase in this 
article of particular significance: ‘силочение - это сило, а самоизоляцуя 
- обессиленуе’ or ‘unity is strength, while self-isolation is weakness’. This 
was intended to remind Putin that displaying power through destructive 



































‘UYGHURS MEAN MONEY, UYGHURS MEAN CASH’, by Lorand Laskai
In mid-July, the Thai government 
provoked international ire when it 
forcibly repatriated over one hundred 
asylum-seeking Uyghurs back to China. 
Uyghurs are a Muslim Turkic language-
speaking people native to the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonymous Region, where 
there has been considerable unrest 
in recent years. In 2015, the Chinese 
government intensified its crackdown 
on Islamic dress and other religious and 
traditional practices in Xinjiang, adding 
to local grievances against Chinese rule. 
China has traditionally sought the return 
of those Uyghurs who seek refugee 
status abroad, a process condemned by human rights advocates.   
The repatriation of Uyghur asylum seekers to China sparked furious outrage against 
China in Turkey. Turkey has historically presented itself as the protector of the Uyghur 
people and offers asylum and identification papers to those who make it there. Anti-Chinese 
protesters in Ankara smashed windows and broke into the Chinese Embassy. Another 
hundred Uyghurs rounded-up by the Thai government in mid-July had Turkish identification 
papers, and were sent on to Turkey.
Turkey is a natural destination for Uyghurs fleeing the country as the Chinese government 
intensifies its crackdown on Islamic and traditional practices in Xinjiang, but getting there is 
hard. Whether they travel through Central Asia or South East Asia, the journey is harrowing 
and dangerous. As one refugee told Reuters in Istanbul: ‘For … traffickers, Uyghurs mean 
money, Uyghurs mean cash. If you are Vietnamese ... they charge $1,000, but when you are 
Uyghur the price goes up five-fold, sometimes ten-fold.’ He had fled after being told that his 
sick and imprisoned brother would not ‘leave jail alive’.
Dismissive of claims of persecution, the Chinese government works hard to associate 
Uyghur refugees with religious extremism. The Chinese media suggested that many Uyghurs 
repatriated from Thailand in July have a history of extremism and that their ultimate 
destination was the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. One Chinese official said that many Uyghurs 
in Turkey had become ‘cannon fodder’ for IS. IS has also pushed forward the narrative, 
releasing a video in June 2015 featuring a eighty-year old Uyghur man who had travelled 
from China to join the jihad. In December, Indonesian officials foiled a terrorist plot that 
reportedly involved a Uyghur man who had entered Indonesia through Thailand.
The blurred line in world media between political refugees and extremists has worked in 
Beijing’s favour. In December, Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh 
claimed that over 5,000 Uyghur ‘would-be fighters’ had been funnelled to Syria via Turkey—
approximately the total number of Uyghur refugees who have arrived in Turkey since 2013.
Chinese security forces escort Uyghurs suspected of 
travelling to join the IS from Thailand
Source: cctv.com
If Xi avoids directly speaking to Russia’s affairs, Putin rarely mentions 
Asia at all, preferring in important speeches to focus on criticising the US 
and the European Union. As in previous years he declined an invitation to 
attend the leaders meeting of the 2015 East Asia Summit.
Guiding this policy of presenting a strong friendship to the world is 
China’s desire to have a smooth relationship with the only other perma-
nent member of the UN Security Council that does not support US primacy 
in the international sphere in general, and the western Pacific in particu-
lar. Bilateral agreements and discussions on issues such as cyber security 
and human rights provide a counterpoint to what are usually referred to 
as ‘universal values’. The US and China agreed on a joint cyber security 
pact in May 2015, for example, which identified key threats to information 
security as including the use of technology ‘to carry out acts of aggression 
aimed at the violation of sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of 
states’; ‘to interfere in the internal affairs of states’ or to disseminate ‘in-
formation that harms [the] political and socio-economic systems, spiritual, 
moral and cultural environment of other states’. 
The Moscow-based international software security group Kasperky 
Lab and the state-owned China Cyber Security Company signed a strate-
gic co-operation pact at the second, China-sponsored World Internet Con-
ference in Wuzhen, Zhejiang province in December. This co-operation is 
aimed at an unnamed state actor that has mounted sophisticated attacks 
against both countries. 
China’s focus on becoming the dominant power in the western Pacific 
leaves room for an active role by Russia. As reported in Japan, in 2014 Rus-
sia and China had more-or-less equally provoked its air force to scramble 
fighter jets in what turned out to be an unprecedentedly high number of 
incidents. The two countries were at it again in 2015, carrying out joint 
naval and air force exercises over the Sea of Japan from 20–28 August. 
And Russia finally agreed to sell twenty-four Su-35 fighters to China over 
three years, with delivery starting in late 2016, despite reported Russian 




































The current Chinese leadership has 
made some effort to prioritise rela-
tions with India, which historically 
have never been too friendly. Li Ke-
qiang went there on his first over-
seas visit in 2013, and Modi’s 2015 
tour in China was reciprocating a 
2014 visit by Xi. India, like Pakistan, 
agreed to join the China-led SCO in 
2015. Bilateral trade remained at 
a healthy US$70 billion in 2014 fig-
ures, though the balance was very 
much in China’s favour, with a sur-
plus of around US$48 billion. 
Modi, like Xi a nationalist with a 
forceful personality, visited China in 
May. A border incursion into still-dis-
puted territory by Chinese troops had marred Xi’s 2014 visit to India, and 
Modi had annoyed his hosts by making a joint statement with President 
Obama in January, declaring the importance of freedom of navigation in 
the South China Sea. China is wary of India’s objectives as a rising naval 
power, and India is cautious of China’s motives in the Indian Ocean, in-
cluding through the OBOR Initiative. Xi Jinping had moreover just con-
cluded an oft-delayed visit to Pakistan in April, agreeing to a massive and 
much-needed US$46 billion investment package. China also announced 
that it would sell Pakistan eight submarines, more than doubling its ex-
isting fleet.
Both China and India seem to want a more positive dynamic. Xi start-
ed his visit in Gujarat, Modi’s home state, and Modi landed in Xi’s home-
town of Xi’an, with Xi flying there to meet him, a privilege never accorded 
to any other VIP. This venue was historically relevant as well as personal; 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Xi’an
Photo: image.baidu.com
Xi’an, or Chang’an, was the dynastic capital of China and the starting point 
for the Buddhist monk Xuanzang’s famous seventh-century pilgrimage to 
India to collect Buddhist sutras and relics to nurture Chinese Buddhism. 
For his part, Modi went home with twenty-one trade and investment deals 
in his pocket worth around US$22 billion. This is clearly better than noth-
ing, but substance has yet to catch up with diplomacy.
Across the Pacific
In February 2015, China publically confirmed that Xi would make a state 
visit to the US in September, when he would also visit the United Nations 
for the annual Leaders’ Week. The unusually early announcement was 
perhaps intended to provide some ballast for this unstable relationship 
through the year. 
The main causes of bilateral friction were not new. They included 
cyber espionage: in June 2015, the US Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) revealed it had been the target of a data breach involving the re-
cords of millions of American citizens. The Washington Post called it ‘one 
of the most devastating breaches of US government data in history’. Many 
in the US suspected China was behind it, which China denied. On the eve of 
Xi’s visit, the Chinese government announced it had arrested the hackers 
involved. The Post observed that this might have been, as some US officials 
speculated, simply part of ‘an effort to lessen tensions with Washington’ 
ahead of the visit. 
 Another important source of tension was China’s ‘island building’ 
in the South China Sea—what US Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of 
the United States Pacific Command, described in a speech in Canberra in 
2015 as a ‘Great Wall of Sand’. (See the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared 
Destiny, Forum ‘Sandcastles in the South China Sea’, pp.78–81.) The Penta-
gon takes a dim view of China’s attempts to increase its strategic reach by 
creating what are in effect stationary aircraft carriers for the PLA, on land 
features claimed by other states. 
Few expected Xi’s visit to break much ground. The two sides had 



































SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE US FONOP, by Matt Schrader
Concern over the construction of artificial islands in the disputed waters of the South China 
by the PRC intensified in 2015. Separate reports by the Pentagon and the Washington DC-
based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative indicated that work on seven islands had either 
been completed or was well advanced by May 2015. In January 2016, the Chinese completed 
an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef—an established reef that the Chinese have converted into an 
artificial island that is long enough to land the PLA’s heaviest bombers and air transports. 
In total, between early 2014 and mid-2015, Chinese dredgers raised roughly twelve square 
kilometres of land above the waves, an area about the size of Heathrow Airport. According 
to the Pentagon, over the past forty-five years other claimants (which include the Philippines 
and Vietnam) have reclaimed only about one hundred acres of land in the area.
This disparity, and the PLA’s apparent determination to assert Chinese sovereignty over 
both the airspace and sea around its new islands came under increasing fire by senior US 
officials in the first half of the year, culminating in a speech by US Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter at the 30 May Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Carter called for ‘a lasting 
halt’ to island building, singled out China for going ‘much further and much faster than [any 
other claimant]’, and said that the US military would not be deterred from sailing or flying 
where it wished.
Carter’s remarks foreshadowed the mutual tension that built over the summer and into 
the early fall. US Pentagon officials also dropped frequent hints that the US was examining 
options for ‘freedom of navigation operations’ (FONOP) in the waters around the new is-
lands. FONOPs, in which US ships sail through contested waters, are intended to challenge 
what the US sees as excessive or illegal territorial claims.  
Under the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), sovereign states are 
entitled to ‘territorial waters’ extending twenty-two kilometres from their coastline. Foreign mil-
itary vessels are permitted ‘innocent passage’ through territorial waters, but they must refrain 
from any activity ‘prejudicial to [the coastal state’s] peace, good order or … security’. Although 
supported espionage, even if they remain hazy, and though they did not 
issue a fully joint text on the subject, there was substantial agreement in 
their separate publications. As for the Pacific, Xi stated China had no inten-
tion to militarise the South China Sea area. Yet Xi’s definition of ‘militari-
sation’ appears limited to the display of offensive capability; China claims 
it is acting to enhance capacity for national defence, as well as providing 
global goods in the form of crisis management capacity. 
The US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Spratly Islands have 
highlighted the tensions surrounding China’s efforts to become de facto 
leader of a region where the US has long been the dominant power (see 
Information Window ‘South China Sea and the US FONOP’ above). None-
theless, neither side wants conflict and, despite outbursts of official rheto-
ric and the occasional sensational headline, extensive policy co-operation 
creates multiple avenues for dialogue, reducing the risks in times of crisis.
UNCLOS does not require warships 
making an innocent passage to provide 
advance notice, Chinese law does, a po-
sition that the PLA Navy seeks to enforce.
Although the South China Sea was 
on the agenda of a summit meeting 
between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping 
at the White House in late September, 
they failed to reach an understanding. 
In October, the USS Lassen, a US Navy 
guided missile destroyer, sailed within 
twenty-two kilometres of Subi Reef, one 
of the newly built artificial islands, in 
what anonymous Pentagon sources described as both an innocent passage and a FONOP. 
The Lassen did not provide prior notice of its passage. Some observers wondered whether 
the US, in claiming innocent passage, had inadvertently bestowed implicit recognition upon 
China’s territorial claim.
A letter from Ashton Carter to US Senator John McCain on 22 December finally put the 
rumours to rest by clarifying that the Lassen’s passage was meant to challenge what the US 
saw as China’s illegal attempts to restrict freedom of navigation by requiring prior notice 
for innocent passage. It was not, he stressed, an indication that the US had taken a position 
‘on which nation has the superior sovereignty claims over each land feature in the Spratly 
Islands. Thus, the operation did not challenge any country’s claims of sovereignty over land 
features, as that is not the purpose or function of a FONOP.’
Chinese official reaction to the Lassen operation took little note of these distinctions. 
State media described the US as ‘irresponsible’ and ‘reckless’, and Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Lu Kang 陆康 said the US should not ‘make a fool out of themselves in trying to 
be smart’.
China’s ‘island building’ in the South China Sea
Photo: guancha.cn
Diplomacy in North East Asia
In 2014, Xi shook Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s hand. But in 2015, 
there was also much fist shaking. The official Xinhua News Agency de-
scribed as ‘insincere’ the statement by Abe on the end of WWII in August, 
in which he expressed ‘remorse’ and pledged that Japan would ‘never 
again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes’ and would ‘respect the right of self-determination 
of all peoples throughout the world’. However, he stopped short of issuing 
a clear apology. 
  For its part, at the military parade commemorating Japan’s 
surrender, China showcased its new Dong-Feng 26 (DF-26, 东风-26) missile, 
also known as the ‘Guam Killer’ for its ability to reach the island chain 



































around the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands, which both sides 
claim, and Japan continued 
to scramble fighter jets in 
high numbers to prevent 
possible incursions by Chi-
nese planes. 
At the same time, there have been positive developments. Japan’s 
National Security Advisor Shotaro Yachi 谷内 正太郎 and Chinese State 
Councillor for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi 杨洁篪 co-chaired the first 
China-Japan High Level Political Dialogue in Beijing in July, affirming 
and acknowledging the ‘momentum’ for improvement in bilateral 
relations. 
Yang made a reciprocal visit to Japan in October where he also met 
with Abe, laying the groundwork for a possible Leaders’ Summit. Yet the 
passage of a new security law by the Japanese Diet in July and Japanese 
protests to UNESCO in October over the inclusion of documents on the 
Nanjing Massacre in its ‘Memory of the World’ program restrained the 
pace of what is already a very slow thaw in relations. 
Despite having resolved none of the issues that had blocked such a 
meeting since 2012, Li Keqiang met his Korean and Japanese counterparts 
for the first time in three years in Seoul on 1 November, signalling that 
China wants to continue dialogue, even if the underlying problems are 
tricky to deal with.
As for North Korea, Beijing re-
mains concerned about Pyongyang’s 
nuclear program and supports 
sanctions as long as North Korea 
continues to violate UN resolutions. 
Yet Politburo Standing Committee 
member Liu Yunshan 刘云山 visited 
Pyongyang in October for a parade 
Abe and Xi shake hands at the APEC meeting in Beijing
Photo: gdb.voanews.com
Liu Yunshan in North Korea
Photo: mingpaocanada.com
marking the seventieth anniversary of the Workers’ Party, carrying a sup-
portive message from Xi Jinping and prompting speculation of a more sen-
ior visit. 
Speculation cooled when the Moranbong ‘girl’ band, whose members 
are apparently hand picked by Kim Jong-un, visited Beijing two months 
later but then left suddenly, without performing and without explanation. 
This might have been because Xi Jinping decided not to attend the per-
formance after Kim announced, only days earlier, that North Korea was 
‘ready to detonate a self-reliant A-bomb and H-bomb’. 
Rumours also circulated that the band had departed after a stand 
off regarding a song declaring Chairman Mao ‘the greatest on earth’ but 
‘Great Leader Kim’ the ‘greatest in the universe’. Either way, relations con-
tinued to cool following a reported test of the hydrogen bomb at the start 
of 2016, and it is not clear how ties might recover. Since 2013, Xi Jinping 
has held six summits with South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye. He has 
never met Kim Jong-un.
… and in South East Asia
Xi and Li both visited the re-
gion, an important part of the 
‘Maritime Silk Road’. But Chi-
na’s continued, enthusiastic 
pursuit of island building in 
contested waters and dismiss-
al of regional concerns meant 
that diplomatic gestures such 
as Xi’s visit to Vietnam in No-
vember, the first by a Chinese 
president in ten years, were 
not universally well received. The Vietnamese government, apparently di-
vided between pro-US and pro-China factions, brutally suppressed some 
of the protests. 




































In June, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that it would stop 
reclaiming land in the South China Sea. At the same time, it said it would 
continue to construct facilities on the islands it had already built—some 
1,170 hectares of land in total, according to Pentagon estimates. 
By September, China had also completed construction of its first air-
strip there, on Fiery Cross Reef. There are four other airstrips in the re-
gion, built by Vietnam in 1976, the Philippines in 1978, Malaysia in 1983, 
and Taiwan in 2006. The Chinese government has accused its critics of a 
double standard, given that other claimants to the Spratly Islands have 
also built islands—although only amounting in total to five percent of all 
the reclaimed land there, with China responsible for ninety-five percent. 
China’s new airstrip, at 3,000 metres, is more than twice as long as any of 
the others.
In November 2015, an arbitral tribunal facilitated by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague decided that it did have jurisdic-
tion to hear a case brought by the Philippines contesting various Chinese 
claims, including the nine-dashed line by which China demarcates its 





THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES IN 2015,  
by Rebecca Fabrizi
China’s military development continued apace 
in 2015, with a defence budget of approximately 
US$215 billion, a 10.1 percent increase from 2014. 
This was the second largest after the US, at US$596 
billion, and way ahead of Saudi Arabia, at US$87.2 
billion. The expansion is intended to advance the 
modernisation of China’s military, especially the 
navy and air force, which have traditionally lagged 
way behind land forces, as well as to fund the de-
velopment of new weapons systems. China’s new 
Dong-feng 26 (DF-26, 东风-26) anti-ship ballistic 
missiles were among new hardware revealed at the military parade on 3 September.
China released a military strategy paper in 2015, providing some broad insights into its 
strategic goals, including ‘... making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream’. Key tasks 
were to safeguard territorial interests and the unity of the motherland; protect against separa-
tism; safeguard China’s overseas interests; maintain strategic deterrence; and provide overall 
support to the Chinese Communist Party.
China’s military parade on 3 September showcased the new DF-26, or ‘Guam Killer’ missile. 
At the end of December, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that China had constructed its 
first domestic-built aircraft carrier. Other modernisation efforts have focused on cyber and 
counter-space capabilities (the latter focuses on the use of satellites in warfare and includes the 
development of ‘directed-energy weaponry’ and satellite jamming technology).
The biggest story in the Chinese military in 2014 and 2015 was the unprecedented crack-
down on corruption at senior levels. The campaign has felled two of the most powerful of-
ficers of recent times, Xu Caihou 徐才厚 and Guo Boxiong 郭伯雄, both former vice chairmen 
of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 中央军事委员会. Xu died in 2015. His case had been 
dropped in 2014 when it was clear that his failing health was already a death sentence. Guo, 
who was the more senior and who may have accumulated even more dirty money than Xu, was 
accused of bribery in July. On 6 July, the People’s Daily reported that more than 200 officers of 
lieutenant-colonel rank and above had been punished in 2013 and 2014 for corruption.
China’s armed forces serve the Communist Party. Under the previous president Hu Jintao, 
the control of the civilian leadership over the army was seen as weak. The world got a glimpse 
of this weakness when the PLA tested its first stealth fighter on the day of a visit by US Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates in 2011 apparently without Hu’s knowledge. This stunning display of the 
military taking the initiative on foreign policy came just one week before Hu’s State visit to the 
United States.
In December, Xi completely overhauled the command structure, asserting and consoli-
dating control by downgrading the previously powerful four PLA functional headquarters to 
departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The navy and air force got their own 
commands, no longer subordinate to the vastly more numerous land forces. There were new 
commands for space and cyber-warfare, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. A new joint 
command, meanwhile, followed the US model. The number of regional commands was reduced 
from seven to five to increase central control. Xi repeated his commitment to reduce military 
personnel by 300,000, to two million. In what appeared to be a final confirmation that he had 
secured total control over the armed forces, in 2016, Xi emerged as Commander-in-Chief 总指
挥, a title never before used in the PRC.
New DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles at the 




































XI’S UK VISIT, by Rebecca Fabrizi
At the end of a day of pageantry during Xi’s visit to the UK in mid-October, the lavish banquet 
at Buckingham Palace wrapped up with a rendition by the Countess of Wessex’s String Or-
chestra of ‘Nobody Does It Better’, the theme song from the The Spy Who Loved Me, a James 
Bond flick about two stolen nuclear submarines. The two countries had earlier announced 
that China would take a one-third stake in the £18 billion Hinkley Point C nuclear power 
plant project.
Former prime minister Cameron had been hailing the ‘golden era’ 黄金时代 in Sino- 
British relations ever since his 2015 re-election. British policy aims to secure London’s pri-
macy in both international trading in the RMB and Chinese inward investment into Europe. 
But David Cameron and former chancellor George Osborne annoyed many of the UK’s tradi-
tional allies as well as domestic critics who believe Britain had abandoned universal values 
in favour of hard cash, despite there being no evidence that the UK’s human rights policy 
towards China had changed. Steve Hilton, David Cameron’s former advisor, called Xi’s visit 
‘one of the worst national humiliations we’ve seen since we went cap in hand to the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] in the 1970s’. 
Chinese state media, meanwhile, joyously propagated images of Xi and his wife Peng 
Liyuan enjoying a traditional state visit. ‘No institution does pomp and pageantry quite as 
well as the British royals, and probably no institution appreciates it as much as the modern 
Communist Party of China,’ observed The Financial Times. Britain’s role in China’s ‘century 
of humiliation’ was overlooked in favour of the rhetoric of ‘win-win co-operation’ 共赢 and 
enthusiastic praise for British culture. Even the nationalistic Global Times, which in 2013 
called Cameron’s overtures insincere and the UK nothing more than ‘an old country apt for 
travel and study’, railed against any suggestions that the ‘golden age’ was built on inequity. 
It characterised such a view as mere ‘sour grapes’.
Xi Jinping attends the official welcoming ceremony in Horse Guards Parade
Photo: news.xinhuanet.com
claim to sovereignty over all of the South China Sea’s land features on the 
map. China refuses to accept that this case has any legal basis, and doesn’t 
recognise the authority of the PCA. The tribunal’s decision, however, 
makes quite clear that the case can be heard, whether or not both parties 
agree to engage. China has always been deliberately vague about the legal 
basis of its own claims, preferring to assert ‘historical rights’. There is no 
basis under the UN Convention on the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS) for a na-
tion to claim territorial rights based on islands built on low-tide elevations 
unless they are on its continental shelf. By building and populating rela-
tively large islands, China may be hoping to create a new precedent in its 
own interests.
China called the US FONOPS (see Information Window ‘South China 
Sea and the US FONOP’, pp.230–231) ‘illegal’ (under Chinese domestic law 
rather than UNCLOS) and a ‘threat to China’s sovereignty and security’. 
Other South China Sea claimant states kept quiet, failing to take take a uni-
fied position. China has successfully avoided multilateral discussion of the 
matter, though they appear more inclined to acknowledge that a solution 
will require discussion with ASEAN. 
Global Attitudes
Most countries struggled to find a consistent and constructive China policy 
that would serve their policy interests in 2015. The then prime minister of 
Australia Tony Abbott crudely summed up a common (if rarely vocalised) 
attitude when he told German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Australians 
viewed China with ‘fear and greed’. For China’s neighbours, balancing in-
dependence and beneficial economic ties with China is a challenge, one 
thrown into relief by the OBOR Initiative. Nations less concerned by China 
as a potential security threat, such as in more distant Europe are none-
theless perturbed by ever-increasing restrictions on civil liberties. How 
to deal with a China that is rich, influential, yet not showing any trend 
towards becoming a liberal democracy is seen to violate human rights and 



































The United Kingdom took a bold and opportunistic stance under the 
initiative of former chancellor George Osborne to court China, becoming 
its ‘best friend in Europe’. The UK was the first European country to ignore 
US lobbying and state its intention to become a founding member of the 
AIIB. Xi described the UK’s position as ‘visionary’ when he visited in Octo-
ber, although many commentators described it as embarrassing, and the 
US accused it of ‘constant accommodation’. 
Britain has certainly taken a risk in alienating traditional allies: in-
vestment from China might be growing but it is still small at around three 
percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock, as opposed to twenty-sev-
en percent from the US, and China’s economic and political future is un-
certain. However, it was interesting to see a new diplomatic approach, one 
with less hedging, working with China in pursuit of UK interests where 
possible, and leaving space to defend universal values where appropriate. 
How best to interact with China on the international stage will depend on 
how China’s domestic struggles play out. It is too early to tell.
Afterword
In July 2016, an arbitral tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
The Hague issued a ruling in Manila’s case against claims made by Beijing 
in the South China Sea. The tribunal was established according to UNCLOS 
provisions and its ruling was final and binding. The ruling dismissed most 
of Beijing’s claims, including to ‘historic rights’ and any validity of the 
nine-dashed line. It also found that Beijing had violated the traditional 
fishing rights of Filipinos around Scarborough Shoal, and the sovereign 
rights of the Philippines over living and non-living resources.  
China has angrily refused to recognise the validity of the court or its 
ruling. Indeed, there is no enforcement mechanism. China has also con-
ducted a vigorous diplomatic campaign to reduce international pressure 
to abide by the ruling. President Duterte of the Philippines has called for 
bilateral talks. China announced that a senior officials meeting with ASE-
AN on 16 August had achieved consensus on achieving a draft Code of 
Conduct by mid-2017. 
XI IN DC, by Rebecca Fabrizi
Xi Jinping visited the US from 22-28 September 
2015. He kicked off with two days of speeches 
and meetings with tech executives in Seattle—
an opportunity to stress the two countries’ 
strong commercial ties, but also to reassure 
a powerful sector rattled by the implications 
of China’s expanding national security regula-
tions. After his first state visit to Washington 
DC, from 24–25 September, where President 
Obama hosted meetings and a state dinner at 
the White House, he spent several days at the 
United Nations in New York. 
The visit was not widely expected to be a 
success. It coincided with the growing scandal 
over a cyber attack on the Office for Personnel 
Management, in which as many as twenty million records were stolen, making it the largest 
breach of government data in US history, and which US government sources attributed to 
China. There were other sources of tension as well. The turbulence in China’s stock market 
over the preceding months had sharply reduced confidence in China’s economic manage-
ment. And the US had been criticising China’s island-building in the South China Sea for 
several months, to Beijing’s acute irritation.
In the end, things went slightly better than expected. Intense negotiation on cyber 
security in the weeks preceding the visit resulted in some agreed-on, if weak, language 
on the subject. Both sides agreed not to ‘conduct or knowingly-support’ commercial 
espionage, though China has consistently denied doing this anyway. The difference 
between commercial and national security espionage remained undefined. Given sweeping 
definitions of national security in China this leaves an expansive grey area, encompassing 
the various commercial sectors described as ‘core’ national interests. However, the 
agreement provided a basis for further discussion. Both sides committed to a ministerial-
level, multi-agency dialogue twice a year. 
With regard to climate change, China and the US had made headlines ten months previ-
ously with an agreement that put Australia to shame on the eve of the Brisbane G20 Sum-
mit. During this visit, they built on this agreement, releasing a joint vision statement for 
the UN Conference on climate change, COP21 in Paris (30 November–12 December 2015). 
Co-operation between two of the largest emitters of carbon dioxide was fantastic news for 
COP21, and demonstrated China’s commitment to making a substantive contribution to 
global governance. 
The two Presidents addressed regional security in their joint press conference, including 
the South China Sea. Xi denied any intention to militarise the Spratly Islands, and said that 
China supported freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law. 
Perhaps his words, at odds with China’s actions ever since, were intended to blame the US 
for militarising the area, and bolster the idea that all China does is defend its sovereign 
interests. More meaningful was an agreement on handling air-to-air encounters, of which 
there had been several through 2014 and 2015, including a reported near miss by only ten 
metres. 
Peng Liyuan, Xi Jinping, and Barack Obama in the 
Lincoln Bedroom in the White House
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O N E  B E LT  O N E  R O A D :  
I N T E R N AT I O N A L  D E V E L O P M E N T 
F I N A N C E  W I T H  C H I N E S E 
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S
David Murphy
C HINA’S TUMBLING STOCKS, slip-pery and slipping growth num-
bers, and pollution emergencies 
were just a few of the crises of 2015 
rattling a global economy increas-
ingly dependent on Chinese growth. 
The central government’s continued 
elaboration of its One Belt One Road 
(OBOR) Initiative suggests that China’s 
leaders, by contrast, are increasingly 
confident that the lessons of China’s 
unique experience of development 
can be applied on a wider stage than 
previously imagined. The Chinese 
concept of development finance 开发
性金融 provides the set of principles 
that determine how Xi Jinping’s gauzy 
statements of intent will actually be 
converted into bricks and mortar, rail 
and highways. As a consequence, un-
derstanding the Chinese concept of 
development finance, and its similari-
ties and differences with international 
orthodoxies is essential for under-
standing what OBOR is and what it 
might imply.
The first time Xi Jinping intro-
duced the concept of OBOR, in 
September 2013 in Kazakhstan, he 
spoke of a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’—
specifically, road and rail construction 
along a route roughly following the 
ancient trade route connecting China 
to Europe via Central Asia. One month 
later, in Indonesia, he proposed an 



































































cally integrated their existing projects 
and future planning with OBOR’s ob-
jectives. (See Chapter 6 ‘Belt Tighten-
ing, pp.214–239.) These statements are 
beginning to give the OBOR concept 
shape and content. 
But the event that perhaps most 
greatly informs our understanding of 
OBOR is not directly related to the in-
itiative itself. In April, the State Coun-
cil issued a document on the future 
structure of China’s banking system. 
It identified three kinds of finance—
commercial, policy, and development. 
It defined the functions of each kind, 
and decreed that Chinese financial 
institutions would each have to com-
mit to one kind and divest itself of its 
other kinds of loans. The institutions 
charged with financing OBOR—the 
link China’s eastern ports to Europe 
via Southeast Asia. The Maritime Silk 
Road would pass along the Indian 
subcontinent, doubling back around 
the Bay of Bengal then across the 
Indian Ocean, grazing the east coast 
of Africa before heading straight up 
through the Suez Canal. On the maps 
that China has since published, this 
‘one belt’ and ‘one road’ appear as 
two threads in a loop that loosely knits 
together Europe, Asia, the Middle East, 
and parts of Africa.
 In March, the government re-
vealed more details about the routes 
and corridors along which the govern-
ment anticipates that construction will 
be concentrated. Most of China’s larg-
est industrial and financial enterprises 
also released OBOR plans, which typi-
Map of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ route
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
China Development Bank, along with 
the new institutions AIIB and Silk Road 
Fund—are all considered development 
finance institutions. So the State Coun-
cil’s decision essentially affirms that 
the principles of Chinese development 
finance will determine the lending 
practices that will shape OBOR. 
Chen Yuan 陈元 was the first 
chairman of the China Development 
Bank and, in the late 1990s, the first to 
articulate a Chinese concept of devel-
opment finance. He was building upon 
the tenets of development finance es-
tablished by Western powers follow-
ing World War II to fund reconstruc-
tion, as embodied in the institutions 
of the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). Foremost 
among these tenets is the notion that 
economic development depends on 
the construction of capital-intensive 
infrastructure. In parts of the world 
where commercial banks will not 
fund development projects because of 
excessive time frames and low yields 
(rather than inherent risk) there is a 
role for state institutions or multilater-
al finance organisations to step in.
Chen established the principle 
that development finance in China 
would support development decid-
ed by national strategic interests. 
At the same 







that would have 
the right to choose the projects 
it funded. It would not have the 
burden of channelling state sub-
sidies to failing industries or ill- 
conceived public works. This dual 
aim—of advancing national strategic 
interests and remaining indepen- 
dently viable—fostered distinct 
lending practices. These included 
the Local Government Financing 
Vehicles that allowed provincial 
and city governments to leverage 
the rising value of land to fund in-
frastructure. The bank has succeed-
ed spectacularly. With few bad 
loans on its books and assets of over 
$US1.6 trillion at the end of 2014, it 
is now one of the biggest financial 
institutions in the world. 
Given that OBOR theoretically en-
compasses over half the world’s popu-
lation, territory, and economic activity, 
and is backed by an institution much 





































































tion arises as to whether the principles 
of Chinese development finance are 
compatible with global norms.
The constant referencing of the 
World Bank in the China Development 
Bank’s reviews of the completed pro-
jects it has financed shows how close 
the core principles of Chinese develop-
ment finance are to those of the insti-
tutions (World Bank, IMF) established 
by the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference of 1944 (also 
known as the Bretton Woods confer-
ence). There are, however, at least two 
major discrepancies.
The first is that Chinese develop-
ment finance is explicitly the servant 
of China’s national strategy. Its found-
ing purpose was to support the broad 
goals of the state, such as the Western 
Development Strategy, first proposed 
in 1999. This involved the diversion of 
resources towards China’s interior re-
gions to help them catch up with the 
more economically dynamic coastal 
provinces. By contrast, the multilateral 
Bretton Woods institutions are guid-
ed by principles that, if ideologically 
inflected, are presented as supporting 
the interests of developing countries 
and the global community in general. 
It might be argued that institutions 
like the World Bank have in practice 
been co-opted by their major donors 
to pursue their own narrow national 
interests. Yet there remains a basic dif-
ference in principle.
The second major distinction 
concerns the importance placed on 
strong institutions of governance in 
countries receiving investment. This 
has long been an article of faith in the 
world of multilateral development fi-
nance, but it appears to conflict with 
China’s own experience. In an arti-
cle in 2011, University of Hong Kong 
The first Chinese train  
reaches Tehran
Image: img0.imgtn.bdimg.com
economist Xu Chenggang 许成钢 ex-
plained how China’s spectacular 
achievements in wealth creation and 
poverty reduction had occurred in a 
context of ‘notoriously weak’ institu-
tions of government, corporate gov-
ernance, law, and finance. He points 
out that China pressed forward with 
development in spite of these defi-
ciencies. This, in turn, has shaped its 
development finance methodologies. 
Now, with OBOR, these may be applied 
abroad on an unprecedented scale.
If, as the plan for OBOR antici-
pates, China continues to ramp up its 
overseas lending to the point that it is 
responsible for a very large proportion 
of global development finance, China’s 
impact on global development para-
digms will be considerable. 
This may not play out, at least ini-
tially, in competition between Chinese 
institutions and established multilat-
eral institutions competing directly to 
finance development in other coun-
tries. In the region covered by OBOR, 
demand for development finance 
vastly outweighs the current supply. 
Concern, however, may arise if Chi-
nese development finance institutions 
are seen to be offering soft loans in 
the service of a strategy of economic 
integration, for such loans could en-
courage an economic dependence on 
China that might substantially shift the 
global balance of power away from the 
liberal democracies. 
Many Chinese commentators 
have emphasised the need to forestall 
suspicion and alarm about Chinese 
intentions, not just in Washington 
and Tokyo, but in the OBOR countries 
themselves. In order to project an im-
age of China as a rising power with 
fraternal instincts, they occasionally 
present arguments that cast the mul-
tilateral institutions of development 
finance as rigidly ideological, paternal-
istic or infected by a residual imperi-
alism.
Niu Wenxin 钮文新, the edi-
tor-in-chief of CCTV’s finance net-
work, wrote such a commentary in 
the China Economic Weekly in March 
2015. He explicitly stated that the 





































































establishment of the AIIB breaks the 
monopoly of the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions in the development finance 
sphere, and that cheaper infrastructure- 
targeted loans could bring about a 
‘second Asian economic miracle’. 
Insisting that China is a ‘developing 
country that understands the needs 
of developing countries’, he suggested 
that the World Bank and the IMF have 
become ‘tools of imperialism’.
He gave as examples the lending 
conditions the IMF imposed during 
the Mexican and Asian financial cri-
ses of the 1990s and said China would 
never indulge in such paternalistic 
prescriptivism. The AIIB, by contrast, 
has created an unprecedented oppor-
tunity for developed and developing 
countries to engage in dialogue on 
development finance as equals. Such 
commentary tends to conflate the pro-
ject financing functions of the World 
Bank, which China has been adapting 
and replicating for some time, with 
the global financial stabilisation and 
crisis management functions of the 
IMF—of which China has no unique 
experience. This is perhaps due to a 
perception that the World Bank and 
the IMF are different branches of a 
global financial establishment with a 
common ideology.
Other prominent Chinese econ-
omists, less boosterish about OBOR, 
have expressed concerned that such 
a scale of strategy-driven finance will 
lead to colossal waste, particularly of 
China’s vast (but diminishing) reserves 
of foreign currency.
If Chinese media has aired a di-
versity of views about the country’s 
evolving role as a development finan-
cier, no one should doubt China’s con-
fidence in and commitment to the sort 
of international development implied 
by OBOR, to which it is devoting for-
midable political and financial capital.














































































































ON 16 JANUARY 2016, voters in Taiwan elected their first female 
president, Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文, and 
gave the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) an absolute majority in the Leg-
islative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, for 
the first time. The election results were 
a thorough repudiation of the ruling 
party, the KMT, and Taiwan’s outgoing 
president, Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九.
Under President Ma, who 
headed Taiwan’s government from 
2008 to 2016, Taiwan had forged 
closer ties with mainland China. The 
government had delivered a series 
of cross-Strait agreements on trade, 
tourism, education, and investment. 
Cross-Strait trade and investment 
grew rapidly through his presidential 
terms, and several million mainland 
tourists began visiting Taiwan every 




g o v e r n m e n t 
officials from 
each side as 
part of a policy to institutionalise 
cross-Strait relations. 
In Singapore in November 2015, 
Ma and Xi Jinping held the first-
ever meeting between the leaders 
of the Republic of China and the 
People’s Republic of China. For Ma, 
this historic gesture was the high 
point of his presidency. However, for 
many Taiwanese voters, the meeting 
was the culmination of a period of 
disenchantment and anger. 
Long before the historic sum-
mit and the presidential election 
P U R I F Y I N G  T H E  B O DY  






campaign, a new generation of polit-
ical activists had begun arguing that 
cross-Strait trade and exchanges ben-
efitted ordinary people in Taiwan far 
less than they did the KMT’s own crony 
networks of political and business in-
terests. As discussed in the 2014 Year-
book, the Anti-Media Monopoly Move-
ment, which began in mid-2012 and 
gained momentum in the second half 
of that year, campaigned successful-
ly against the concentration of media 
ownership in Taiwan in the hands of 
the pro-Chinese businessperson Tsai 
Eng-meng 蔡衍明. 
In 2014, student activists of the 
Sunflower Movement occupied the 
Legislative Yuan to protest against a 
bilateral agreement that would have 
given Chinese commercial interests 
access to key areas of Taiwan’s econo-
my including the media, banking, and 
education. The protesters claimed that 
the agreement would have afforded 
mainland China undue influence over 
Taiwan’s social and cultural life and 
that this would ultimately undermine 
Taiwan’s democratic system and free-
doms. 
The results of county and mu-
nicipal elections in November 2014 
showed that the concerns expressed 
by the student activists were widely 
shared. The KMT lost the mayorships 
of every major city bar one, and follow-
ing that election the entire cabinet of 
the Taiwanese government resigned. 
The KMT’s heavy defeats not only be-
stowed formal democratic legitimacy 
on the position of anti-KMT activists 
but also enabled the DPP to capitalise 
on voter sentiment to build an unstop-
pable momentum through 2015.
Students mobilised again in July 
2015 to protest changes to high school 
history textbooks proposed by the Min-
istry of Education. The protesters were 
angered by changes to the language 
and terminology with which the text-
books discussed key events in Taiwan’s 
history, such as the period of Japanese 
colonial rule (1895–1945). They said 
that these changes both over-empha-
sised Taiwan’s Chinese identity and 
reintroduced the style of education 
that characterised Taiwanese educa-











































tion in the authoritarian era of Chiang 
Kai-shek and his immediate successors 
(1949–1987).
During the campaign for the 
2016 presidential election, the KMT 
presidential candidate Eric Chu 朱立
倫, the chairman of the KMT, placed 
Taiwan’s relationship with mainland 
China at the centre of his presidential 
campaign. Chu said that the KMT had 
created a stable basis for Taiwan’s re-
lationship with the Mainland, which, 
he argued, afforded Taiwan the best 
prospects for long-term prosperity and 
peace. 
Tsai Ing-wen conversely em-
phasised the DPP’s focus on domestic 
issues, noting in particular the poor 
state of Taiwan’s economy, wage stag-
nation, and housing affordability. She 
also called for better environmental 
protection and a culture of innovation. 
She attacked the KMT for its ineffective 
domestic governance, using examples 
such as the tainted cooking oil scandal 
in late 2014, in which food company 
Chang Guann 強冠企業 was found to 
have adulterated cooking oil with re-
cycled oil and other substitutes.
Tsai avoided, as much as possible, 
being drawn into a clear position on 
Taiwan’s relations with mainland Chi-
na. Rather, she stressed that Taiwan 
has a unique iden-




She pledged to 
manage cross-
Strait relations in 
accordance with 
the Constitution of 
the Republic of China and thereby 
accommodating a key demand from 
Beijing. At the same time, her empha-
sis on domestic issues of deep con-
cern to voters implicitly criticised the 
KMT’s approach to relations with Chi-
na as well as the notion advanced by 
the KMT that closer links to the Main-
land represented a positive future for 
Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s economy slipped into 
recession in late 2015 as campaigning 
for the presidential election reached 
fever pitch. Party figures on both sides 
threw inflammatory statements and 
slurs against their opponents. Senior 
KMT figure Chiu Yi 邱毅 accused Tsai 
Ing-wen of illegally profitting from a 
real estate deal in the 1990s. The DPP 
responded by publicising Chiu Yi’s ex-
tensive land holdings and financial in-
terests. The election rallies grew ever 















































HUANG AN’S WITCH HUNT FOR TAIWANESE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS, 
by Lorand Laskai
In the lead-up to the Taiwanese presidential 
election, the fifty-four-year old Taiwanese 
singer Huang An 黄安 (best known for his 
1993 pop hit New Dream for a Pair of But-
terflies 新鸳鸯蝴蝶梦) launched a personal 
campaign to expose supporters of Taiwan-
ese independence 台独份, particularly in 
Taiwan’s entertainment industry, and re-
port them 举报 over Weibo to Chinese au-
thorities. Huang An’s music career initially 
took off in Taiwan, where he was born. Yet 
like many Taiwanese artists, he found a far 
larger market for his work on the Mainland. Unlike a number of other Taiwanese artists 
and entertainers who perform in mainland China and make a conscious decision to un-
derplay any personal politics that would be controversial there—pro-independence views, 
for example—Huang sings in harmony with the Communist Party’s adamant opposition to 
Taiwanese independence.
Huang’s one-man Weibo campaign started in earnest in late September 2015, 
when Chung Yu-chen 钟屿晨, a politically-minded twenty-four-year-old Taiwanese 
businesswoman, posted a status update on her Facebook page after returning from a 
business trip to the Mainland. In it, she joked about taking mainlanders’ money and using 
it to strengthen the cause of independence. Prickly Chinese netizens expressed anger, but 
Huang went a step further. The singer dredged up and posted information about Chung’s 
company and the Xiamen-based state-owned enterprise with which it was co-operating, 
and tagged relevant government agencies on Weibo. Soon after, Huang posted a picture 
of himself outside the gate of Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office 国台办 holding up a sign with 
the words ‘I am anti-Taiwanese independence, not anti-Taiwan’ 我是反台独，不是反台湾 
scrawled across it. 
On 20 November, Huang reported on Taiwanese singer Crowd Lu 卢广仲,  divulging  
online that the artist, who had been slated to perform at a music festival in Dongguan, 
had joined the opposition to a controversial service trade agreement with China in 2014. 
Huang explained that he had originally withheld this information lest he ruin the young 
Huang An
Photo: chinesepress.com
artist’s career, but had changed his mind: ‘I have only one reason for reporting you [to the 
authorities]: Taiwanese Independence! Crowd Lu, my little friend, why force yourself to go 
sell your voice in a place you oppose, protest against, disdain and raise your voice against 
for “suppressing Taiwan’s nationhood?” ’ 我举报他的理由只有一条：台独！广仲小朋友，何必勉
强自己去你反对、抗议、不屑、呛声、‘打压台湾国’的地方卖声呢? The artist dropped out of the 
music festival and has not toured in the Mainland since. 
A profile of Huang published around the same time reported that he had become 
‘obsessed’ with the ‘report’ function on his Weibo and spent all his time ‘before sleep, 
on the road, and even on the toilet’ trawling Weibo for signs of Taiwanese independence 
sympathizers. Once, in the span of a few minutes, Huang reported five people and received 
a system error notification: ‘your reports exceed normal frequency, please wait five 
minutes then try again.’
Huang An’s next two high-profile targets were TV host and comedian NONO 陳宣裕 
and pop singer Chou Tzu-Yu 周子瑜. NONO, apparently an old friend of Huang, provoked 
Huang’s anger after he voiced his support for an independence-leaning legislative candi-
date in his hometown. Huang reported NONO and the comedian cancelled an upcoming 
TV appearance in the mainland. Chou Tzu-Yu unwittingly entered Huang’s sights after she 
held up a Taiwanese flag during a performance with her international K-pop group TWICE 
on South Korean television. Huang railed against the sixteen-year-old singer on Weibo, and 
called for a boycott of her music, leading a series of mainland TV programs and venues to 
cancel performances. 
With Chou, Huang An finally seemed to go too far. On 
15 January 2016, the eve of the Taiwanese election, Chou’s 
talent agency released a video of the young singer reading a 
scripted apology. ‘There is only one China ... and I am proud 
to consider myself thoroughly Chinese,’ the teary-eyed singer 
said. Taiwanese society reacted with disgust: legislators 
called for an inquiry into revoking Huang’s Taiwanese 
citizenship and KTV parlors on the island boycotted his 
music. Observers have ascribed the large voter turnout for 
independence-leaning candidates on election day in part to 














































concerts. The campaigning received 
non-stop and frequently emotive and 
hyperbolic coverage from Taiwan’s 
twenty-four-hour cable news media.
When election day dawned, Tai-
wanese citizens cast their votes and at 
the end of the day the process of vote 
counting began. In contrast to the rau-
cousness of campaigning, vote count-
ing at the end of an election day in Tai-
wan is a solemn and formal process. 
School classrooms commonly serve 
as polling stations, with local teachers 
acting as tellers and counters. When 
the voting concludes, the large yellow 
ballot boxes, emblazoned with the flag 
of the Republic of China, are unlocked, 
their broad paper seals torn, and a tell-
er pulls out the large voting slips one at 
a time. A second holds it aloft in both 
hands and calls out the voter’s choice. 
At the blackboard, a third repeats the 
result and records it as a line on the 
long strip of paper dedicated to that 
candidate, each five lines forming the 
complete character zheng 正. This style 
of counting is widely used in shops and 
restaurants across the Chinese-speak-
ing world but zheng, which means 
correct, exact or orthodox, acquires a 
special importance in this context. A 
fourth counter takes the ballot paper, 
checks it off, and stacks it. 
At the other end of the classroom, 
representatives of the political parties 
and Central Election Commission offi-
cials watch carefully. If there is a mis-
count, a shout goes up and the process 
stops. The ballot paper is examined 
and an election official notes the error. 
Local police are on hand, and some-
times individuals and families known 
to the scrutineers will wander into 
the classroom to observe the process. 
When all the votes are counted, the 
scrutineers examine the empty ballot 
boxes and the final tally is made. The 
election officials then phone in the re-
sults to the main election tally room 
of the Central Election Commission in 
Taipei. The CEC takes over a large hall 
on the Taiwan Police College campus, 
where hundreds of journalists, politi-
cians, and observers gather to watch 
huge screens broadcasting the results. 
The counting of the votes in Tai-
wan has the quality of a rite. The prac-
tice of counting becomes a series of 
formalised repeated motions as the 






tellers, while the uttered declarations 
of the ballots are like a secular liturgy 
of versicle and response. 
In the Chinese worldview, rites, 
or li 禮 are a central part of the many 
lineages of thought and practice that 
make up the Chinese world, including 
Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. 
The classical Confucian text the Li Ji 禮
記 or Book of Rites, one of the Five Clas-
sics of the Confucian canon, prescribes 
ritual practices and describes their 
moral, social, and political value. 
Rites are one of the ways political 
power, the social order, morality, and 
cosmology are understood as all inter-
connected. They establish the social 
regulation of behaviour as the foun-
dation of power and order. Through 
rites, an individual knows the correct 
behaviour for their place and time in 
society. In that knowledge, he or she 
is able to see beyond the disorder of 
everyday life to a higher and enduring 
social order. Rites, with their requisite 
seriousness and forbearance, afford 
participants an experience of things 
being put right and in this momentary 
symbolic rectification of everyday de-
viations people can entertain the pros-
pect of an ideal, or even orthodox and 
transcendent social order.




For the Taiwanese, the ritualised 
way in which their votes are counted, 
with every one of twelve million 
ballot papers held aloft and declared 
out loud, is an enduring expression 
of social and political ideals that they 
continue to observe above the noise of 
party politics and vociferous political 
activism. The public declaration of 
the political will of each individual 
member of Taiwanese society is 
intrinsic to how the Taiwanese have 
come to understand democracy as an 
orthodox social and political order.
In 2016, after the counting of 
the votes delivered victory to Tsai 
and the DPP, their supporters were 
jubilant and tearful. The KMT’s 
Eric Chu bowed grim-faced after 
conceding defeat. In her victory 
speech, Tsai said: ‘the people want 
to see a government more willing to 
listen to the people, a government 
that is more transparent and 
accountable, and a government that 
is more capable of leading us past our 
current challenges and taking care of 
those in need.’
But Tsai and the DPP face a con-
tracting economy and a belligerent 
Beijing. One of her greatest challeng-
es may be to manage expectations 
within her party and among young 
student activists as she makes the in-
evitable compromises of governance. 
There is nothing to suggest that the 
Tsai era will be less rancorous than 
the Ma era. However, just as Taiwan’s 
body politic judged the KMT unfit to 
rule on election day in 2016, in four 
years Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will 
face a similar ritual when the Tai-
wanese voters renew their commit-





































































C H R O N O L O G Y
2015 
1 January:  China’s updated Environ-
mental Protection Law comes into 
effect. The law emphasises the impor-
tance of transparency and for the first 
time imposes daily penalty fines for 
polluters that exceed their permitted 
quota of emissions. Most notably, the 
new law gives certain Chinese envi-
ronmental NGOs the right to bring en-
vironmental public interest lawsuits 
against polluters. Two environmental 
NGOs do so on the day the law goes 
into effect. 
6 January: The Ministry of Agriculture 
announces a plan to nearly double the 
farmland devoted to cultivating pota-
toes by 2020 as part of an effort to en-
sure food security. 
29 January: Education Minister Yuan 
Guiren 袁贵仁 calls for vigilant ‘ideo-
logical management’ in order to keep 
Western values and other perceived 
threats to the CCP out of classrooms.
16 February: The Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) investi-
gation into Su Rong 苏荣, vice-chairman 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference (CPPCC) and former 
party chief for three provinces, con-
cludes that he ‘violated organisational 


























discipline’ and ‘used his position of 
power to seek gain for others’. He is 
expelled from the Party, a ‘big tiger’ in 
terms of the anti-corruption campaign.
28 February: Former investigative 
journalist Chai Jing 柴静 releases Un-
der the Dome, a documentary on pol-
lution in China which garners over 300 
million views online within two weeks 
but is blocked within a week by cen-
sors, who also prohibit mention of it in 
Chinese media.  
6 March:  Five women activists, Li 
Tingting 李婷婷, Wu Rongrong 武嵘嵘, 
Zheng Churan 郑楚然, Wei Tingting 韦
婷婷, and Wang Man 王曼, are arrested 
for ‘picking quarrels and stirring up 
trouble’ on the eve of a planned pub-
lic campaign to raise awareness about 
sexual harassment on public transpor-
tation. The ‘Feminist Five’ become a 
global cause célèbre. On 27 April, the 
five women are released on bail. 
16 March: CCTV America releases ‘The 
13 What’, an English-language propa-
ganda video explaining the Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan to a foreign audience, 
becomes a minor online sensation. 
Unlike most propaganda aimed at the 
outside, the video is light-hearted and 
witty. Media inquires reveal that a 
Western PR company was involved in 
the production. 
20 March: Chinese media celebrates 
the detention of Xu Gang 徐钢, the 
vice governor of Fujian, as the ‘Nine-
ty-ninth tiger’ to fall since the Eight-
eenth Party Congress. 
1 April: The People’s Daily publishes 
an op-ed dismissing warnings that a 
bubble, fuelled by marginal financing, 
might be forming in China’s stock mar-
kets, telling investors ‘4000 points is 
just the beginning’. 
30 April: The Politburo formally en-
dorses the Jing-Jin-Ji Co-operative De-
velopment Outline Plan for the Bei-
jing-Tianjin-Hebei region 京津冀协同
发展规划纲要.
5 May: The National People’s Congress 
(NPC) releases the second draft of the 
Foreign/Overseas Non-Governmental 
Organisations Management Law of the 
People’s Republic of China. The draft 
proposes stringent controls over for-
eign non-governmental organisations, 
including foundations and universi-
ties.
18 May:  The Communist Party con-
venes the first national United Front 
work conference in nine years. During 
his speech, Xi calls on Party officials to 
‘befriend’ non-Communist Party intel-
lectuals and bridge the divide between 
other parts of society and the Commu-
nist Party.
19 May: During a joint meeting of Chi-
na’s national security agencies, Presi-
dent Xi Jinping 习近平 calls for ‘abso-
lute loyalty’ to the Communist Party 
as a necessary condition for national 
defence. 
1 June:  Beijing municipality rolls out 
a strict anti-smoking law that prohibits 
smoking in public, including in restau-
rants, offices and on public transport, 
imposing steep fines on offenders. 
Highlighting the government’s new 
tough stance on smoking, the provi-
sion’s successful enforcement is care-
fully monitored by authorities, and 
state media signals the law could be 
rolled out nationwide in the near fu-
ture. 
1 June: The Yangtze River cruise ship 
the Eastern Star 东方之星 capsizes 
in fifteen-metre-deep water in Jianli 
County, Hubei Province, killing 442 
people.
11 June: Former head of China’s state 
security Zhou Yongkang 周永康 is 
sentenced to life in prison for abuse 
of power and bribery during a closed-
door trial, marking the first time 
a former member of the Politburo 
Standing Committee is convicted of 
corruption-related charges. State me-
dia heralds the fall of a major ‘tiger’ 
and suggests the corruption drive is 
entering a new stage. 
16 June: Share prices on China’s stock 
exchanges drop, triggering a series of 
extreme market fluctuations that de-
stroy trillions of renminbi (RMB) in 
wealth before the end of the summer. 
1 July:  Yang Jisheng 杨继绳, a former 
Xinhua journalist and the celebrated 
author of Tombstone (about the three-
year famine from 1958–1961), is forced 
to step down as editor-in chief of the 
embattled liberal magazine Yanhuang 
C hunqiu. 
9 July: A two-month crackdown on 
human right lawyers begins with the 
detention of Zhou Shifeng  周世锋 and 
Wang Yu 王宇 of the Beijing Fengrui 
Law Firm 北京锋锐律师事务所. By the 
end of August, public security officials 
have detained over 250 lawyers and le-

























16 July: Months after authorities 
launch an Internet anti-porn cam-
paign, a video of a young Chinese cou-
ple having sex in a Uniqlo fitting room 
in Beijing goes viral ocin WeChat and 
Sina WeChat. Police detain four people 
in connection with the video, but not 
before the video becomes a cultural 
sensation, inspiring t-shits and fan vis-
its to the Beijing Uniqlo where it was 
shot. 
2 August: Nearly a thousand Taiwan-
ese turn out to protest ‘China-centric’ 
changes to the high school curriculum 
in Taiwan. The protest started on 24 
July with a break-in to the Ministry of 
Education by thirty protestors, many 
of them high school students. 
12 August: Two explosions at the port 
of Tianjin create a fireball visible from 
miles away and are strong enough to 
register as seismic activity by China’s 
national earthquake centre. The acci-
dent, caused by illegal storage of dan-
gerous chemicals at a nearby ware-
house, kills 173 people. 
24 August: Shanghai’s main share 
index loses 8.49 percent of its value, 
leading Xinhua to dub the day ‘Black 
Monday’.
25 August: Ken Liu’s translation of Liu 
Cixin’s 刘慈欣 The Three Body Prob-
lem 三体 wins the international Hugo 
Award for best science fiction, becom-
ing the first Chinese science fiction 
novel to win the prestigious prize.
25 August: Police detain Caijing fi-
nancial reporter Wang Xiaolu 王晓璐
for an article he published on 20 July, 
in which he suggested the China Se-
curities and Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) might stop propping up share 
prices. On 31 August, CCTV airs footage 
of Wang apologising for ‘spreading ru-
mours’ and adding his ‘own subjective 
judgment’ to the report.
3 September: The Chinese govern-
ment holds a large military parade, 
showcasing China’s military might 
along Tiananmen’s Chang’an Avenue 
to commemorate the nation’s victory 
over Japan. Billed as an internation-
al celebration of the world’s triumph 
over fascism, it is attended by heads 
of state from twenty-nine countries, 
including Russia and South Korea. A 
number of other world leaders, wary 
of the parade’s militaristic overtones, 
stay away. In China, the parade is 
nonetheless a major propaganda coup 
for the Party-state at a time of econom-
ic uncertainty. 
8 September: China marks the fifti-
eth anniversary of the Tibet Autono-
mous Region (TAR) 西藏自治區 with 
a massive public celebration. Politbu-
ro Standing Committee member Yu 
Zhengsheng 俞正声 oversees the cel-
ebration, stressing the importance of 
inter-ethnic harmony and economic 
development.  
21 September: Authorities announce 
the launch of a national emissions 
trading system in 2017.
23 September: Xi Jinping meets with 
American business executives in Seat-
tle before heading to Washington DC to 
meet with President Obama. After two 
days in DC, he flies to New York City 
to deliver a speech at the UN General 
Assembly, in which he pledges US$100 
million in aid to the African Union. 
5 October: Tu Youyou 屠呦呦 becomes 
the first Chinese national to win a No-
bel Prize in Medicine for her work on 
the discovery of artemisinin and its 
use in the treatment of malaria.
10 October: Politburo Standing Com-
mittee member Liu Yunshan 刘云山 
visits North Korea for the seventieth 
anniversary of the ruling Worker’s 
Party in an attempt to reset relations 
after a period during which relations 
between the Kim regime and Beijing 
had been turbulent. 
15 October: State media releases the 
transcript of President Xi Jinping’s 
speech on cultural production at ‘Fo-
rum on Art and Literature’ that had 
been delivered the previous year. Of-
ficials are told to diligently study the 
speech and state media draws par-
allels to Mao Zedong’s 1942 talks on 
the same subject, which guided state 
cultural policy for nearly forty years 
after. 
17 October: A hundred days before 
Taiwan’s general election, and in light 
of strong anti-China sentiment among 
voters, the governing Nationalist Party 
recalls its hardline presidential can-
didate, Hung Hsiu-chu 洪秀柱, who 
called for closer relations—and pos-
sible unification—with mainland Chi-
na. Hung’s replacement is New Taipei 
Mayor Eric Chu 朱立倫.
19 October: Xi Jinping and Peng Liyu-
an 彭丽媛 receive a royal welcome dur-
ing their state visit to the UK, the first 
of a Chinese president to the UK since 
2005. Both sides herald the trip as the 
start of a ‘golden age’ in Sino-British 








some British commentators criticise 
the Cameron government for not put-
ting human rights on the agenda.  
21 October: The CCP releases a revised 
disciplinary code, which for the first 
time applies to all CCP members. It 
bans the playing of golf and emphasis-
es moral conduct.
27 October: The US destroyer, USS 
Lassen, passes close by the China-con-
trolled Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands 
in a ‘Freedom of Navigation Opera-
tions’ (FONOP). China calls the move a 
‘deliberate provocation’. 
29 October: Two environmental NGOs, 
Friends of Nature and Fujian Green 
Home, win China’s first-ever environ-
mental public interest lawsuit, against 
an illegal mining operation in Fujian. 
2 November: The editor of the Xinjiang 
Daily, Zhao Xinwei 赵新慰 is removed 
from his post and expelled from the 
Party for ‘improperly’ discussing gov-
ernment policy towards Xinjiang.
7 November: President Xi Jinping 
meets Taiwan President and head of 
the Nationalist Party, Ma Ying-Jeou 
马英九 in Singapore, the first face-to-
face meeting of leaders from main-
land China and Taiwan since 1949. 
The highly choreographed meeting 
provides memorable images for both 
international and domestic media, but 
results in no substantial breakthrough 
in cross-strait relations. Taiwanese 
media criticise President Ma—who is, 
functionally, a lame duck president—
for taking the trip in the first place. 
18 November: The Islamic State exe-
cutes Chinese national Fan Jinghui 樊
京辉, posting photos online, and spark-
ing an outpouring of grief and anger in 
China. President Xi Jinping and China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi 王
毅 promise justice for the victim in 
strongly-worded statements. 
26 November: The Beijing municipal 
government announces that the city 
will cap its population at twenty-three 
million.  
8 December: The Beijing municipality 
issues its first ‘red alert’ for air pollu-
tion since the introduction of the en-
vironmental emergency response in 
late 2013. A red alert places temporary 
restrictions on the city’s cars, facto-



















14 December: Jack Ma’s 马云 Alib-
aba announces that it will buy the 
South China Morning Post, Hong 
Kong’s premier English-language pa-
per, for US$266 million. In an inter-
view with The New York Times, Ma’s 
second-in-command, Joseph Tsai 蔡 
崇信, vowed to preserve the SCMP’s 
editorial independence, though he 
said he looks forward to more news 
reporting that will provide ‘the Chi-
nese perspective’. 
16 December: Chinese officials, for-
eign dignitaries and tech industry 
leaders meet in Wuzhen, Zhejiang for 
the Second World Internet Conference. 
In his keynote address, President Xi 
Jinping outlines China’s vision for 
strict and broad Internet governance 
and ‘rectification’互联整理. 
22 December: Human rights lawyer 
Pu Zhiqiang 浦志强 is given a suspend-
ed three-year sentence for ‘picking 
quarrels and inciting ethnic hatred’. 
Pu was detained the previous May for 
posting criticism of government offi-
cials and China’s policy in Tibet and 
Xinjiang on Weibo.  
25 December:  President Xi posts his 
very first Weibo message while con-
ducting a media tour of the People’s 
Liberation Army Daily. 
25 December: The Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank (AIIB) opens for 
business, with thirty-seven regional 
and twenty non-regional Prospective 
Founding Members (PFM). The bank 
has a founding capital of US$100 bil-
lion, equivalent to two-thirds of the cap-
ital of the Asian Development Bank and 
nearly half that of the World Bank. It is 
the first significant multilateral lender 
dominated by a developing country.
27 December: The National People’s 
Congress adopts the two-child policy, 
a major change to the country’s strin-
gent family planning policy which had 
imposed, with some exceptions, a one-
child limit on most families for almost 
four decades. 
28 December: China passes its first an-
ti-domestic violence law.  
30 December:  Lee Bo 李波, a Hong 
Kong bookseller, is seen pushed into a 
minivan while delivering a book order. 
He is next heard from days later, when 
he telephones his wife to say that he 
had to go to Shenzhen for urgent busi-








Department has no record of Lee’s de-
parture, which suggests an abduction. 
Lee is one of five people associated 
with the publishing house Mighty Cur-
rent which specialises in scandalous 
accounts of the private lives of Party 
leaders, all of whom were abducted by 
mainland authorities between October 
and December. 
2016
1 January: China’s two-child policy 
goes into effect. 
8 January: Chinese security officials 
acknowledge that they have detained 
Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo. The 
message, sent to Hong Kong Police, 
was just nine words, and contained no 
other details.
17 January: Voters in Taiwan elect Tsai 
Ing-wen 蔡英文 of the pro-independ-
ence Democratic Progressive People’s 
Party as their president. China reacts 
swiftly and negatively to her election. 
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned 
that it would treat Taiwan as an issue 
of national sovereignty and oppose 
any move towards independence. She 
voices a commitment to maintaining 
the status quo and ensuring peace.
17 March: The Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan (2016–2020) is formally adopted 
by the annual plenary session of the 
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PREVIOUS CHINA STORY YEARBOOKS
2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse 
The authors of Red Rising, Red Eclipse survey China’s 
regional posture, urban change, social activism and law, 
human rights and economics, the Internet, history and 
thought. This inaugural China Story Yearbook offers an 
informed perspective on recent developments in China 
and provides a context for understanding ongoing issues 
that will resonate far beyond the Dragon Year of  
2012–2013. 
2013: Civilising China  
As China becomes wealthier and more confident on 
the global stage, it also expects to be respected and 
accommodated as a major global force—and as a 
formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis of 
China’s regional posture, urban change, social activism 
and law, mores, the Internet, history and thought—in 
which the concept of ‘civilising’ plays a prominent role—
China Story Yearbook 2013 offers insights into the country 
today and its dreams for the future.
2014: Shared Destiny 
The People’s Republic of China under the leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party and its ‘Chairman of 
Everything’, Xi Jinping, has declared that it shares in the 
destiny of the countries of the Asia and Pacific region, as 
well as of nations that are part of an intertwined national 
self-interest. The China Story Yearbook 2014 takes the 
theme of Shared Destiny 共同命运 and considers it in the 
context of China’s current and future potential.
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